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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to detennine what constitutes desirable Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) policies for the state in the age of globalisation. The study begins with 
the realistic assumption that FDI has variable effects on host economies, and that 
multinational corporations (MNCs) are fundamentally national finns doing business 
internationally. This assessment of FDI reflects the needs of government efforts to 
increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs in order to maximise the positive 
effects of FDI while minimising its negative effects. Based on this view, I develop a 
theoretical framework, namely the N eo Bargaining Model (NBM) , and identify the 
factors that have an impact on government bargaining power. The model is applied to 
the Korean state and produces the following findings that: (1) the bargaining power of 
the Korean state has diminished constantly over time; (2) the Korean state's bargaining 
power has been affected by internal factors (the decline of the developmental state) and 
external factors (the progress of globalisation); and (3) the bargaining power of the state 
affects its bargaining outcomes. Finally, these findings enabled me to argue that: (1) the 
state must have strong bargaining power in order to attain more beneficial effects and 
less hannful consequences from the MNCs; (2) in order to increase the bargaining 
power of the state, an active role of the state in the market is required; and (3) lastly, the 
NBM suggests ways for the state to increase its bargaining power, which are the key for 
successful FDI policy in the global era. 
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Introduction 
1. Research Questions 
We currently live in a global era in which it is usually assumed that states have no 
alternative but to don the 'Golden Straitjacket' (Friedman 1999: 104).1 Globalisation is 
argued to lead to a convergence of national policies toward a 'race to the bottom' in 
which states enter into intense global competition by sacrificing domestic interests 
(Drezner 2001). It is assumed that states open their markets unquestioningly and 
liberalise their regulations in order to avoid missing out on the ever-expanding trend 
towards further globalisation. More states seem to become increasingly neo-liberal and 
competitive, involved in greater deregulation and liberalisation, and less able to act 
strategically or developmentally (Cerny 2000). Industrial policy and state intervention 
are now regarded as having been rendered obsolete by globalisation. 
One of the main pressures on national policy options comes from the mobility 
and size of capital flows. Capital has become increasingly mobile and is seeking the 
locations where it can earn the highest return. Simultaneously, states are compelled to 
compete to capture this footloose capital for their economic prosperity and are forced to 
lower regulatory standards to attract it. Intensifying competition among states is putting 
pressure on governments to relinquish their bargaining power to multinational 
corporations (.MNCs); this growing predominance of capital over state is likely to 
continue in the future as globalisation deepens (Stopford and Strange 1991, Strange 
1996). If this is the case, (1) will states necessarily be dominated by expanding foreign 
I Friedman (1995: 104) likens the spread of the neoliberal economy to donning a 'Golden Straitjacket'. 
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capital? (2) Are there any ways to enhance the bargaining power of states vis-a-vis 
multinational corporations? This study takes these questions as its starting point. 
This thesis shall examine the specific relations between foreign MNCs and the 
South Korean government since 1962? In particular this study will focus on foreign 
MNCs in the manufacturing sector due to its significance in the industrialisation of the 
Korean economy. The study shows that the Korean state had lost bargaining power vis-
a-vis foreign MNCs over time and will identify the factors that have weakened the 
bargaining power of the state and thus present the key to restoring the state's power. The 
study suggests that if the developmental prospects for the Korean economy could be 
significantly enhanced, the state could regain its bargaining power. It is suggested that 
claims of the discard of the developmental state are premature and that a return to some 
form of developmentalism needs to be reconsidered. 
In order to make this case, the thesis shall draw upon, and bring together, two 
complementary literatures - which have previously existed largely in isolation from 
each other. First, a revised bargaining model will be produced that can adequately 
characterise the bargaining relations and outcomes between MNCs and the Korean state. 
This develops a fresh insight by building upon previous models and is termed a 'Neo 
Bargaining Model' of state-MNC relations. Second, one aspect of the literature of the 
developmental state is drawn upon and integrated into the model. The result, it is hoped, 
will produce a fresh analysis both of the state and economy and of state-MNC relations 
which will help us understand how the economy can be enhanced through globalisation. 
Korea is chosen as the focus for the study as it provides not only an excellent 
example of rapid development, but also because it was the principal East Asian state to 
2 Unless otherwise noted, 'Korea' indicates South Korea hereafter. 
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be affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The developmental state model. even 
though discredited by the 1997 crisis, has been responsible for the miraculous rise of 
East Asia (Amsden 1989, Evans 1995, Weiss and Hobson 1995, Chang 1996, World 
Bank 1997).3 Since the region has supplied the principal models of the developmental 
state it makes sense to examine one of the leading examples. Moreover, the case of 
Korea provides a perfect comparison between pre-crisis developmental state and post-
crisis neo-liberal state, demonstrating entirely different state attitudes to foreign capital 
in the two periods. 
This study takes a longitudinal approach describing the dynamic changes in the 
Korean state. The period to be examined starts from 1962, when Korea's first inward 
investment occurred, and ends in 2005, which is the latest year for which statistical data 
is available. This period will be subdivided into three eras in terms of state-MNC 
relations: (1) the state over market (SOM) phase from 1962 to 1979; (2) the transition 
phase from 1980 to 1997; and (3) the market over state (MOS) phase from 1998 to 2005. 
Korea in the SOM phase was a typical model of a developmental state which dictated 
market forces including foreign capital. In this period, state initiatives manipulated 
businesses to achieve pre-determined goals. However, from 1980, when the transition 
phase began, the developmental state started to wane; market forces challenged state 
power and the state began to find it more difficult to dominate business, labour and 
foreign capital. This was an evolutionary period to another stage of economic 
development. After the crisis of 1997, the Korean state was reshaped to conform more 
to neo-liberal ideals as a result of both external and internal pressures. In the MOS 
3 There has been an on-going debate between neo-classical orthodoxy and developmental theorists on the 
background to the economic success of East Asian Countries. For more details about this debate, see 
Chapter One. 
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phase, when market forces outflanked state power, the state appeared to have lost its 
developmental determination and capacity.4 In particular, its approach to foreign capital 
changed totally from one of strict control to one of active promotion. This study will 
analyse the bargaining power of the state in the SOM and MOS periods, highlighting 
the stark contrast in the relationships between the state and market. Through the analysis 
of both periods, the extent of bargaining power of both phases will be compared and the 
relations between bargaining power and bargaining outcomes calculated. 
This research is primarily concerned with the host country's bargaining power in 
relation to its foreign direct investment (FDI) policy because it is assumed that not all 
FDI has a positive effect on host countries. The assumption is drawn from the inherent 
differences in the respective motivations of governments and MNCs; governments seek 
to promote development within a national context whereas MNCs seek to increase their 
competitiveness in an international context (UNCTAD 1999: 154-155). Thus, not all 
FDI is always and automatically in the best interests of host countries; that is, a 
universal and beneficial result from FDI on all economies cannot be expected. 
Historically, the effects of FDI have been interpreted in two different ways: the benign 
model and the malign model (Moran 1999: 19-21), which means that FDI can have both 
a positive and a negative impact. Whether the impact of FDI is positive or negative is 
greatly affected by the consequences of bargaining between host governments and 
MNCs (Grosse and Behrman 1990). When the bargaining power of the host government 
is strong, it can select investor firms that will best serve its purposes, but when its 
bargaining power is weak, it has to make efforts to be selected as a location by the 
4 According to Chang et a/ (1998) and Shin and Chang (2003), the Korean developmental state started to 
wane from the late 1980s, was dismantled from the mid-1990s, and was reconstructed according to 
neoliberal ideals after the financial crisis in 1997. 
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potential investor. When the bargaining power of the host government is strong~ it can 
not only attract higher levels of FDI but it can also maximise the net contribution made 
by MNCs to development. However, when the bargaining power of the host government 
is weak, not only is the ability to attract FDI weak, but also its beneficial impact may be 
questionable. In this respect, strengthening the bargaining power of the host government 
increasingly becomes a crucial element in development, as FDI plays a greater role in 
national economies. 
In this thesis, an examination of the shifts in the bargaining power of the Korean 
government vis-a.-vis foreign manufacturing companies during the four decades covered 
by the study will highlight the factors affecting the host country's bargaining power. An 
analysis of the relationship between the Korean government's bargaining power and the 
bargaining outcomes allows us to answer the question of how the state increases its 
bargaining power in the globalizing world. This thesis seeks to address the three 
following questions regarding the state-MNC relationship in Korea throughout the 
chapters: (1) how has the Korean state's bargaining power vis-a.-vis MNCs changed? (2) 
What factors have weakened or strengthened its bargaining power? (3) What are the 
consequences of the fluctuations in the state's bargaining power? Then, based on the 
findings of these questions, we answer two general questions above, that is, (1) will 
states necessarily be dominated by expanding foreign capital? (2) Are there any ways to 
enhance the bargaining power of states vis-a-vis multinational corporations? 
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2. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis, which consists of five parts, is structured in the following way. The first 
chapter reviews the literature relating to the relationship between governments and 
MNCs in general and bargaining theory in particular. Based on existing bargaining 
models, a theoretical framework for analysing the bargaining relationships between host 
countries and MNCs, the 'Neo Bargaining Model (NBM)' , is developed. This model 
will offer a novel framework for analysing state-MNC relations. A brief overview of the 
Korean economy in the second chapter divides the whole period into three phases and 
sets the economic background for the chapters. In Chapter Three, Korea's bargaining 
power is analysed by applying the NBM and the questions of how the Korean 
government's bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs has shifted and what factors have 
affected its bargaining power are addressed. Chapter Four illustrates the arguments 
made in Chapter Three by analysing statistical data relating to FDI activity in Korea and 
describing particular bargaining cases between the Korean government and MNCs. 
Chapter Five analyses how bargaining outcomes have changed according to the shifts in 
the bargaining power of the Korean government in legal aspects. Finally, drawing 
together the arguments of this thesis, the findings and implications of the study are 
presented. 
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3. Methodology 
This thesis employs both qualitative and quantitative approaches; the qualitative method 
being used in Chapter Three and Chapter Five and both approaches being employed in 
Chapters Four. Chapter Three, in which the bargaining model is applied to the Korean 
government, uses a qualitative approach that relies mainly on secondary evidence and 
scholarly accounts of Korean political economy. The secondary literature is 
supplemented by a variety of government documents and statistical evidence. The NBM 
basically consists of three dimensions: bargaining resources; stakes; and constraints. 
However, there are problems in trying to assess the level of importance of each factor in 
the model; while some aspects can be judged by quantifiable criteria (such as the level 
of resources) most of the elements in the model difficult to measure quantitatively 
(including the level of stakes and constraints). Hence, an assessment of the level of 
importance of each factor of the government's bargaining power must necessarily be 
based largely on qualitative judgements, a methodology used by Loewendahl (2001), 
Stoever (2002) and Grosse (2005). 
Chapter Four illustrates the arguments made in the preceding chapter by 
employing both qualitative and quantitative methods: case studies and statistical 
analysis. Case studies and statistical analysis have both advantages and disadvantages: 
although case studies enable us to have an in-depth insight into the bargaining process 
and the influential factors in each case, they are difficult to generalise. In contrast, a 
statistical approach offers generalised results but is limited in terms of insight into the 
specific dynamics of the relationships. By employing both approaches, the limitations of 
both methods can be minimised. The data for analysis are mainly obtained from the 
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Korean Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Energy (MOCIE) and Invest Korea, which 
is Korea's investment promotion agency (IPA).5 Cases are selected from both the SOM 
and MOS periods to display clear differences in state-MNC relations. Chapter Five 
employs qualitative approaches; the core methodology in its analysis ofFDI policy is an 
examination of Korean laws regarding FDI. 
The romanisation of Korean words in this study follows in principle the Revised 
Romanisation of Korean system, which is the official romanisation system for the 
Korean language. 6 The new system is similar to the older system, the McCune-
Reischauer system, but eliminates diacritics and is more closely based on Korean 
phonology than on western perceptions of Korean phonetics (for instance, Seoul instead 
of Soul). Korean names are given with the family name first, followed by the given 
names, and are romanised using the official Korean government system. However 
where names that are romanised under other systems are well-established in the 
literature, these versions are used, such as Park Chung-Hee rather than Park Jeong-Hee. 
5 Most data in this thesis are are provided by the Korean government, which tends to interpret figures in 
its favour. Therefore the use of such data has its limitations and has the potential to create distortions. 
However it is the most widely available and relatively reliable. 
6 The R~vised Romanisation of Korean was released to the public on July 4, 2000, by South Korea's 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism in Proclamation No. 2000-8 (Ministry of Culture and Tourism 2007) 
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Chapter One: Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this thesis draws on two key areas of the academic debate 
relating to the role of state: the bargaining model and the developmental state.7 The 
bargaining approach will be the main theoretical framework for this study since its main 
concern is how to strengthen the bargaining power of a host government vis-a-vis 
multinational corporations (MNCs). The first section of the chapter begins with a 
discussion of the ideological background of the bargaining approach and an historical 
overview of the development of the bargaining model, providing the context for an 
explanation of the rationales for employing the bargaining model. Finally, the Neo 
Bargaining Model (NBM), the theoretical framework of this study, will be introduced. 
The second section of the chapter will explore theories relating to the developmental 
state and highlight key areas of the debate on the desirability of government 
intervention in economic activity. This review of the debate will serve to strengthen the 
model by providing rationales of the state's role in market. This is an indispensable 
aspect of our argument because the concept of 'host government bargaining power' is 
premised on the idea that governments can intervene in markets and that such 
intervention can be positive. The debate has significant implications for this study of 
host government bargaining power because the role of government lies at the centre of 
the viability of the NBM. 
7 'State' refers to a set of institutions that possess the menas of legitimate coercion, exercised over a 
defIned territory and its population. 'Government' may refer to the body that consists of three distinct set 
of powers: legislature, executive and judiciary, or sometime may be referred to as the administration body 
only. In this thesis the term state and government are used equivalently or interchangeably as they are 
often used in many other scholarly works (World Bank 1997: 20), and also both usually refered to as the 
national administration body because in either case they represent the entity that is responsible for 
bargaining with foreign companies and establishing regulations and laws regarding FDI within the 
Korean state. 
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1. The Bargaining Model 
Ideological Background 
During the past two decades, the role played by MNCs and FDI in the development and 
growth of host economies, and the relationship between host governments and MNCs 
have generated controversy and debate within academic circles and among government 
policy makers. Some regard MNCs as a 'boon to mankind', while others view them as 
'imperial predators' (Gilpin 1987: 231); praise for FDI as an 'engine for economic 
development' contrasts with criticism of it as a 'means for exploiting resources'. 
Perspectives on MNCs and FDI range from the Marxist view, which sees MNCs as 
instruments of imperialist domination, to the liberal view, which regards MNCs as 
contributing to an increase in the overall efficiency of the world economy (Hymer 1976, 
Vernon 1971, Dunning 1993b, Caves 1971). Between these two extremes there are 
many different shades of opinion, which vary according to the ideological orientation of 
the author. The relationships between MNCs and host governments have changed 
according to governmental perceptions of MNCs and the specific nature of the 
relationship. 
Jenkins (1987) categorizes four main perspectives on MNCs: the neo-classical; 
the Global Reach; the neo-fundamentalist; and the neo-imperialist. The neo-classical 
and neo-fundamentalist approaches stress the positive role of MNCs in a host economy, 
whereas the Global Reach and the neo-imperialist views express anti-foreign investment 
sentiments. Lall (1974) classifies perspectives on FD I into six groups. of which three 
are pro- and three are anti-foreign investment. The pro-foreign investment perspectives 
16 
comprise the business school approach, the traditional economic approach and the neo-
traditionalist approach, while the anti-foreign investment perspectives consist of three 
views: the nationalist approach; the dependency approach; and the Marxist approach. 
Gilpin (1975) introduces three models of the state-MNC relationship: the 'sovereignty 
at bay model' (liberalism); the dependencia model (Marxism); and the mercantilist 
model (mercantilism). Moran (1993) and Balaam and Veseth (2005) use the same 
categorization of perspectives as Gilpin, although they use different terminology. 
Grieco (1986) identifies four major theoretical approaches with respect to host 
government-MNC relations: the proponents of FDI, the dependency school, the 
structuralist approach and the bargaining school. The proponents of FDI may belong to 
the liberal tradition, while the dependency school is roughly classified as Marxist. In 
this context, the structuralist approach is adopted by those who argue that the bargaining 
power of host governments tends to decrease over time, whereas the proponents of the 
bargaining school support the view of the 'obsolescing bargain,' in which host 
government bargaining power is expected to increase. However, the structuralist 
approach and the bargaining school can be categorized as being in the same group, in as 
much as both approaches assume the indeterminacy of gains, which means that the 
effects of FDI can be either positive or negative, and both argue the necessity of 
bargaining between MNCs and host governments. 
As this literature review shows, the political ideology regarding FDI ranges from 
a free market stance that advocates a policy of non-intervention to a radical stance that 
is hostile to FDI; between these two extremes lies an approach that is best described as 
economic nationalism. The free market view has its roots in the tradition of liberalism; 
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most neoclassical economists and business economists have belonged to this category. 8 
Internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson 1976), product life cycle theory (Vernon 
1971) and the eclectic theory of international production (Dunning 1980) all seek to 
explain FDI within this tradition, and regard MNCs and FDI as a means of increasing 
the overall efficiency of resource utilization in the world economy. Academics working 
within this tradition usually work from the standpoint of the MNC rather than that of the 
host or home country, and they stress the positive effects of FDI such as resource-
transfer effects, employment effects, balance of payments effects and competition 
promotion effects. They argue that government intervention in market functions should 
be discouraged as it serves only to cause distortions that create inefficiency (Gilpin 
2001: 279-286). 
The origins of the radical view can be traced to classical Marxism. Although a 
broad range of arguments exists among the various approaches within Marxism 
tradition, most of them perceive MNCs to be capitalist instruments for exploiting the 
natural and human resources of less developed countries (LDCs).9 They stress the 
negative effects of FDI such as the displacement of indigenous production, the 
8 Liberalism may be defined as a doctrine and set of principles for organising and managing a market 
economy in order to achieve maximum efficiency, economic growth and individual welfare (Gilpin 1987: 
27). Neoclassical economics refers to the mainstream economics following the tradition of liberalism, 
which is commted to the market and the price mechanism as the most efficient means for organising 
economic relations (Gilpin 2001: 46). 
9 The representative Marxist theories in relation to MNCs are imperialism and dependency theory. In his 
book, Imperialism, Lenin (1939 cited in Gilpin 1987) argued capitalism could be escaped from its 
collapse through its prosecution of overseas imperialism. The acquisition of colonies had enabled the 
capitalist economies to avoid economic breakdown by providing them with cheap resource and captive 
markets for unconsumed goods. Therefore, as they increased their productive capability, they had to 
expand their markets abroad by establishing colonies. In his view, MNCs such as West India Company 
are should be regared as the tools of imperialism. Dependency theorists, who were emerged in 1950s, 
argued that the terms of trade of underdeveloped Latin American countries with developed countries 
would be aggravated due to the structural problems in their trade; the world consisted of a 'core' of 
dominant nations and a 'periphery' of dependent countries; MNCs destroy local entrepreneurship. caused 
technical dependence of host countries to home nations, and distorted the economic structure of the host 
economy. Therefore, MNCs to them are the instruments of developed economies by which to depive 
developing countries of their wealth (Seers 1981, Gilpin 1975). 
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suppression of local capital fonnation, exceSSIve profit taking, the transfer of 
inappropriate technology, and uneven income distribution (Biersteker 1978, Jenkins 
1987). In order to solve these problems, they emphasize the need for revolutionary 
changes, both in external relations and in internal power structures. Although the 
prescriptions vary according to their place in the ideological spectrum, most proponents 
of the dependency theory propose a 'de-linking' from the international economy and the 
building up of self-reliant and viable economies (Brewer 1990). In their view, 
governments should not allow FDI and the entry of MNCs, as they are the instruments 
of economic domination, not economic development. 
Economic nationalism, which takes the standpoint of the nation, holds that 
economic activities should be subordinate to the national goal of improving economic 
conditions and sees MNCs as potential tools for achieving that goal. As there are both 
benefits and costs associated with FDI, the nation's goal is to use the MNCs to 
maximize the benefits for and minimise the costs to the nation; to this end, host 
governments must bargain with MNCs. While the liberal view maintains that host 
governments should not intervene in the economic activities of MNCs, the radical view 
holds that host governments of developing countries should not allow FDI. However, 
according to the economic nationalist view, host governments should intervene in order 
to improve the tenns in bargaining with MNCs (Grieco 1986). 
Political ideology with respect to MNCs or FDI is an important determinant of 
government policy, as the ideological stances and perceptions of the external 
environment held by policy makers or opinion leaders playa crucial role in formulating 
a host governmenfs FDI policy. Throughout history a common element in the 
behaviour of governments in their relationships with MNCs can be identified, which is 
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that they all seek to further their national goals. Before the Second World War. the 
governments of several powerful European nations used MNCs as an instrument of 
territorial expansion and a means of achieving economic and political goals. During this 
period, most European countries regarded their foreign colonies as sources of supply of 
raw materials and markets for their manufactured goods (Dunning 1993c: 311). People 
living in the colonies at this time can not be expected to have held liberal views 
regarding these instruments of imperialism. They might have adopted an attitude of 
defensive nationalism, which Gilpin (1987: 32) calls 'benign mercantilism', in order to 
protect their independence or ensure their survival. 
After the Second World War, hegemony passed to the United States from Great 
Britain. The U.S. government also used its corporations as instruments of implementing 
its foreign policy; as Gilpin (1975: 139) observes "if British economic hegemony was 
based on the City of London, America's was based largely on her multinational 
corporations." Assuming that Gilpin's argument was valid, U.S. government officials 
must have held mercantilist views inasmuch as they wanted to implement their foreign 
policy through their MNCs. In response to the penetration of the Third World by U.S. 
multinationals, dependency theories emerged in Latin America, mostly between the late 
1960s and the late 1970s (Brewer 1990). The dependency theorists' negative perception 
of MNCs influenced the attitudes of less developed countries (LDC) towards 
multinationals and caused strained and even hostile relationships between MNCs and 
LDC governments. This sometimes resulted in the expropriation or nationalization of 
foreign-owned assets by host governments, a phenomenon that peaked in the mid-1970s 
(Dunning 1998a). In this case, the underlying motivation of the majority of decision 
makers within LDC governments was the protection of their own or their countries' 
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interests rather than socialist revolution. They also can be called mercantilists rather 
than Marxists, even though they drew on Marxist logic. 
From the second half of the 1980s, attitudes toward FDI began to change. In the 
1980s, developing countries turned to a more open and market-friendly development 
strategy spontaneously or by force (Wiegel et a11997, Dunning 1998a). Since the mid-
1980s, communism and the import-substitution strategies of LDCs disappeared and 
many Third World and former communist countries became more willing to participate 
in the global market economy. The relevance of Marxism greatly declined with the end 
of the Cold War and the influence of liberalism increased significantly. More and more 
countries now accept liberal principles, open their economies to trade and FDI, and 
compete to attract MNCs into their territories. The whole world seems to be dominated 
by neo-liberalism and it is argued that MNCs are becoming truly global corporations 
that are stateless and independent from their national origins. However, in the real world, 
most countries do not adopt a pure free market policy toward FDI but instead 
implement policies that allow government intervention to win FDI competition. 
Moreover, MNCs are still national firms, which are embedded deeply in their national 
society, while actively conducting international business (Doremus et al 1998, Gilpin 
2001: 297-300). 
In a liberal world, FDI brings benefits to a host country and may contribute to its 
economic development, whereas in a radical world, FDI always exerts a negative 
influence on the host economy. However, in the real world, FDI has both positive and 
negative effects on a host economy. In their study of the economic effects of FDI 
projects, Encamation and Wells (1993) found that the majority (ranging from 55 to 75 
percent) of MNC operations increased the host country's national income. However. a 
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significant proportion (ranging from 25 to 45 percent) of investments have had a 
negative impact on host economies. This evidence shows that FDI can have either 
positive or negative effects, and suggests the need for government policy that is 
designed to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of FDI. The costs and 
benefits of FDI will vary from case to case and many case studies show that MNCs~ 
impact on a host economy depends on the host government's policies. Singapore and 
Ireland have developed their economies by means of FDI while many other developing 
countries suffered the adverse effect of MNC investment activity. Differing results from 
FDI reflect the success or failure of government to direct FDI, thus the role of 
government in dealing with MNCs is a crucial factor in determining whether FDI 
enhances or inhibits the economy of countries (UNCTAD 1999). 
Grosse and Behrman (1992: 96) argue that governments seek growth and equity, 
and do not allow businesses to set the rules of the market on their own; government 
intervention causes 'appropriately' distorted markets, which are difficult to explain 
using the theories of liberalism. Therefore, they suggest the use of a bargaining model to 
explain international business activities, arguing that "in a mercantilist world such as 
ours, we need a mercantilistic theory of international business" (1992: 121). It may be 
concluded then that relationships between MNCs and host governments can be best 
described by a bargaining approach which can incorporate the standpoint of both 
governments and MNCs. In the following section an historical overview of the 
development of the bargaining model is provided and key elements of this approach are 
combined to construct a revised theoretical framework which can be used to further our 
understanding of the bargaining process. 
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An Historical Overview of the Bargaining Model 
Over the past two decades, a considerable number of studies have been undertaken on 
the relationship between host governments and MNCs. One particularly noteworthy 
paradigm for the analysis of MNC-government relations has been the bargaining model 
developed by Vernon (1971) and further enriched by Behrman et al (1975), Fargre and 
Wells (1982), Kobrin (1987), Lecraw (1984), Encarnation and Wells (1985), Poynter 
(1985), Grosse and Behrman (1990; 1992), and Brewer (1992) (Luo 2004: 432). The 
bargaining model is defined as: 
A pragmatic approach in which the benefits of FDI to the host country are 
contingent on each deal. MNCs and host countries bargain over the 
distribution of benefits from FDI, and the bargaining power of each side is 
determined by its bargaining sources (Levy and Prakash 2003: 141). 
Ramamurti adds: 
The bargaining model assumes that MNC entry into developing countries 
involves negotiations on a case-by-case basis, with the actual entry 
conditions depending on the bargaining power of the two sides, which, in 
tum, depends on their respective strength (2002: 103). 
The maIn assertion of the bargaining model is that the outcomes of MNC-host 
government interactions are derived from the relative bargaining power of MNCs and 
host governments, which is, in tum, dependent on the bargaining resources of each party. 
According to this model. parties with greater levels of bargaining power are likely to 
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obtain more favourable terms in the negotiation process. 10 
The bargaining model focuses on the relationship between the MNC and the 
nation state; in this relationship the host government's aim is to maximize national 
wealth, whereas the MNC focuses on maximizing its own interests. Bargaining 
basically arises from a conflict of interests: where their goals overlap, the two sides may 
exhibit cooperative behaviour but in areas where they have conflicting goals, relations 
can be strained. In many cases, the interests of MNCs and host governments are 
different; whereas the MNC's interests are mainly focused on economic efficiency and 
profitability, the host countries' interests focus not only on economic growth but also on 
political goals such as the distribution of the benefits from FDI or the maintenance of 
national sovereignty. Conflicts in bargaining are caused by the differences between the 
interests of the two sides and the outcomes of the bargaining depend on the respective 
resources of the parties involved. 
The bargaining power of the host country anses from location-specific 
advantages such as domestic market size, natural and human resource endowment and 
industrial infrastructure, which are constantly in a state of flux. The bargaining power of 
10 The bargaining model has much in common with the game theory in that two or more players are 
involved in the negotiation process. However, there are significant differences between two theories. 
Firstly, the bargaining model has been developed especially for analysing relationships between host 
governments and MNCs, while the game theory is concerned with the general relationships between the 
competing subjects. Secondly, the bargaining model deals mainly with the power relationships between 
the players and the sources of their power whereas the major concerns of the game theory are the 
strategies that players employ to win the game. Thirdly, certain studies of the bargaining model have used 
mathematical methodologies whereas most game theorists have preferred the mathematical model. These 
separate focuses seem to derive from the difference between main concerns of both theories. That is, the 
bargaining model concerns the power of the players, which is an abstract and comprehensive concept thus 
difficult to apply to the mathematical model, while the chief focus of the game theory is the strategies of 
the players, upon which it is relatively easier to build a mathematical formulation. As mentioned above, 
the aim of this study is to analyse power relationships between host countries and foreign companies. 
Specifically, it is to examine the sources of power of host countries rather than examine strategic 
decisions in certain situations, which was the basis of the bargaining model to be applied to this study. 
Fourthly, in the game theory, information plays an important role in making strategic decisions. However, 
in the bargaining model, information is treated as one of resources that players possess, which lowers the 
significance of the role of information in the model (Montet and Serra 2003). 
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the MNC derives from the posseSSIOn of firm-specific advantages such as capital. 
technology and management skills. Given that bargaining inherently assumes an 
opponent, bargaining power is a dynamic and relative concept. The merit of the 
bargaining model is that it enables us to observe both sides of the bargaining process at 
the same time. In the following section, the historical development of the bargaining 
model is reviewed and a new framework constructed that synthesizes the key elements 
of existing models. 
The Obsolescing Bargaining Model 
In the 1960s and 1970s, relations between MNCs and host governments were often 
confrontational; developing countries were concerned about the negative effects of 
MNC activity such as economic dependency, political intervention and the weakening 
of the position of domestic companies and so screened MNCs' entries, regulated their 
operations and, in extreme cases, expropriated or nationalized their assets. The 
obsolescing bargaining model was introduced by Raymond Vernon in 1971, in an 
attempt to explain the relationship between MNCs and host governments in this context. 
The model describes how developing countries and MNCs negotiate the conditions of 
entry and operations for MNCs and how those conditions are determined by the 
respective strengths and weaknesses of the bargaining partners. 
Many scholars agree that the bargaining model was developed from the idea of 
'obsolescing bargain' presented in Raymond Vernon's Sovereignty at Bay (Luo 2004. 
Eden and Molot 2002, Ramamurti 2001). In the obsolescing bargain modeL Vernon 
(1971) described patterns of investment in the natural resource industries of developing 
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countries and observed the shifts in power between MNCs and the host governments. 
Prior to an MNC's entry into a market, its bargaining power is greater than that of the 
host country, as it has freedom of choice in terms of location and must bear the risks 
associated with the investment; this gives the MNC an advantage when bargaining with 
the host government. The decision as to whether or not the investment will take place 
remains the responsibility of the MNC, affording strong bargaining power to the MNC 
and leading to the provision of concessions by the host government. However, once the 
investment has been made, bargaining power shifts to the host government. As Vernon 
(1971: 47) observes: 
Almost from the moment that the signatures have dried on the document, 
powerful forces go to work that quickly render the agreements obsolete in 
the eyes of government. 
After the investment is made, the associated risks and uncertainty dissipate if the project 
proves successful. The capital invested by an MNC becomes a sunk cost, the host 
country becomes less dependent on the MNC for capital and technology as these 
resources diffuse through the host country, and the bargaining power of the MNC begins 
to obsolesce. Ultimately, the host government demands a renegotiation of the original 
bargain in order to secure more benefits (Vernon 1971). 
The creation of the obsolescing bargaining model was an outcome of the 
polarization of the debate regarding the effects of FDI on developing countries in the 
1970s (Levy and Prakash 2003). At that time, as we have seen, dependency theory was 
the dominant argument in the developing countries of Latin America; created as a 
counter argument to this theory, the obsolescing bargaining theory argues that the 
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dependency theory exaggerates the power of MNCs and ignores the power of 
developing host countries. The obsolescing bargaining theory focuses on the role of host 
governments and stresses the autonomous power of host countries. Moran (1985: 6) 
sees the obsolescing bargaining model as a breakthrough in several respects; first, it 
adds more dynamism to the understanding of relations between MNCs and host 
governments; second, it provides a model of economic nationalism based on rational 
self interest rather than an interpretation of the world system based on Marxist views or 
irrational waves of anti-foreign emotions; finally, it offers an optimistic view of the 
future for Third World nations in that it anticipates the eventual strengthening of the 
power of their governments. 
Testing the Bargaining Model 
The obsolescing bargaining model has been tested USIng data from a number of 
extractive and manufacturing industries and has proved valid in many cases in the 
extractive industries. The problem of sunk costs and investment risk typically appear 
in the extractive sectors, such as the oil, copper and diamond industries, which require 
large capital expenditures under highly uncertain conditions. The nature and 
characteristics of the extractive industries seem to be the reason why Vernon developed 
the obsolescing bargaining model to explain shifts in bargaining power relating to the 
operation of natural resource extraction ventures. 
In his study of the Chilean copper industry, Moran (1974) demonstrates the 
validity of the obsolescing bargaining hypothesis by analysing the process of the 
nationalization of US copper companies. He argues that, although the dependency 
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theory assumes that the power of MNCs increases in developing countries, the power of 
US copper companies in Chile declined continuously and, eventually, they were 
nationalized by the Chilean government. Moran points out that this process of shifting 
power is derived from the nature of extractive industries which need a large lump-sum 
investment under conditions of high risk and uncertainty. 
However in the manufacturing sector, MNC-host country bargains are less likely 
to obsolesce because investments tend to be smaller, more mobile, and less uncertain 
compared with those in the extractive sectors (Grosse and Behrman 1992). Bennett and 
Sharpe (1979), Grieco (1982), Kobrin (1987) and Vachani (1995) test the obsolescing 
bargaining model on manufacturing investments in developing countries and draw 
different conclusions. Bennett and Sharp (1979) and Kobrin (1987) question the validity 
of the obsolescing hypothesis in manufacturing industry but Grieco (1982) and Vachani 
(1995) provide evidence of obsolescence in the manufacturing sector. 
In their study of bargaining procedures between the Mexican government and 
MNCs in the automobile industry, Bennet and Sharpe (1979) conclude that the 
bargaining power ofMNCs does not obsolesce in manufacturing sectors as it does in the 
extractive industries. Observing negotiations between the Mexican government and 
automobile multinationals, they discover that the MNCs' bargaining power actually 
increases after they enter the market. In the initial stages, the host government appears 
to have more power than the MNCs due to the would-be investors' demands for 
concessions, but, with time, the power shifts in favour of the multinationals. Moreover, 
technology transfer can also be an important element in preventing a decline in the 
erosion ofMNCs~ bargaining power, as long as the host economies remain dependent on 
these technologies. 
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Kobrin (1987) measures the bargaining power of MNCs and host countries using 
data from 49 countries and 563 subsidiaries. He indicates that the occurrence of 
'obsolescing' depends on the characteristics of the technology possessed by foreign 
manufacturing companies. If the foreign companies' technology is mature or widely 
available, a power shift takes place but if the company has advanced technology and 
upgrades it continuously, the company can avoid obsolescing and maintain or even 
strengthen its bargaining power. Kobrin concludes that, generally speaking, the 
obsolescing bargaining model is valid as long as it considers the relative demand for 
resources and the constraints on the power of the parties involved, but notes that 
obsolescence does not always occur in every industry (Kobrin 1987: 635-636). 
In contrast with Bennett and Sharp (1979) and Kobrin (1987), both Grieco 
(1982) and Vachani (1995) conclude that the obsolescing of bargaining does occur in the 
manufacturing sector. Grieco (1982) examines the experience of India's computer 
industry in order to assess the power of governments relative to MNCs. Evidence of 
India's success in bargaining with MNCs in possession of advanced technology would 
give strong support to the bargaining school argument, whereas a lack of evidence 
would give validity to the dependency theory. From his analysis, Grieco finds that, over 
time, the Indian government significantly increased its power to manage relations with 
MNCs in the computer industry and he concludes that the Indian case supports the 
bargaining school hypothesis. Vachani (1995) analyses changes in patterns of ownership 
of MNCs in India between 1973 and 1987, following the end of fifteen years of 
restrictive FDI legislation in 1973. He observes the changes of foreign ownership levels 
during the period and discovers that the average share of foreign ownership tends to 
decline and confirms that the obsolescing bargaining hypothesis is valid. 
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As these studies show, there is no general agreement on the obsolescing 
hypothesis as it relates to the manufacturing sector. However, it is generally accepted 
that the obsolescing bargaining argument is more likely to have validity in extractive 
industries due to the characteristics of high sunk costs and levels of risk than in the 
manufacturing industry, where MNCs can avoid the obsolescing of their power because 
of their technology and the nature of their integration into the local economy. However, 
in her study of Canada's National Energy Program, Jenkins (1986) demonstrates that 
obsolescence may not occur even in extractive industries. She concludes that the 
obsolescing argument lacks validity in this case; MNCs can manage to maintain their 
positions through alliances with domestic companies and reliance on their home 
country's power, which means that the bargaining power does not shift to the host 
government. Jenkins argues that the theory of the obsolescing bargain is an 
oversimplification and, as such, can not explain the complicated relationship between 
the host government and MNCs. The host government does not have sufficient power to 
dictate to MNCs and, for their part, MNCs are not so weak that they have to submit to 
pressure from the host government as the theory suggests. In her view, the theory 
overestimates the power of the state and underestimates the capacity of MNCs; in an 
increasingly interdependent global economy, host governments find it difficult to persist 
with policies that are hostile to MNCs. 
Refining the Bargaining Model 
As we have seen above, many empirical studies have demonstrated that the obsolescing 
bargaining model, which claims that the bargaining power of host governments can be 
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expected to increase over time, has all but lost its validity. Stopford and Strange (1991: 
215) also conclude that governments' bargaining power vis-it-vis MNCs has gradually 
declined as competition among nations to induce FDI has intensified. Many 
international business scholars argue that the obsolescing bargain model is no longer 
valid for explaining relations between MNCs and host governments (Dunning 1993a, 
Stopford 1994). This sceptical view, which is derived from the empirical studies 
summarized above, also challenges the basic assumption of the bargaining model - that 
relations between MNCs and host governments are based on conflict - because of 
changes in the global economic situation. 
Generally speaking, after the mid 1970s, the relationship between MNCs and 
host countries began to change from one based on confrontation to one based on 
cooperation. Dunning (1998a) suggests two reasons for the shift in attitudes on both 
sides; firstly, declining economic growth combined with technological development has 
forced countries to seek to attract FDI and, secondly, intense competition is driving 
MNCs to seek the most cost-efficient locations for production. Weigel et al (1997: 6) 
describe two different phases of FDI in developing countries: the first phase was the 
1960s and 1970s, when developing countries pursued closed economic models of 
development out of a fear of becoming economically dependent on industrialized 
nations. This led to protectionism which, in turn, resulted in inefficient economies 
because insulation from the global economy led to a decrease in exports and massive 
balance of payments deficit. The second phase was during the 1980s and 1990s. when 
developing countries realised the cost of being isolated from global economic expansion 
and adopted more open, market-friendly FDI policies, which led to a significant 
increases in inward investment. According to a report by UNCTAD (1998: 57), between 
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1991 and 1997, 94 percent of national FDI policies were revised in favour of foreign 
investors, with only six percent remaining unfavourable to inward FDI. Host 
governments of developing countries became increasingly MNC-friendly and even 
began to compete with each other to attract FDI into their territories; the obsolescing 
bargaining model, which basically assumes conflictual relationships between MNCs and 
host governments, appeared to have faded away. 
However, some scholars continue to advocate the value of the obsolescing 
bargaining model; Eden et al (2005) and Ramamurti (2001) argue that, with slight 
modifications, the model is still a powerful tool for analyzing MNC-host government 
relations. Eden et al (2005) assert that, as long as the core insight of the model - that 
bargaining outcomes are dependent on the resources of both parties - has validity, the 
life of the model should be extended. This can be achieved by removing 'obsolescing' 
from the model. As we have seen, the obsolescing bargaining model argues that the 
bargaining power of MNCs gradually decreases after entry, and that the bargaining 
power of MNCs can be measured by the initial ownership level. However as many 
empirical studies demonstrate, obsolescence does not occur in many cases. Moreover, 
few countries now place restrictions on inward FDI and so there is little formal 
bargaining over entry conditions between MNCs and host governments. Eden et al 
(2005) suggest re-conceptualizing the obsolescing bargaining model to create a 
'political bargaining model', in which the focus shifts from ownership level at the entry 
stage to an iterative bargaining process over government policy during the life of the 
investment. 
Ramamurti (2001) also argues that it is too early to discard the obsolescing 
bargaining model because, even if relations have become cooperative. there still are 
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some restrictions on inward FDI. In his view, the inward FDI policy of developing 
country governments is better understood as a process of transition, in which there are 
various stages from restriction to liberalization, rather than as a completed process. He 
argues that, while the liberalization of the FDI policies of developing countries is partly 
spontaneous, we have to be aware that changes in policy have also been forced by 
international actors, institutions and agreements. He presents a two-tier model for 
understanding these non-voluntary changes; the 'two-tier bargaining model' retains the 
original bargaining model as one tier (Tier 2), where host governments negotiate with 
MNCs, but adds another tier (Tier 1) where host developing countries bargain bilaterally 
with home countries and multinational institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) , the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Whereas 
market forces drive the original tier (Tier 2), it is political power that drives Tier 1. 
Ramamurti (2001) argues that the outcomes of Tier 1, which are influenced by 
macroeconomic and political variables, govern the macro rules of FDI and also 
constrain Tier 2 negotiations between MNCs and host governments. 
Loewendahl (2001) proposes a 'political economy bargaining model' which is 
derived from Bacharach and Lawler's (1981) dependence approach to bargaining 
power. 11 Bacharach and Lawler (1981) argue that bargaining power comes from 
dependence: that is, the more A depends on B, the more bargaining power B has over A. 
In other words, the power of one party in the bargaining process is based upon the other 
party's dependence, which is in tum determined by the alternatives available to both 
11 Bacharach and Lawler (1981) have presented three different theories of bargaining power: (1) the 
attribution theory of bargaining power, (2) the control theory of bargaining power and (3) ~h~ dependence 
theory of bargaining power. Bargaining po,",:er in this c~n~ext is. not related to the bargammg model of 
International political Economy (IPE) and dependence IS a dIfferent concept from that used by the 
dependency school of IPE. For a fuller discussion of this issues, see Bacharach and Lawler (1981: 52-79). 
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parties and their commitment to the bargaining objectives. The fewer the alternatives 
available to B and the stronger commitment B has, the greater the bargaining power that 
A can wield. 
Loewendahl (2001) applies Bacharach and Lawler's 'dependence approach' to 
bargaining power to the relationship between MNCs and host governments and equates 
their alternatives and commitment to the flexibility and demands of MNCs and 
governments. As far as governments are concerned, their alternatives depend on the 
number of potential investors, and their commitment reflects not only domestic demand 
for the MNCs' resources but also their perception of the value of FDI in the national 
economy. For the MNCs, the alternatives are other locations which provide similar 
locational advantages and their commitment reflects their demand for the host country's 
resources (Loewendahl 2001: 128-129). In addition he argues that the existing 
bargaining model plays down the role of pressures from interest groups and the 
competence and willingness of bargaining institutions. 
Loewendahl criticises the existing model on the grounds that it focuses only on 
the bilateral relationship between MNCs and governments, and neglects the other actors 
who influence the external and internal bargaining process. Loewendahl argues that an 
, 
understanding of the policy-making process surrounding the implementation of 
bargaining power is crucial for interpreting specific MNC-government relations and so 
includes in his model the variables of external pressure from interest groups and the 
strength of internal bargaining institutions. The pressure from interest groups is 
demonstrated in the political and economic constraints imposed on governments and 
MNCs by interest groups, and the strength of bargaining institutions is seen in their 
ability to control the bargaining process. Loewendahl provides us with a crucial insight: 
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that one party's power is dependent on the other party's demand for its resources. 
However, with his model, it is difficult to identify the reasons for the weaknesses and 
strengths of the bargaining power of the parties involved, because bargaining resources, 
which are the source of power, do not appear in his model. Bargaining resources are, in 
fact, crucial to an explanation of the dynamics of the power relationship. In this section 
principal arguments on the bargaining model are reviewed. The following section will 
construct a Neo Bargaining Model which will form the framework for this thesis by 
taking into account recent developments and arguments in the debate on government-
MNC relations. 
The N eo Bargaining Model 
In this section, the Neo Bargaining Model will be constructed to provide a fresh insight 
into current state-MNC relations. As the basic concept and structure of the new 
framework is derived from the Grosse and Behrman bargaining model (1992), we first 
present Grosse and Behrman's model, and then, based on this, construct a new model. 
Grosse and Behrman's Bargaining Model 
Grosse and Behrman (1990; 1992) criticise international business theories on the 
grounds that they disregard the government factor. They argue that, despite the fact that 
government intervention is central to international business, most international business 
theories do not take the government factor into consideration as one of the variables but 
regard governments as a 'given condition' or an 'undesirable actor.' According to them, 
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the basic difference between domestic and international business is home and host 
government intervention. 12 Therefore, international business theory must include 
government interventions, and explain market distortions that arise from these 
interventions. In their efforts to include government elements in the international 
business disciplines, they present a bargaining model that they believe to be appropriate 
for analysing MNC-government relations. They seek to develop a formal analytical 
model of the bargaining relationship between MNCs and governments and call it 'an 
explicit bargaining model'. In creating this model, they clarify the basic concept of the 
bargaining relationship (1992: 100). 
The bargaining relationship will lead to outcomes based on the efforts of 
the two sides to achieve their own goals, constrained by their own limited 
resources, on their interdependence and on their relationships with other 
relevant groups. 
Grosse and Behrman build a framework, beginning with the presentation of given 
conditions, objectives and constraints of both parties (see Table 1.1). Based on these 
preconditions, they develop a model that consists of a goal and three dimensions: 
relative resources, relative stakes, and similarity of interests. In the model, the 
government's goal is the imposition of restrictions, while the firm's goal is the 
avoidance of restrictions. Therefore, the stronger the government's bargaining powec 
the more restrictive it is in its treatment of the firm. Conversely, the stronger the firm's 
bargaining power, the fewer restrictions the firm faces. In terms of dimensions, the first 
dimension is relative resources, which refers to the resources possessed by each party. 
12 It seems that Grosse and Behrman (1992) assume that there are few government interventions in the 
domestic market. 
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The resources of host governments are the market and factors of production, while the 
resources possessed by MNCs consist of the elements for improving the host 
government's internal balance (for example, income and employment), the factors for 
improving the host government's external balance (for example, balance of payments) 
and the factors for achieving non-economic goals. 
Table 1.1 Grosse and Behrman Model: Given Conditions 
Party 
Objectives Government 
Constraints Government 
TNC 
Given conditions 
economic efficiency; equity in TNCs; distribution of 
benefits; participation in ownership, management, 
technology, R&D and so forth; stability (economic, 
political, social); acceptable interdependence, 
preservation of environment, and so on 
access to markets; access to inputs; reduction of risks; 
freedom of decision-making and operations 
inadequacy of resources; fragmentation of power in a 
country; pressure to achieve economic goals more 
rapidly; relationship with other governments; lack of 
information; inexperience of negotiations, and so on 
dependence on governments to permit access; 
activities of competitors; limited resources; lack of 
information, and so forth 
(Grosse and Behrman 1992: 99-100) 
The second dimension consists of the relative stakes that a government and a 
firm have in a given bargaining situation. The relative stakes indicate possible losses 
that each side could suffer if successful bargaining were not attained. Stakes for 
governments would include the possible loss of access to resources that firms offer, 
13 Grosse and Behnnan use TNCs (transnational corporations) referring to MNCs. 
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whereas stakes for a company would mean the inability to gain from the governmenf s 
resources. 
The third dimension is the similarity of interest between the two parties. The 
more comparable the goals of a government and a firm, the less likely it is that a 
government would impose regulations or place undue pressure on an MNC. Conversely, 
when the goals of each side differ greatly from one another, the bargaining process is 
likely to be more difficult and there will be more of a tendency for the government to 
impose restraints on an MNC's activity. Grosse and Behrman argue that a firm with 
high relative resources, low relative stakes and a high similarity of interest is likely to 
face low levels of government restriction. Conversely, if the firm has low relative 
resources, high relative stakes and a low similarity of interest, it will encounter highly 
restrictive policies. 
This model, which was the first formal analytical framework for the bargaining 
relationship, enables more analytical observations of the relationships between MNCs 
and host governments than theories that do not take government interventions into 
consideration (Lowendahl 2001: 127). The advantages of this model areas follows; 
firstly, it explicitly incorporates a government dimension and so offers an insight into 
the perspectives of both bargaining parties: the host government and the MNC. Whereas 
theories of international business or neo-classical economics assume the standpoint of 
the MNCs, this model includes both perspectives. Secondly, the model enables the 
bargaining parties to diagnose the weaknesses or strengths of their bargaining power 
and develop strategies to compensate for their weaknesses. If a party wants to increase 
its bargaining power, it has to examine its bargaining dimension and identify its 
vulnerable points. 
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Figure 1.1 Grosse and Behnnan Model: Conceptual Schemes 
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However, Grosse and Behnnan's bargaining model has several weaknesses; 
firstly, the basic assumptions and perceptions of host-MNC relationships contained in 
the explicit bargaining model are somewhat out of date. The model was developed in 
the early 1990s but now the situation is very different, not only in terms of the realities 
of international business but also in terms of theoretical interpretations of host-MNC 
relationships. In the 1990s, countries started to realise the need to cooperate with MNCs 
due to the increasing pressures of global integration, declining economic growth and 
intensified competition to attract foreign investment. The general relationships between 
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host governments and MNCs have shifted from adversarial and confrontational to non-
adversarial and cooperative (Dunning 1998a: 281-282). However, in the model, the 
bargaining goal is restriction ( for government) or the avoidance of restriction (for firms), 
in which the underlying assumption is one of conflicting relationships between hosts 
and MNCs. As Luo (2004) argues, today's host-MNC relationships contain not only 
competitive aspects such as control and conflict, but also cooperative features including 
mutual accommodation and collaboration; these relationships are more complicated 
than those in the 1990s. Therefore, the model must now be updated by incorporating 
current circumstances and recent discussions. 
Secondly, the constraints factor should be included as an explicit variable in the 
model. Although the Grosse and Behrman model regards constraints as given conditions, 
constraints are not always fixed and may be manageable by governments or MNCs; thus, 
they are variables rather than conditions. Furthermore, the influence of constraints is 
increasingly critical in the process of the bargaining as the global economy becomes 
more closely integrated. It is evident that the factors of constraints such as agreements 
with international institutions can directly affect the bargaining power of both parties. 
Yet, in Grosse and Behrman's model, there is no channel in which constraints affect 
bargaining power because they are not included as one of the variables. Therefore, the 
constraints factor should be included as an explicit variable in the model to reflect the 
relevance of current circumstances. 
Thirdly, the dimension of similarity of interest is flawed and should be 
eliminated. This dimension seems to relate more to whether the negotiations will be 
successful or not, rather than to bargaining power. A high degree of congruence between 
both parties' interests can increase the possibility of agreement but is not capable of 
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showing the changes of bargaining power. For example, if a government that possesses 
the perfect environment for high-tech business and that is looking a high-tech firm, 
negotiates with a company that has advanced technology and is seeking the kind of 
location offered by the host country, then both sides have a high level of common 
interest, which is highly likely to result in successful negotiation. However, in this case, 
it is not clear whether the close similarity of interest strengthens the bargaining power of 
the host government (or the firm). Therefore, if each dimension of the model represents 
the factors affecting the extent of the bargaining power of parties, the dimension of the 
similarity of interest should be removed or replaced with another relevant factor. The 
last point presents the inappropriateness for this study rather than the weakness of the 
model. The standpoint of the model is from a firm's perspective rather than that of a 
government because the model was developed within business economics disciplines. 
The model, of course, includes a governmental perspective but its focus is on firms 
rather than governments. However, the perspective of this thesis is that of the 
government, and thus the focus of the model should be changed from firm to 
government. In the following section, Grosse and Behrman's bargaining model will be 
reshaped to overcome these weaknesses and to increase its relevance by incorporating 
recent discussions about government-MNC relations. 
The Neo Bargaining Model (NBM) 
The Neo Bargaining Model has been developed to overcome the shortcomings of 
Grosse and Behrman's model (1992) and to explain the government-MNC relationship 
more pertinently. While retaining the fundamental structure of the Grosse and Behrman 
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model, the system of elements has been replaced with more appropriate and updated 
ideas. The key elements of their model are a goal and three dimensions, which are 
resources, stakes and congruence of interests. These elements have been revised by 
incorporating other vital insights discussed in international business, such as the 
'coopetition' perspective described below (Luo 2004), the dependence theory of 
bargaining power (Bacharach and Lawler 1981), the political economy bargaining 
model (Lowendahl 2001), the two-tier bargaining model (Ramamurti 2001, 2002), and 
the political bargaining model (Eden et al 2005). 
Perspectives 
Although Grosse and Berhman's bargaining model includes the government factor, its 
perspectives are those of firms. The model is basically a firm-centric model seeking 
ways to increase the firms' bargaining power vis-a-vis governments and means to avoid 
host governments' restrictions. However, the aim of this study is to find ways to 
enhance the bargaining power of states vis-a-vis MNCs. Therefore, a government-
centric model is required to approach government-MNC relations from the perspective 
of the government. Accordingly, the Neo Bargaining Model shifts its viewpoint from 
that of firms to that of governments. 
Bargaining goals 
According to Grosse and Behrman's bargaining model, the government's goal in 
bargaining is imposing restrictions on the MNC's entries and act~vities, while the MNC 
wants to bargain for fewer restrictions. The model's underlying assumption is that 
relationships between MNCs and host governments are confrontational and their goals 
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are likely to conflict with each other. This assumption might have been valid in the 
1960s and 1970s, but has been challenged since the 1980s as relationships have become 
more complex as we have mentioned. 
In the NBM, the goal of each bargaining party is to achieve a strong position 
from which it can impose its will on the other party. Of course, the respective goals 
government and MNC's may go beyond this to include the maximisation of their wealth 
or their interests. However, at least in the context of bargaining, their immediate goals 
are the attainment of strong positions in order to serve their ultimate goals. The strength 
of a party's position can be interpreted as its level of competitiveness in a competing 
world. Governments make many efforts to strengthen their position, including the 
creation of a pool of highly-educated workers, building an efficient physical 
infrastructure, establishing industrial harmony, and maintaining a well-organised 
bargaining institution system. Such efforts enhance the country's competitiveness and 
also strengthen its position in dealing with global firms. In this vein, a strong position 
serves not only as a means for regulating but also for attracting foreign investors. 
Governments have dual positions in that they have to make themselves attractive to 
global firms, but also need to regulate the firms to maximise government gain. 
This dualistic attitude on the part of governments is a reflection of current state-
MNC relationships. As Luo (2004) argues, relationships between MNCs and host 
governments in today's world contain elements of both cooperation and competition, 
which function simultaneously - a phenomenon that Luo terms 'coopetition~. In areas 
where their goals overlap the two sides may exhibit cooperative behaviour but in the 
remaining areas where they have conflicting goals, relations can be strained. Their 
relationship is not always characterized by conflict, nor is it always cooperative: the 
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goal of bargaining is not only to impose regulation but also to advance cooperation. 
Therefore the bargaining goal for each party is best defined as strengthening its position 
by increasing its competitiveness. 
Bargaining resources 
According to Grosse and Behrman's model (1992), governments possess two resources 
sought by MNCs, namely a market and factors of production, while MNCs have three 
attributes sought by governments, which are factors for improving the host country's 
internal balance, enhancing its external balance, and achieving non-economic goals. 
Their view regarding the resources of the host country and the firms seems to be 
outdated, especially on the government side. In their model, the MNC's goal is limited 
to market-seeking or resource-seeking motivations. Given that motivations for FDI have 
shifted increasingly from market- or resource-seeking FDI to efficiency- or strategic 
asset-seeking investment, the notion of the government's resources should be expanded 
(UNCTAD 1998, Dunning 1998b). To incorporate recent changes, a more 
comprehensive view and definition is required. 
Bargaining resources are defined as the resources possessed and required by 
each party in order to achieve their respective goals. In the NBM, each party's goal is to 
enhance its competitiveness; thus, bargaining resources can be described as the 
resources possessed by each party that can serve to enhance the other party's 
competitiveness. Therefore, in the NBM, host countries' bargaining resources are the 
factors which can satisfy not only traditional demands (such as market or factors of 
production), but also the growing demand for factors that promote business efficiencies 
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(including created assets or presence of clusters). 14 These can be best captured by the 
concept of location-specific advantages (Dunning 1993b, 1998b). On the other hand, 
MN Cs' bargaining resources are defined as the elements that can assist in the 
enhancement of host countries' competitiveness. Therefore, a firm's specific advantages. 
which could contribute to the host country's economic strength, are the resources of 
MNCs. Bargaining resources are the means that enable one party to force the other party 
to compromise or cede ground. Therefore, a higher level of relative resources produces 
a greater degree of bargaining power. 
Bargaining stakes 
Grosse and Behrman (1992: 103) describe relative stakes as the possible losses that each 
side could suffer if successful bargaining were not achieved, and enumerated a long list 
of factors contributing to the stake of the host government (or firms). These are as 
follows: the availability of other firms (or markets) to replace the one in question; the 
importance of the situation to the government's (or firms') interests; the importance of 
this negotiation in the government's (or firms') dealings with the given firm (or 
country); the relationship between this situation and the country's (or firms') overall 
interests. In total, they identify eight factors that influence the size of the stakes of host 
governments and MNCs. This notion of stakes, we argue, can be best conceptualised by 
drawing on Bacharach and Lawler's (1981) 'dependence approach of bargaining power'. 
Bacharach and Lawler (1981: 59-79) regard one party's dependence on the other as its 
14 UNCTAD (1998: 113-114) suggests several factors that may serve t.o attract.FDI including a~ ~?n­
traditional determinants such as created assts, agglomeration economIes and mfrastructure facJlltles. 
Created assets are assets made by human beings (as distinct from natur~1 resources) such as ~echnology or 
. t' capacl·ty· Agglomeration economies' refers to the benefiCIal effects from spatIal clusters of 
mnova Ive· . ., . 
related activities or specialized support servIces wlthm a country or a regIOn. 
main source of power when two parties negotiate. The level of dependence is in tum 
determined by the alternatives available to both parties, together with their commitment 
to the bargaining objectives. Loewendahl (2001: 128-129) applies Bacharach and 
Lawler's dependence approach of bargaining power to his model. 
According to Bacharach and Lawler (1981: 57), the concept of dependence 
refers to the extent to which each party has a stake in the bargaining. Thus Bacharach 
and Lawler's dependence concept can be equated with the concept of stake in the NBM; 
A's high degree of dependence on B's resources can be seen as A's high stake in B's 
resources and, in the same way, A's low level of dependence on B's resources can be 
equated to A's low stake in B's resources. The level of dependence is determined by the 
alternatives available to each party and its commitment to the bargaining objectives. 
Therefore, A's stake is determined by A's alternatives and commitment; if A has many 
alternatives available and a low level of commitment to the negotiations, A's stake will 
decrease and its bargaining power will increase. Applying this concept to the 
government-MNC relationship, it can be seen that if a host government has a 
considerable number of potential investors and regards FDI as an unimportant factor in 
its economy, the government will have a low stake in the bargaining, which translates 
into strong bargaining power. 
In short, the level of stakes is determined by the alternatives available to, and the 
commitment from, each party and this can influence the level of bargaining power of 
each party. The more alternatives there are and the lower the level of commitment to the 
negotiations that a party exhibits, the lower the stake level. This lower stake level 
creates a higher level of bargaining power. 
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Bargaining constraints 
Grosse and Behrman (1992: 100) regard constraints as a given condition to bargaining 
between hosts and MNCs and provide a long list of such constraints (see Table 1.1). As 
argued above, the concept of constraints in Grosse and Behrman's model has several 
shortcomings. Firstly, although they acknowledge that constraints can influence the 
bargaining relationship and include them in the given conditions for the bargaining 
relationship, they do not apply these factors as variables that can have an effect on 
bargaining outcomes. As Figure 1.l shows, their model consists of three dimensions: 
relative resources, relative stakes and similarity of interests. According to this model, 
bargaining outcomes are determined by these three variables, and constraints cannot 
influence these outcomes. Secondly, many of the constraints in their model overlap with 
other variables. For example, the inadequacy of resources (a government constraint) or 
limited resources (a MNC constraint) are redundant with regard to the relative resources 
variables because those factors are basically problems of resources. They present an 
ambiguous concept of constraints. Thirdly, most of the constraints in their model are 
endogenous (for example, inadequacy of resources and lack of information). Since the 
1990s, exogenous constraints, such as pressure from non-government organizations 
(NGOs) and agreements between home countries and multilateral institutions, have 
become increasingly important and can influence the formulation of government 
policies (Ramamurti 2002, Levy and Prakash 2003). However, Grosse and Behrman 
focus on endogenous factors only and fail to consider exogenous restrictions, even 
though the latter have come to have a more crucial impact on bargaining outcomes. 
In the NBM, constraint factors are regarded as crucial elements of bargaining 
outcomes, and so are incorporated explicitly into the model as one of the sets of 
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variables. In addition, a more relevant concept of constraints is developed, uSIng 
Loewendahl's (2001) 'political economy bargaining model' and Ramamurti's (2002) 
'two-tier bargaining model'. In the NBM, constraints are categorized as internal and 
external factors; internal constraints are derived from Loewendahl's model, and external 
constraints from Ramamurti's model. Loewendahl (2001: 114) argues that although an 
understanding of the policy-making process surrounding the implementation of 
bargaining power is crucial for interpreting specific MNC-government relations, the 
existing bargaining model treats MNCs and governments as 'black boxes' that produce 
outcomes mechanically. Therefore, he includes in his model the variables of pressure 
from interest groups and the strength of bargaining institutions. He succeeds in 
highlighting the importance of interest groups and bargaining institutions in the 
bargaining process, but fails to consider the influence of external factors, such as the 
actions of home countries and multilateral institutions. 
Ramamurti (2001, 2002) stresses the role of external factors in the formulation 
of governments' policies. He argues that the FDI policies of developing countries are 
influenced by international actors, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World 
Bank. Furthermore, in many cases, developing countries are forced to change their FDI 
policy by the home countries of MNCs or by international institutions. Ramamurti 
(2001) argues that the macro rules of FDI are determined in negotiations between host 
governments and home governments, or between host governments and supranational 
institutions (Tier 1 bargaining), and the outcomes of these negotiations can act as a 
constraint on bargaining between host governments and MNCs (Tier 2 bargaining). We 
have adopted this idea as one of the external constraints in our model and suggest that 
fr m interest groups and the strength of bargaining institutions can serve as an pressure 0 
48 
internal constraint, while pressure from home governments and supranational 
institutions serves as an external constraint. 
To summarize, bargaining constraints are negative factors that restrict the 
exercise of potential bargaining power. Bargaining constraints have two facets: internal 
and external. Internal constraints refer to pressures from interest groups and the strength 
of bargaining institutions, whereas external constraints refer to pressures from home 
governments and supranational institutions. The lower the level of constraints the 
bargaining party faces, the greater the bargaining power the party possesses. 
Bargaining outcomes 
In Grosse and Behrman's model, the level of a host government's intervention in the 
business activities of an MNC, or the avoidance of intervention, are viewed as 
bargaining outcomes. If an MNC has strong relative bargaining power, it may minimise 
restrictive interventions from the host government but if that government has strong 
relative bargaining power, it can impose restrictive measures on the MNC's activities. 
The assumption of bargaining outcomes in their model is one of the most outdated 
perceptions of the relationship between MNCs and host governments. Today's 
government-MNC relations are more complicated, thus simple assumptions can not be 
applied to the relationships. 
Eden et al (2005) argue that bargaining outcomes can be defined by comparing 
the final outcomes with the original goals of each party. According to this argument, 
bargaining outcomes should be measured by the extent to which goals are achie\'ed, 
rather than by the extent of government intervention. Both parties will consider the 
bargaining process a success if they see the outcome as beneficial for them and as 
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unsuccessful if they are not satisfied with the outcome. Applying this concept of 
bargaining outcomes to the NBM, bargaining outcomes are defined as the extent to 
which competitiveness is enhanced by attracting MNC investment (for host countries) 
or by entering a foreign market (for MNCs). 
The Advantages of the N eo Bargaining Model 
In constructing the NBM, Grosse and Behrman's 'explicit bargaining model' has been 
revised by incorporating recent developments and new concepts of international 
business in order to increase the model's relevance to the current increasingly global 
economy. In this way, the NBM retains the advantages of Grosse and Behrman's model, 
in that it includes both government and MNC perspectives and enables the bargaining 
parties to diagnose their weaknesses and strengths. In addition, the NBM overcomes the 
various shortcomings of Grosse and Behrman's model; it does this firstly by including 
constraints as one of the variables in bargaining outcomes. As Figure 1.1 shows, Grosse 
and Behrman's bargaining model excludes the constraints factor, making it difficult to 
assess the influence of constraints on the bargaining process. In recent years, the power 
of interest groups in domestic economies has increased to the point where these groups 
have become significant actors in the bargaining process. The role of bargaining 
institutions, such as inward promotion agencies (IPAs), is becoming more important for 
promoting inward investment (Encamation and Wells 1985a, 1985b) and international 
agreements between host governments and home governments, or between host 
governments and supranational institutions, increase every year (Salacuse 1990). In 
order to reflect these developments, we haye incorporated constraints as a \'ariable that 
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has an impact on bargaining outcomes (See Figure 1.3). 
Secondly, the Neo Bargaining Model removes the inherent redundancy between 
the variables of Grosse and Behrman's model. Among their three variables, the concepts 
of relative stakes and similarity of interest overlap because similarity of interests - that 
is, a high level of interdependency - entails high stakes for each party. As the variable of 
similarity of interests can be absorbed into the variable of relative stakes, in the new 
bargaining model, the similarity of interests dimension is removed and replaced by the 
dimension of constraints. 
Thirdly, the NBM renews outdated concepts in the Grosse and Behrman model. 
Despite its superior insight into business-government relations, it does not reflect recent 
changes. The NBM revises the old model and makes it more relevant in terms oftoday's 
reality. Moreover, the new model develops appropriate concepts of dimensions such as 
resources, states and constraints, which were not defined, and so were somewhat 
ambiguous in Grosse and Behrman's model. In their model, these elements are 
explained by a long list of examples without clear definitions. The NBM develops more 
relevant and comprehensive concepts, which can capture universal reality in firm-state 
relations, by accommodating recent debates. 
As we have already mentioned, the Neo Bargaining Model can be used for 
analysing the weaknesses and strengths of each party's bargaining power. Figure 1.2, 
which is constructed from the perspective of host countries, shows that their bargaining 
power is dependent on resources, stakes and constraints. According to the NBM, in 
order to increase its bargaining power, a host government should increase its bargaining 
d ease l'ts stakes and remove or minimize constraints. The point S indicates resources, ecr 
. t hl'ch the government maximizes its bargaining power and achieyes its goal. the pOInt a w 
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This model enables host governments to identify the sources of its weakness in terms of 
bargaining power, and offers an appropriate prescription by providing a general 
framework for interpreting the relationship between MNCs and host governments. 
Figure 1.3 shows how bargaining outcomes arise from interaction between MNCs and 
host governments, encompassing bargaining goals, resources, stakes and constraints. 
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Table 1.2 Neo Bargaining Model: Concepts of Elements 
Elements Concepts 
Relations Competition and Cooperation 
Goals Host Ultimate goal: maximisation of national wealth 
Country Immediate goal: strengthening its position to realise its ultimate goal 
MNC Ultimate goal: maximisation offmn's interest 
Immediate goal: strengthening its position to realise its ultimate goal 
Resources Host Location specific advantages 
Country - factors contributing realisation of a fmn's ultimate goal 
e.g. size of market, quantity and quality of factors of production 
MNC Firm specific advantages 
- factors contributing to realisation of a country's ultimate goal 
e.g. capital, technology, management know-how, marketing network 
Stakes Host Alternatives 
Country - presence of alternative economic development options 
Commitment 
- country's demand or attached importance on foreign resources 
MNC Alternatives 
- presence of locations substitutable 
Commitment 
_ fmn's demand or attached importance on a country's resource 
Constraints Host Internal 
Country _ pressure from interest groups, institutional strength 
External 
_ home countries, multilateral institutions 
MNC Internal 
_ pressure from interest groups. institutional strength 
. 
External 
_ home countries, multilateral institutions 
Outcomes 
Extent to which goals are achieved 
h h d 
Lawler 1981 Grosse and Behrman 1992. Dunmng 1993a, 1998b, (Bac arac an ' 
Loewendahl 2001, Ramamurti 2002, Luo 2004. Eden ef al200S) 
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In the first section, the Neo Bargaining Model was created. In the following section, we 
will explore the various arguments relating to development state in order to justify 
governments' intervention in their economies and thus strengthen our model. 
2. The Developmental Capitalist State 
The Diversity of Capitalism 
Since the end of the Cold War, capitalism has been in the ascendancy and free market 
principles seem to be the sole basis for managing economies. However, with close 
observation, differences can be found among market capitalist nations in terms of the 
way they manage their economies. In fact, there are varieties of capitalism among 
market economies according to the institutional arrangements in place for managing 
their market systems. 
Gilpin (2001) categorises national systems of political economy into three 
groups: American, Gennan and Japanese. While the American, British and other Anglo-
Saxon economies can be grouped into the same category of 'market-oriented capitalism'. 
the Gennan economy shares many features of a corporatist-type 'social market 
capitalism' with continental Europe, and the Japanese economy has provided the 
'developmental capitalism' model for its East Asian neighbours. Hall and Soskice 
(2001) classify capitalist states into two groups, as either 'liberal market economies' or 
'coordinated market economies'. According to them, the United States, the United 
Kingdom and other Anglo-Saxon countries are 'liberal market economies', while Japan, 
G d oth
er continental European countries are grouped as 'coordinated market 
ermanyan 
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economies'. Cerny (2000) places contemporary states into one of three categories: 
'developmental state', 'neo-liberal state' or 'neo-corporatist state'. 
This diversity of capitalism raises the question: why have the economies of 
capitalist countries developed in different ways? According to Gerschenkron (1962), the 
timing of industrialisation is a key factor determining the mechanism of capital 
accumulation and the overall structure of a nation's economic system. He argues that the 
difference in the development path followed by Britain, Germany and Russia can be 
attributed to the timing of their industrialisation. In contrast to Britain, which was the 
pioneer of industrialisation and which did not face strong international competition, 
Germany and Russia had to industrialise from positions of disadvantage and needed to 
compete with the forerunners. This late industrialisation urged them to fashion a 
different economic system, which relied more on banks and states. 
Gerschenkron's historical insight offers an important message that there is no 
regularity of economic progress, as modernisation theorists argue. Circumstances differ 
among nations and, consequently, their methods of dealing with challenges to their 
economic progress cannot be identical. Efforts to adapt to challenges in different 
contexts have given rise to the variety of economic systems among nations. The success 
of Germany, Japan and Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) in 'catching up' reveals 
that their institutional efforts were appropriate for a sudden great 'leap forward'. In fact, 
there is no orthodox system or superior system; there are only successfully adapted 
t 
. . cI'rcumstances A certain type of economy is not always the sole path 
sys ems In gIven . 
'ty.. the 1970s Germany was the miracle model but in the 1980s. attention 
to prospen ,In , 
. d J d I'n the 1990s the United States was the best performer. Therefore. it 
shlfte to apan an 
. th t one economic SYstem is superior to others and there are good reasons 
IS hard to say a . 
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why each successful system has developed as such (Gilpin 2001: 175-176). In the 
following section, a discussion of the political economic system developed by Japan and 
the East Asian NICs, which has been called 'developmental state capitalism' seeks to 
identify the reasons for their success. 
The Developmental State Arguments 
From the 1980s, the economic success of East Asia - specifically Japan and the NICs -
became a focus of attention for both academics and policy makers. Since the 1960s 
these countries have achieved impressive economic performance that was characterised 
by high growth rates, macroeconomic stability, thriving exports and relatively 
egalitarian distribution (O'Brien and Williams 2004: 263). Their success was distinctive 
because it was achieved a time of economic recession for the rest of world in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The success of these economies spurred a debate concerning the reasons for 
their achievements. 
The debate was dominated by two competing schools, namely the neo-liberal 
school and the developmental state school. The neo-liberals interpret the success of the 
East Asian economies as deriving from market-conforming economic development 
strategies and adherence to market principles. In other words, the East Asian countries 
were economically successful because they followed neo-liberal policy prescriptions; 
they opened their economies, limited the state's role to activate the market function 
properly and promoted export-led growth (Hughes 1989). However, this interpretation 
f h was ch
allenged by the developmental state school that emphasised the 
o t e success 
f h t t l·n the 'catch-up' process seen in East Asian countries. role 0 t e s a e 
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The theory of the developmental state is a collection of several important ideas, 
The seminal works are Chalmers Johnson's MITI and the Japanese Miracle (1982). 
which introduced the concept of the developmental state to academia; Gordon White's 
Developmental State in E;ast Asis (1988); Alice Amsden's Asia's Next Giant (1989), 
which deals with the industrialisation of Korea; Robert Wade's Governing the Market 
(1990), which explains Taiwan's economic success; Peter Evans' Embedded Autonomy 
(1995); Weiss and Hobson's States and Economic Development (1995) and Ha-Joon 
Chang's the Political Economy of Industrial Policy (1996), Although these works varied 
in terms of the focus of their interest and their interpretations of the success were 
different, the common theme from the analysis of each country is that the state played a 
great part in its economic development, which is contrary to the neo-liberal 
interpretation, 
In his study of the Japanese government's role in Japan's economic success, 
Johnson (1982) conceptualises the developmental state by distinguishing the plan-
rational system of the developmental state from both the plan-ideological system in the 
Soviet command state and the market-rational system in the regulatory state, From this 
classification, the core concepts of the developmental state can be extracted: firstly. it 
has the explicit goal of development (developmental); secondly. it relies more on the 
state's decisions for managing economic affairs (planned): nevertheless, thirdly, its 
, d " are ratl'onal namely market-conforming and thus do not contradict 
economIC eClslons " 
, 'I (t' nality) The plan-rational economic system of the developmental 
market pnnclp es ra 10 ' • 
, b' t' of a planned economic system which has long-term goals and a 
state IS the com Ina IOn 
th t arantees efficient resource distribution. Therefore. when the market system a gu 
k 11 't possesses both the advantages of the effectiveness of planned system wor s we . I 
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systems and the efficiency of market systems. What is the secret to making the system 
function well? Johnson identifies four essential features: a powerfuL competent 
bureaucracy; a political system in which the bureaucracy is given sufficient power: a 
cooperative relationship between the state and business that enables the governmenfs 
intervention to be market-conforming; and the presence of a pilot agency to drive the 
developmental agenda. 
White (1984, 1988) views the ideology of developmentalism as associated with 
the idea of the interventionist state and categorises developmental states into three 
types: state capitalist; intermediate regimes; and state socialist regimes. Among these, 
he argues that what is really meant by the developmental state is a 'state-capitalist' 
developmental state where the relationship between state and private capital involves 
both control and collaboration and in which the state itself acts as an economic 
entrepreneur and exercises a wide range of direct and indirect controls over the 
economic actors. He argues that the strength of a developmental state is dependent on 
three basic factors: its social nature; the state's politico-administrative capacity: and the 
modes of involvement of state organisation in social and economic processes to further 
industrialisation. He considers the economies of Taiwan and South Korea to be 'guided 
market economies' where the market is guided by the concept of long-term investment 
as formulated by government with the ultimate goal of national development. 
Amsden (1989) constructs an interpretation of Korean economic success based 
on several findings that run contrary to neo-liberal principles. Firstly, the Korean state 
. I . olved in the management of economic affairs by acting as an was actIve y Inv . 
banker' second I" it distorted the price structure to stimulate economic 
entrepreneur or a , .. 
. ., . t d of getting the relative price 'right' as dictated by market principles: 
actIVItIes Ins ea 
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thirdly, it disciplined business by using subsidies and other forms of support and used 
them to achieve the government's goal of industrialisation. Amsden~s main argument, 
however, is that Korea's success was not based on the adoption of free market 
principles, as the neo-liberals insist, but on the creation of appropriate institutions for 
late industrialisation, as Gerschenkron's late developers did. 
Wade (1990) proposes a 'governed market' theory from a study of the Taiwanese 
industrialisation process. The factors in the success that the theory points out are: firstl\', 
the high level of productive investment, which produces high level growth; secondly, 
greater investment in certain key industries than would have occurred in the absence of 
government intervention; and thirdly, the exposure of industries to international 
competition. The first and third factors of the above explanation are no more than the 
usual reasons cited by neo-classical economists for the success of the East Asian 
economies. The crucial insight of Wade's theory is the second element which 
emphasises state-directed investment to achieve long-term goals. He argues that without 
the governments' effort to spread or to socialise the risks associated with long-term 
investment, large-scale investment in strategic sectors would have been unlikely to take 
place. Wade further argues that the creation of the governed market in East Asian 
countries derives from the authoritarian characteristics of their political regimes; Korea 
and Taiwan can be seen as 'hard authoritarian~ while Japan can be called 'soft 
authoritarian'. In short, the theory says that the authoritarian nature of the political 
system confers the state with enough autonomy to allocate resources in line with long-
. I' terests This raises two questions: firstly, what is the mechanism that term natlona In . ~ 
c, I bureaucrats in authoritarian regimes pursuing their own interests and 
prevents powerlu 
h t make the right decisions for an unpredictable future? Secondly, does encourages t em 0 
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the end of an authoritarian regIme mean the demise of the developmental state? 
Definitive answers to both questions cannot be provided from his argument; the answers 
appear in the works of Evans (1995) and Weiss and Hobson (1995). 
Evans (1995) introduces the concept of 'embedded autonomy' which, he argues, 
must exist if the state is to be successfully involved in industrial transformation. 
Autonomy is an indispensable condition for achieving state goals, insulating states from 
particular interests. Yet, it is not sufficient in itself and must be combined with 
'embeddedness', which implies a concrete set of connections that links the state and 
non-state actors, through which the state is able to coordinate the economy and 
implement developmental objectives. A state that is only autonomous would be despotic 
or incapable because it would lack the ability to prevent individual incumbents from 
pursuing their own goals or it would require source of intelligence and ability to 
implement its policies. This can be called 'predatory state'. Only when embeddedness 
and autonomy are entwined in a balanced combination, can falling to the predatory 
stage be avoided and developmental tasks achieved. Therefore, Evans answers the first 
question, regarding mechanisms to control the bureaucrats' behaviour, by saying that it 
is 'embedded autonomy' that can not only stop their pursuit of self interest but also 
provide them with sufficient information and access to channels of implementation. 
Regarding the second question, he might reply 'yes': that is, the end of an authoritarian 
regime does indeed mean the demise of the developmental state. In fact, his concept of 
developmental states seems to have an authoritarian tinge in which a capable state leads 
a relatively weak society. He argues that the process of achieving a state"s 
developmental goals is the course that breeds its "gravediggers' (Evans 1995: 229). In 
other words, as a state undergoes economic development, the social groups which were 
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once obedient, following the state's directions find their VOIces and increasingly 
challenge the state's authority. Following this logic, a developmental state is inherently 
doomed to collapse. However, he rejects the idea of dismantling a developmental state; 
instead, he recommends the reconstruction of the state by accepting the 'gravediggers' 
into the system. 
Weiss and Hobson (1995) stress the 'governed interdependence' between an 
autonomous state and a well-organised business sector as the underlying institutional 
basis for effective market governance. They argue that when a state achieves governed 
interdependence, the state has the highest form of strength with the peak of 
infrastructural power, power which is enhanced by more institutionalised and 
cooperative relations with civil society. Governed interdependence, which has arisen 
from a strong society's linkage with the insulated state, could afford the coordination 
based on long-term calculation and the channels and intelligence that enable the 
successful design and implementation of transformative tasks. Therefore, for Weiss and 
Hobson, the answer to the first question regarding the successful mechanism of the state 
is the 'governed interdependence'. This is in a similar vein to Evans. However, as for 
the second question which concerns the future of developmental states, Weiss and 
Hobson hold a different view from Evans. According to them, as the private sector (the 
'gravedigger' in Evans' terminology) becomes strong, the outcome is not necessarily the 
weakening of the state. The state is able to maintain its high capacity in terms of 
achieving its transformative tasks, even though society's capacity to resist is also high. 
In fact, for them, this is the ideal stage that every state seeks to attain, in which a strong 
state links with a strong society. Therefore, according to their theory, even as 
denl0cratisation progresses the developmental state does not collapse. On the contrary, 
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it upgrades to a flexible state which is the best form of state for economic development. 
Chang (1996, 1999a) provides an analytic discussion of industrial policy and an 
economic theory of developmental states. He argues that state can coordinate 
complementary investment decision to prevent coordination failures, and can intervene 
in industries especially at the earlier phase of the product cycle. Such coordination and 
intervention would serve to increase the dynamism of the capitalist economy rather than 
diminish it. Moreover, he proposes necessary functions that successful developmental 
states have demonstrated, which are: coordination of investment plans; formulation of 
long-term vision; participation in institution building and mediation in conflicts that 
arise in the development trajectory. Finally, he posits the case of Korea as good example 
of how active intervention by a strong developmental state can minimise static 
inefficiency while maximising the dynamic efficiency of the economy. 
In summary, two major characteristics of developmental states can be abstracted 
from the debates discussed above: autonomy and capacity. Autonomy is crucial because 
it prevents a state from being held hostage by special interests and enables the state to 
pursue long-term goals. Capacity means a state~s capacity to make the right decisions-
practically and morally - for attaining its goals. Therefore a state's capacity is achieved 
when it has well-functioning institutions that design and implement policies effectively 
and efficiently and also when it has a mechanism that guarantees that public servants 
will serve public interests. The major discordances among the developmental state 
theorists are derived from the differences in their proposed methods of attaining this 
capacity. Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) regard competent 
bureaucrats and powerful pilot agencies as the origins of state capacity, while Evans 
(1995) and Weiss and Hobson (1995) highlight the strong inter-relationship between 
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state and society as the main source of the capacity. However, there is a clear consensus 
in these works and among these scholars that autonomy and capacity are core elements 
of the developmental state. 
The Interpretations of the Asian Economic Crisis 
In the above debate regarding the interpretation of East Asia's economIC success, 
supporters of the state appeared to have triumphed over the proponents of the free 
market economy with the widespread and growing acknowledgement - even at the 
World Bank (1993, 1997), the home of the neo-liberals - of the role played by East 
Asian governments in the region's economic success. However, the Asian economic 
crisis re-opened the debate about the role of the state in the region~s industrialisation. 
Neo-liberals argued that the main reason for the crisis was government intervention and 
that East Asian governments should not intervene in the economy but should rather 
adopt the neoclassical development model based on the free market. According to them, 
moral hazard and overinvestment, which were caused by the close ties between 
government, banks and industry, ultimately led to the crisis. Krugman (l998a) argued 
that 'long-standing' government protection in the market led corporations and financial 
intermediaries to undertake excessively risky investment and indeed, over-investment, 
so causing overall inefficiencies of the economy that finally caused the crisis. IS Min 
(1999) concluded that the crisis was a direct result of financial vulnerability, which was 
caused by moral hazard with the absence of prudential regulation in the process of 
15 Krugman (1994) even rejected the existence of an 'East Asian miracle' and argued that the 
developmental experience of these economies was not miraculous but was simply a neo-classical growth 
model of development at work in which their economic success was merely fuelled by mobilising 
resources rather than innovation and productivity growth. 
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market liberalisation. Flynn (1999) and Henke and Boxill (2000) also pointed out the 
limitations of, and problems inherent in the developmental state model in the wake of 
the crisiS. 16 
In contrast, for proponents of the developmental state, the main reason for the 
crisis was not an excess of government intervention but rather a lack of government 
regulation. Amsden and Euh (1997) argued that the crisis was mainly caused by overly 
rapid liberalisation of the financial sector; and that the freeing up of the foreign 
exchange market had resulted in overvalued exchange rate, which eventually rendered 
the economy susceptible to speculative attack. Johnson (1998) was against the view that 
'crony capitalism' was the main reason of the crisis and argued that the meltdown was 
caused much more by under-regulation than by corruption or any other side effects of an 
overly close relationship between businesses and the government. In a similar vein, 
Weiss (1999) and Chang (1999b) argued that the crisis was provoked by uncontrolled 
rapid capital inflow and outflow, which resulted from the premature liberalisation of 
financial markets and capital accounts without adequate monitoring and supervision. 
Therefore, in their view, the cause of the crisis was the demise of the developmental 
state rather than the developmental state itself. 
These differing interpretations by both schools raise an important question about 
the cause of the Asian crisis: was it the outcome of the system~s inherent problems or 
the result of a simple malfunction? The neo-liberals take the former view and argue that 
the system should be abandoned. However, the developmental state theorists contend 
16 Maswood (2002) criticised the developmental state argument on the grounds that it failed to define 
state intervention and to establish cogent theoretical justification for such intervention. He argues that 
there is confusion as to how to define state intervention as the main characteristics of the developmental 
state in terms of its type and level among developmental theorists and also the theorisation of the 
developmental state model, which was mainly based on the empirical example of East Asian countries, 
was neither sophisticated nor consistent. 
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that, as the crisis resulted from a malfunction of the system, the system has to be fixed if 
it is to function well. These interpretations are closely related to the predictions of the 
future of the developmental states. 
The Future of Developmental States 
It appears from the literatures that there are three possible future incarnations for the 
developmental states: regulatory state, social corporatist developmental state and 
transformative state. The first viewpoint is based on neoclassical convergence theory: as 
economies grow and economic globalisation progresses, national differences will 
disappear and the economies will converge into Anglo-American regulatory states. In a 
regulatory state, a state acts as a regulator and an umpire for economic activities. The 
state places emphasis upon the establishment of legal institutions in order to let the 
market function well. The proponents of this standpoint argue that the East Asian 
economies, which are mutations of capitalism, have inherent drawbacks in their system. 
The crisis was, they argue, pre-destined because of the developmental state's flawed 
structure which inevitably entails moral hazard and inefficiency; moving away from the 
state-led development model is inescapable, and globalisation will drive them towards a 
neo-liberal regulatory model (Maswood 2002, Pirie 2005). 
The second scenario emphasises the state's role In conflict management, 
considering the possibilities of a social corporatist developmental state (Evans 1995. 
Johnson 1994). According to Evans (1995), the developmental states created exclusive 
connections with businesses in order to focus on industrial transformation projects 
during the industrialisation process. Although embeddedness in this context involved 
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only states and businesses, embeddedness does not necessarily, he argues, take the form 
of exclusionary ties to industrialists; it could be enlarged and include labour. The basic 
idea of this argument is that bringing in social corporatism could make the 
developmental state more sustainable by correcting the innate imbalance in the 
developmental state. These views may be more wishful thinking than an accurate 
description of the current situation. However, there is a clear possibility to make the 
developmental state more sustainable by strengthening the relationships between 
government, business and labour. 
The third view is the continuation of the developmental state (Weiss and Hobson 
1995, Weiss 1998, Weiss 2000, Chang 1999b). In contrast with the convergence 
argument, they argue that national differences are likely to become more pronounced as 
globalisation progresses and that developmental states will continue, charged with 
different tasks, rather than fading away. In their view, the developmental state is not a 
transitional form which arose and disappeared in the process of progression to a mature 
form of capitalism, but rather one variety among many diverse forms of capitalism. 
According to Weiss and Hobson (1995), as the developmental state becomes mature, it 
turns into a flexible state, an upgraded version of the developmental state, which has 
different goals, relations and behaviour pattern but still possesses long-term vision and 
engages in institutionalised collaboration. This state acts as entrepreneur by providing a 
vision for the future of the economy and coordinating resources. The developmental 
state was created to enable economies to 'catch up' but catching-up does not mean the 
end of the developmental state. The state will have new tasks to perform such as 
'keeping up' or 'staying ahead', thus Weiss (2000: 29) prefers the term 'transformative 
state' to 'developmental state'. 
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The future path of the developmental state seems to depend on the viability of 
the state's role in the market; when the role of the state is denied by the market the state 
tends to be a regulatory state; when the role of the state is accepted in the market, the 
state is likely to be a corporatist or transformative state. The next section will provide 
the justifications for an active state role in the market by comparing the views of neo-
liberals and developmental theorists. 
Legitimating the Active Role of States in the Market 
To predict the viability of the developmental system, the state's activity in the market, 
which is the essence of the developmental state model, should be justified. If a 
government's intervention continues to produce disastrous consequences like the 1997 
Asian crisis and developing mechanisms to prevent those disasters is impossible, as 
neo-liberals argue, the developmental state system should be abandoned. However, if 
there are devices that can prevent the negative effects of government intervention, such 
intervention can correct the weaknesses of a neo-liberal economy. 
As far as the role of the state in the market is concerned, the neo-liberal view is 
that the state's role should be minimised for smooth operation of market forces. To the 
neo-liberals, less intervention produces better economic performance. There are three 
major components in their view of the role of states. Firstly, the state should limit its 
role to that of night-watchman. Secondly, the state is seen as an agent who serves the 
interests of a powerful group of insiders and outsiders, thus the activities of the state can 
be captured by particular interests. Thirdly, there are government failures such as lack of 
information and the rent-seeking cost of private agents. Due to this, state intervention is 
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likely to produce inefficiencies in allocation and rent-seeking waste rather than 
correction of market failures (Chang 2003: 47-48). Simply put, according to neo-liberals, 
the state should not intervene in the markets because the state can be captured by special 
interests and government failures can occur. 
However, the neo-liberal economy in which the market dominates is also argued 
to have many drawbacks (Chang 1999a). Firstly, neo-liberals underestimate the extent 
of market failures. Secondly, neo-liberal economies can lead to 'short-termism' because 
they are based on the belief that achieving short-term efficiency will automatically lead 
to the realization of long-term goals. Thirdly, the neo-liberals want to separate politics 
from economics, which can lead to undesirable social effects such as the concentration 
of wealth, because they regard politics as an irrationality that inhibits rationality in the 
economy. These problems can be solved by active government intervention. 
Governments can prevent market failures by providing public goods, curbing the non-
competitive market and compensating externalities. Governments can drive forward 
long-term goals which sometimes demand the sacrifice of short-term efficiency and 
economic policies with political consideration can produce more desirable social 
outcomes. The problem lies with the costs and benefits of government intervention. The 
neo-liberals content that the costs of government intervention are greater than its 
benefits and that the costs cannot be reduced. However the developmental theorists 
maintain that the costs of government intervention can be lessened and that this can lead 
to a situation that the benefits outweigh the costs. 
The key is how the state creates appropriate institutions to remove or reduce the 
possible problems arising from state intervention. According to the developmental 
theorists, the key is achieving "autonomy' and "capacity'. By attaining autonomy. the 
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state is able to avoid being captured by special interests and can pursue long-term 
development goals. Through enhancing capacity, the state can overcome the pitfalls of 
government failures. Developmental theorists believe that many institutional 
arrangements contribute to the enhancement of state capacities including powerful pilot 
agenCIes, competent bureaucrats, 'embedded autonomy' and 'governed 
interdependence'. Such institutions reduce information costs and rent-seeking waste, 
and increase intelligence and implementation efficiencies. A huge amount of empirical 
evidence for how the state realises autonomy and capacity is shown in developmental 
state literature (Johnson 1982, Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Evan 1995, Weiss and 
Hobson 1995). This state intervention, from which the potential negative effects are 
removed (or reduced), succeeded in solving the shortcomings of the neo-liberal 
economy and resulted in the region's achievements in terms of 'catching-up'. However, 
the developmental states do not need to stop their developmental tasks; they still need to 
keep up or stay ahead (Weiss 2000). Insofar as the negative effects of state intervention 
can be minimised by various creative institutions, the role of the state as an entrepreneur 
and a coordinator of the market can be continued. 
3. Combination of the Neo Bargaining Model and Developmental State 
Theories 
In this chapter, the first section constructed the Neo Bargaining Model and the second 
section legitimated the active role of the state in the market. Although these two views 
are ostensibly isolated from each other, in this study, the two different developments 
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complement each other. First, the NBM was strengthened by developmental state 
theories. This novel model was developed to provide an analytical framework for 
business-government relations, based on the assumption that FDI does not have 
universal effects and that those effects are dependent on the host countries' bargaining 
power. The advantage of the NBM is that it enables a government to diagnose its 
strengths and weaknesses, and to find ways to increase its bargaining power. Therefore, 
the NBM presupposes that the government can intervene in the market to increase state 
bargaining power. However, there are some misgivings about state intervention in 
economic activities; these argue that the state's intervention is futile or harmful. If the 
state's efforts are in vain, the bargaining model is useless. Therefore, theories of the 
validity of state intervention are needed, namely developmental state theories whose 
arguments justify government interventions. This rationalisation of government 
intervention confers viability on the bargaining model. 
Secondly and conversely, the developmental state theories could be enhanced by 
incorporating the NBM. As has been pointed out above, most developmental theories 
have largely focussed on state-domestic capital relations rather than state-MNC 
relations. The arguments of the 'disciplined market' (Amsden 1989) and 'governed 
market' (Wade 1990) emphasise state domination over domestic capital and the theories 
of 'embedded autonomi (Evans 1995) and 'governed interdependence' (Weiss and 
Hobson 1995) stress the cooperative aspects of government-business relations. Their 
concerns principally concentrated on relationships between governments and domestic 
capital. However, currently, the influence of MNCs in the domestic economy is 
becoming stronger, and also, domestic companies are themselves becoming 
multinationals by locating their subsidiaries in various countries. State-MNC relations 
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are increasingly important and draw greater attention from academics and policy makers. 
Thus, how the state deals with global capital is becoming a more important subject in 
developmental state theories. 
In this context, some developmental theorists (Chang 2003, Weiss 1998, 2003a) 
are concerned with the state's role in the globalising era and conclude that the state will 
have a more important role in the market as the globalisation process intensifies, 
opposing the orthodox view of the demise of state power. The NBM is in line with their 
views and complements their thesis by providing an analytic tool for investigating state-
MNC relations. Using the NBM, how the developmental state has strengthened or 
weakened its power vis-a-vis MNCs or what factors have affected power shifts can be 
identified. Moreover, the NBM offers prescriptions to states for how they can strengthen 
(or avoid any weakening of) their bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs. These could help 
states to restore (or sustain) their developmentalism in a globalising world where MNCs 
are playing a larger role in many economies. In summary, this chapter contributes to 
both theories of the bargaining model and the developmental state by providing insights 
that complement each other. Next, the Neo Bargaining Model developed in this chapter 
will be applied to the rise and decline of the Korean developmental state. 
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Chapter Two: Economic Context 
In this chapter, we briefly review Korea's modem political economy from a historical 
perspective to provide the context for the discussion of inward foreign direct investment 
(IFDI) in Korea in the following chapter. We begin by constructing a periodisation of 
the time span covered by this study and then, using this as a foundation, we briefly 
analyse Korea's economy in each of the three periods. 
1. Periodisation 
'The miracle on the Han River' refers to Korea's rapid economic growth over the past 
50 years. In the first half of the 20th century, Korea suffered from a succession of 
tragedies: occupation by the Japanese (1910-1945) as a result of imperial competition in 
the 19th century, the division of the Korean peninsula into South and North (1945) in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, and the Korean War (1950-1953), the first 'hot' 
conflict of the Cold War. During the Japanese colonial occupation, as the Korean 
economy took on the characteristics of an implanted colonial capitalism, Korea turned 
into a supplier of raw materials as well as a market for manufactured Japanese goods. 
With all economic policies implemented for the benefit of Japan rather than Korea, the 
industrial growth achieved during Japanese colonial rule was almost negligible as well 
as meaningless for the majority Koreans (Lee 2004: 48-52).17 Furthermore, the war 
17 Sub (1978) calculated economic growth on the Korean Peninsula during the Japanese colonial period 
at approximately 3 percent with little fluctuation. Although he acknowledged there were significant 
contributions by Japanese colonial rule to the economic growth of Korea, he argued that the majority of 
inhabitants in Korea were largely deprived of any benefits resulting from the overall growth of the 
economy as a whole. This, he reasoned, was because growth without accompanying modernisation of the 
social structure and organisational framework was bound to create total exhaustion of resources. He 
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destroyed nearly two thirds of the Korea's production capacity and killed almost one 
million civilians, or five percent of the total population. After the war, Korea relied 
heavily on foreign aid to support its impoverished economy; between 1953 and 1961, 
foreign aid amounted to USD 2 billion, equivalent to 16 percent of Korea's gross 
domestic product (GDP) of USD 13 billion during the period (Sakong 1993: 96-102). 
However, Korea, which was one of the poorest countries in the world in the 1950s, grew 
to be the world's 12th largest economy in 2005 (NSO 2006). In 1953, when the Korean 
War ended, Korea's gross domestic product (GDP) was a mere USD 1.3 million and per 
capita income stood at just USD 67; by 2005, GDP had soared to USD 787.5 billion 
while per capita income had increased to USD 16,291 (see Table A).I8 In the latter part 
of the 20th century Korea's economic performance was truly remarkable. 
The takeoff of the Korean economy started in 1962, a year that is significant for 
several reasons. Firstly, 1962 was the first year in which the first Five-year Economic 
Development Plan was implemented. 19 The Korean government was determined to 
develop its economy using a set of goals and detailed action plans. The series of five-
year development plans implemented between 1962 and 1996 provided a road map for 
Korea's economic development. Secondly, in 1962 the government started an export-
oriented development strategy under the banner of 'nation building through exports' 
(suchool ipkuk). Thirdly, the first case of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) was 
registered in Korea in 1962. As foreign aid from the United States (US), which had been 
concluded that the colonial development produced both contributions and impediments to the Korean 
economy that became apparent after national liberation in 1945. 
18 Table A, B, C, D and E are available in Appendices. 
19 The Korean government established five-year development plans from 1962 to 1996. In al1, there were 
seven five-year development plans between 1962 and 1996: the first (1962-1966), the second (1967-
1971), the third (1972-1976), the fourth (1977-1981), the fifth (1982-1986), the sixth (1987-1991), and 
the seventh (1992-1996). From 1982, the official name of the plans was changed from 'Five-year 
Economic Development Plan' to 'Five-year Socio-economic Development Plan." For more details on the 
five-year development plans, see Gang Gwang-Ha (2000). 
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a major source of support for the Korean economy after the Korean War, decreased 
following a shift in US aid policy after 1960, the Korean government needed foreign 
capital in a form other than aid to sustain the economy and promote economic 
development. The government enacted the Foreign Capital Inducement Promotion Act 
in 1960 and took measures to promote IFDI and induce foreign loans. In view of these 
developments, we use 1962 as the starting point for our examination of the relationship 
between the state and the market and between the state and MNCs. 
Figure 2.1 Korean Economy: Annual Growth Rates 1962-2005 (Unit: %) 
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Since 1962, the Korean economy has grown rapidly; between 1962 and 2005, the 
average GDP growth rate was 7.5 percent, the average per capita income growth rate 
was 11.0 percent, and the average export growth rate was 24.3 percent (BOK 2005). As 
can be seen in Figure 2.1, the Korean economy grew at a rate of more than 5 percent per 
annum during most of the period, although it underwent ten periods of economic 
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fluctuation and, in 1980 and 1998, Korea recorded negative rates of economic growth of 
minus 1.5 percent and minus 6.9 percent, respectively. These were not just cyclical 
economic downturns but were actual economic crises that were triggered by a 
combination of internal structural problems and external shocks. The crisis in 1980 
occurred when the innate problems of a state-led economy in the 1960s and 1970s were 
compounded by the second oil shock. The economic crisis in 1998 was triggered by the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, coupled with the gradual loss of latecomer advantages 
from the beginning of the 1990s.2o 
These two crises led the Korean government to make fundamental changes in 
economic policy, creating the momentum for changes in the relationship between the 
state and the market. During the process of recovery from the crises, the nature of the 
Korean economy changed fundamentally; before 1980 (during the presidency of Park 
Chung-Hee between 1962 and 1979) the state dominated the market and virtually 
controlled the economy (Amsden 1989). The years from 1980 to 1997 were a 
transitional period that saw the beginnings of a shift away from a state-led economy 
towards a market-oriented economy, with both models competing with each other for 
dominance (Park 2005). Since 1998, the government's role in the economy has 
diminished while market principles have been reinforced by the reform and 
restructuring programmes implemented after the 1997-8 crisis (Pirie 2005). In this most 
recent era, the market has dominated the state. It can be argued that the crises of 1980 
and 1998 were turning points that mark critical changes in the characteristics of the 
economy. Thus, this thesis divides the 43 years between 1962 and 2005 into three 
20 The Asian economic crisis that began in Thailand and spread to Korea in late 1997, triggering the 
Korean financial crisis that year and resulting in numerous bankruptcies, soaring unemployment, and 
negative growth in 1998 (Go 2005: 177). As the fi~ancial c.ri~is in .1997 turned into an economic crisis in 
1998 in this thesis we include both 1997 and 1998 In the cnsls penod. , 
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phases, using the crisis years of 1980 and 1998 as milestones: 
(1) State over market (SOM) phase (1962-1979) 
(2) Transitional phase (1980-1997) 
(3) Market over state (MOS) phase (1998-2005) 
2. Economic Context 
State over Market Phase (1962-1979) 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Korea's economic performance was outstanding: the 
average annual growth rate between 1962 and 1979 was 9.8 percent and per capita 
gross national income (ONI) soared from USD 87 in 1962 to USD 1,676 in 1979. As the 
industrial structure changed dramatically, the proportion of the economy accounted for 
by primary industries diminished from 37.0 percent in 1962 to 20.9 percent in 1979, 
while the manufacturing sector's share expanded from 16.4 percent to 25.9 percent in 
the same period. Exports grew at an average annual rate of 40 percent, rising from USD 
55 million in 1962 to USD 15.1 billion in 1979 (BOK 2005, BOK 2006). 
If developmental states are defined as states that pursue their developmental 
goals with appropriate capabilities (Leftwich 1995: 401),21 then Korea during President 
Park Chung-Hee 's term of office (1962-1979) was a typical model of a developmental 
21 Leftwich (1995: 401) defines developmental states as such: 'states whose politics have concentrated 
sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of 
explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of 
economic growth, or by organising it directly. or a varying combination of both'. 
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state. The government set clear goals for development, planned the prOVISIOn and 
distribution of resources through the competent pilot agency, and used a variety of 
intervention measures to drive companies in the desired direction. The government 
often set various prices including exchange rates, interest rates, and prices for consumer 
and agricultural products, and used a system of rewards and punishment to discipline 
business and entrepreneurs. Thus, the market was manipulated and distorted in 
accordance with the state's goals (Amsden 1989). 
This phase can be divided into two distinct periods: the first from 1962 to 1971 
and the second from 1972 to 1979 (Woo 1991). In the first period, the Korean 
government pursued export-oriented industrialisation focusing on labour-intensive light 
industry; in contrast, the second period is characterised by a shift in policy emphasis 
from labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries. From 1962 the Korean government 
started an 'export-oriented development strategy', which was influenced by the nation's 
factor endowments in this early stage of Korean industrialisation. In this period, the 
only resource the country possessed was abundant and low-cost labour; accumulation of 
domestic capital had not yet taken place and technology remained undeveloped. In this 
situation, the government's strategic exploitation of the country's comparative 
advantage of cheap labour was a natural and rational approach to its goal of 
industrialisation. The state encouraged firms to produce labour-intensive light industrial 
products such as textiles and shoes and export them to the world market. This was an 
effective strategy at the time, but simply exploiting the comparative advantage of cheap 
labour was not enough. The government created additional comparative advantages in 
order to make Korean exporters more competitive. Throughout this period, the 
government put all its efforts into boosting exports, to the extent that one consider its 
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economic policy to have been more of an export policy. The state restricted imports 
while manipulating exchange and interest rates to provide incentives to exporters; 
commercial banks that had been nationalised offered favourable loans to exporters and 
many special-purpose banks were established to support export industries.22 As a result 
of these concerted efforts, the government achieved an average annual growth rate of 39 
percent for exports between 1962 and 1971 (BOK 2006). 
However, despite the rapid expansion of exports, the country's current account 
showed a deficit throughout the 1960s, primarily because of the rapid growth of imports. 
This was a reflection of Korea's industrial structure at that time, as higher levels of 
production of finished goods entailed greater imports of capital and intermediate goods. 
The government realised that, without investment in capital-intensive industries, and 
specifically in heavy and chemical industries, imports of capital and intermediate goods 
would remain at high levels and the balance of payments situation would not improve 
(Kim and Kim 1997: 22). In addition, changes in international relations in East Asia in 
the early 1970s, including the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 and the 
subsequent rapprochement between the United States and China in 1972, prompted the 
Korean government to realise the necessity of building a domestic defence industry for 
its own survival.23 The development of a national defence industry required, in tum, 
investment in heavy and chemical industries (Oh 2006: 221). 
Thus, from the early 1970s onwards, the government actively promoted the 
development of heavy and chemical industries and for this reason, government 
22 President Park nationalised all commercial banks when he took office in 1961 and established state 
banks including the Korea Development Bank (KDB), the Korea Export-Import Bank (KEIB), and the 
Foreign Exchange Bank to serve specific government goals. Th~ priv~tisati?n of these banks began in the 
1980s durino the presidency ofChun Doo-Hwan. For more detaIled dISCUSSIon, see Chapter Three 
23 President' Nixon declared in a press conference in Guam on July 25, 1969 that the United States 
henceforth expected its allies to take care of their own military defence (Cha 2004: 143). 
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economic policy in the 1970s is characterised as a 'Heavy and Chemical Industry 
Policy' (HCIP). The strength of the policy lay in selection and concentration: that is. the 
careful choice of industries and the concentration of investment in them. The Park 
government selected and invested heavily in six key industries: steel, nonferrous metals. 
machinery (including automobiles), shipbuilding, petrochemicals, and electronics (Lee 
2005: 439). Investment in these industries accounted for 57 percent of total 
manufacturing investment in the first half of the 1970s and 64 percent in the latter half 
of the decade (Kim and Kim 1997: 22). In order to implement the HCIP, the government 
mobilised the necessary resources including capital, technology, technical manpower, 
and industrial sites and channelled these resources to selected finns. The government 
offered preferential long-tenn financing and generous tax incentives to the companies 
concerned; it was through this process that selected companies grew into conglomerates 
or chaebol. The Chaebol acted as agencies for realising government goals in the SOM 
period. The state designated strategic industries and selected companies to carry out the 
task of industrialisation while providing them with subsidies and protection. The 
government also nurtured domestic capital by restricting foreign companies' access to 
the local market and regulating market entry (Shin and Chang 2003: 13). 
Thanks to the massive investment in the heavy and chemical industries in the 
1970s, Korea was able to achieve high growth and capital accumulation throughout the 
decade. However, the government's HCI policy also resulted in high inflation and 
substantial foreign debts. Throughout the 1970s, due to a long period of excessive 
demand, the annual average increase rate for the GDP deflator was 20.6 percent (see 
Table A). Substantial investments in the heavy and chemical industries, combined with 
the Middle East construction boom for Korean finns after the first oil shock, led to 
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increasing excess demand pressure (Sakong 1993: 4). In addition, the governmenfs 
dependence on foreign loans as a source of capital for funding the HCIP led to a rapid 
increase in levels of foreign debt as companies continued to invest in the heavy and 
chemical industries. Korea's foreign debt increased almost six-fold from USD 3.5 
billion in 1972 to USD 20 billion in 1979. Meanwhile, the second oil shock hit the 
global economy in 1979, and Korea encountered an economic crisis in 1980, resulting 
in negative growth for the first time since 1960. Many companies that had invested 
heavily in the heavy and chemical sectors became insolvent as operating rates fell, 
provoking criticisms that the HCIP had led to a waste of resources and that the 
government's HCIP had failed (Lee 2005: 477).24 As we shall see, the crisis in 1980 led 
to a new phase in the development of the Korean economy. 
Transitional Phase (1980-1997) 
The second phase runs from 1980 to 1997, a period in which the presidential office 
changed hands from Chun Doo-Hwan (1980 to 1988) to Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1993) and 
finally to Kim Young-Sam (1993-1998). This phase began with the severe economic 
slump of 1980, when the Korean economy recorded a negative growth rate of minus 1.5 
percent. In addition, the inflation soared and the current account deficit reached a record 
level ofUSD 5.3 billion (Sakong 1993: 4). As we have seen, Korea's problems in 1980 
were amplified by economic and political issues that occurred at the end of the 1970s: 
24 The rate of operation in the manufacturing sector plunged from 82 percent in 1979 to 72 percent in 
1980. The decline was greater in the heavy and chemical industries, where the operation rate fell from 60 
percent to 42 percent in the machinery industry and from 69 percent to 57 percent in the electrical 
equipment industry. A total of 45 percent of companies in the heavy and chemical industries were making 
a loss in 1980 (Lee 2005: 477). 
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the second oil shock in 1979 and the assassination of President Park in 1979. Put simply, 
Korea in 1980 was in crisis. 
From the beginning of transitional phase, the power of the Korean 
developmental state began to wane due to the growth of social and market forces; that is, 
the state's power weakened while the market's power was reinforced (Evans 1995: 229-
234). As the big business conglomerates or chaebol continued to expand and diversify, 
they tried to break free from government control. Furthermore, increases in the power of 
civil society, including resistance from labour unions and students, increased, led to a 
further weakening of the power of the state waned. As proponents of free market 
principles increased in number in the Korean bureaucracy, economic policy swung 
between state-centred and market-centred approaches. However, developmental policies 
did not disintegrate completely during this transitional period even as the state's power 
gradually weakened; rather the relationship between the state and the market evolved 
into a more equal and competitive one. 
President Chun Doo-Hwan took power during the political turmoil that followed 
the assassination of President Park in 1979. With the onset of the Chun administration 
(1980-1988), a group of US-trained economists emerged who opposed state-led, 
growth-oriented protectionism and valued stability and market function (Amsden 1994). 
With the implementation of the policies formulated by these economists, the focus of 
the government's economic efforts moved from growth to stabilisation, bringing the 
economy into a new phase. However, President Chun was not himself a neo-liberal and 
developmental state ideology continued to permeate the system during his 
administration (Shin and Chang 2003: 67). 
The stabilisation measures implemented in the early 1980s proved successful; 
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the average annual rate of inflation, which had averaged 25 percent in 1980-1981, 
decelerated to 2-3 percent between 1983 and 1988 (Kim and Kim 1997: 34). 
Furthermore, growth was not sacrificed for stability and the annual GDP growth rate 
between 1981 and 1987 was 8.7 percent. The Korean economy also recorded current 
account surpluses during 1986-1988; the rapid rate of economic growth and the 
improvement in the balance of payments situation were due to favourable international 
circumstances known as the 'three lows': the low value of the dollar relative to the 
Japanese yen, low international interest rates, and low international oil prices (Lee 
2005). 
The appreciation of the Japanese yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985 allowed 
Korean companies to gain price competitiveness in almost all their products that 
competed with Japanese goods in the world's export markets. Oil prices, which rose 
sharply during the second oil shock in 1979, plummeted in the mid-1980s as the United 
Kingdom (UK) embarked on oil exploration in the North Sea, and Iraq increased 
production to prepare for the Iran-Iraq War. Since crude oil was Korea's biggest import 
accounting for 15 percent in 1985, the decrease in oil prices contributed significantly to 
the improvement in Korea's international balance of payments. Finally, lower 
international interest rates, which were caused by falling interest rates in the United 
States (US) in the mid-1980s, eased the burden of interest and principal repayments on 
Korea, which, as we have seen, had high levels of foreign debt (Lee 2005: 478).25 
This favourable environment in the mid 1980s solved the problems that had 
appeared in the late 1970s, such as the overcapacity in the heavy and chemical 
25 Korea's foreign debts continued to increase after it started to promote the heavy and chemical 
industries in the 1970s. As of 1985, Korea was the fourth largest debtor nation in the world with foreign 
debts of USD 46 billion, accounting for 48 percent of its gross national product that year (MOF 1991 b: 
15). 
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industries and foreign debts. Between 1986 and 1989, the Korean economy recorded a 
substantial trade surplus for the first time in its modern history and average 11 percent 
of GDP growth (BOK 2006). Heavy and chemical industry factories that had lain idle at 
the end of the 1970s began to operate at full capacity and the products of the heavy and 
chemical industries, such as steel, ships, automobiles and electronics, became Korea's 
main export items. 
Problems surrounding the legitimacy problem of the Chun administration, which 
had come to power though a military coup after the assassination of President Park in 
1979, erupted in massive demonstrations in the late 1980s. This democratic movement 
forced the government to issue the '6.29 statement' in June 1987, promising significant 
democratisation measures, including the holding of direct presidential elections, the 
formation of free and effective trade unions, and measures to promote political 
democratisation. As we shall see, the 1987 democracy movement had significant 
implications for the continuing development of the Korean economy. 
When President Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1993) took office in the wake of the 
democracy movement of 1987, he inherited a stable and rapidly-growing economy from 
the previous administration. Although the Chun government had simultaneously 
achieved the conflicting economic goals of growth and stability, this economic success 
had come at a price and the new president faced challenges at home and overseas. With 
the economy performing well, workers who had endured low wages under the previous 
authoritarian regimes, began to demand their share of the benefits of economic growth 
as the new democratic regime was established (Koo 2001). In addition, the chaebol. 
which had grown rapidly thanks to government protection and preferential treatment, 
now wished to escape the government's control as they continued to expand their 
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business empues (Kim 1994). The United States, which had provided economIC 
assistance to its poorer ally during the Cold War, started to put pressure on Korea to 
open its markets to foreign goods and services as the Cold War military confrontation 
relaxed and its trade deficit with Korea grew (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2001: 408). 
After the economic boom of the late 1980s, GDP and export growth rates 
dwindled, the balance of payments situation deteriorated, and the rate of inflation 
increased from 1989 onwards. The immediate cause of the economic slowdown was the 
increase in and intensification of labour disputes; these were closely related to the 
political democratisation process in Korea described above which provided the 
momentum for unions' demands, ritherto suppressed, for political participation and 
economic benefits. Labour disputes spread rapidly throughout the country, increasing 
from 276 cases in 1986 to 3,749 in 1987 and this growing labour movement resulted in 
massive increases in wages, prompting not only foreign companies but also Korean 
companies to reconsider their investment plans for Korea (Kim and Sung 2005). The 
increase in labour costs was inevitable as the economy developed and democracy 
progressed and, in order to adapt to the new business circumstances, companies should 
have endeavoured to shift their production to more technology-based structures through 
investment in capital infrastructure and research and development (R&D). In the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s, technology had not been a key factor in Korea's economic 
development; at that stage, mature or standard technology sufficed, and it was relatively 
easy to obtain from developed countries (Amsden 1989). Economic development in 
these periods was predominantly enabled by increases in labour and capital input. 
However, entering a new stage with relatively high labour costs, Korean companies 
required newer and more advanced technologies, which developed countries were 
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reluctant to transfer. Since the 1990s, the development of new technology has been a 
crucial factor in further development for Korean companies that could no longer rely on 
latecomer's advantages. However, rather than investing in R&D, the chaebol were 
seeking easier ways to sustain their business by speculative investment in real estate and 
the diversification of their businesses. Although the government sought to force 
businesses to sell their non-commercial real estate and refrain from excessive 
diversification (Gang 1994, Go 2005), the chaebol, had grown to the point where they 
could challenge the state and would not follow the government's guidance.26 Instead, 
they publicly demanded that the government retreat from the market (Bishop 1997: 110) 
and the government was unable to channel resources to support its plans and policies 
due to its weakened autonomy and capacity. 
President Kim Young-Sam (1993-1998) took office amid a post-Cold War 
atmosphere: the Berlin Wall was tom down in 1989, the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, 
and the Uruguay Round was concluded in December 1993, foreshadowing the launch of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995. A key policy objective for the Kim 
government was seeking membership of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) in 1996, which would require comprehensive liberalisation 
measures. In accordance with the changes in the international environment, the Kim 
administration placed globalisation (Segyehwa) at the top of its policy agenda and 
announced a 'globalisation road map' in November 1994, a month before the National 
Assembly ratified the joining of the WTO. President Kim's globalisation road map 
26 For instance, the chaebol were reluctant to follow the demands for 'the compulsory sale of non-
business real estate owned by conglomerates' made by the Roh Tae-Woo administration, and they filed a 
civil suits or unconstitutionality suits against the state (Gang 1994: 65). The Kim Young-Sam 
administration tried to implement measures relating to the diversification of ownership and the 
specialisation of chaebol businesses, but made little progress since the measures were either shelved or 
diluted in the face of the powerful chaebol lobby (Go 2005: 98). 
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included economic liberalisation policies such as the opening of the domestic goods and 
capital markets, the easing of regulations, the privatisation of parts of the public sector~ 
and the creation of a flexible labour market. 
One drastic change was the implementation of financial liberalisation measures 
in 1993. From the early 1990s, the government was put under pressure by the United 
States and the chaebol to liberalise the domestic financial markets; the American 
government was eager to open up the Korean financial sector to US financial 
institutions, while the chaebol wanted to benefit from the interest rates in international 
capital markets that were lower than those offered by domestic lenders. 27 Moreover, 
financial liberalization was a prerequisite for joining the OECD; considering these 
circumstances, liberalisation measures were inevitable. After 1993, the government 
removed a considerable number of restraints related to short-term foreign loans: 
restrictions on foreign borrowing by the chaebol and financial agencies were lifted and 
the chaebol were allowed to set up merchant banks. However, a major problem was that 
these liberalisation measures were implemented without first establishing any systems 
for control and regulation resulting in an inward surge of short-term foreign capital and 
a drastic increase in foreign debt levels (Lee 1999, Weiss 2000, Shin and Chang 2003).28 
This became one of the major reasons for the financial crisis in 1997 which caused 
serious problems for the country and resulted in massive changes in the nature of the 
Korean economy (Weiss 2000: 31).29 
27 The US government continuously pressured for an opening of the Korean fInancial market and the 
Korea-US fInancial policy consultations held in 1992 actually influenced the fInancial liberalization 
measures implemented in 1993 by the Kim Young-Sam administration (Lee Kang-Kuk 2004: 63-64). 
28 In October 1997, the merchant banks' foreign debts reached USD 20 billion, out of which 64 percent 
or USD 12 billion, was short-term debt due in under a year. With these funds, they lent as much as USD 
16.8 billion or 84 percent of their total debt in long-term loans over one year due (Gang 2005: 429). 
29 There are two competing perspectives regarding the cause of the crisis in 1997: the neo-liberal 
interpretation and the developmental state view. For more details, see chapter one and Burkett and Hart-
Landsberg (1998). 
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Market over State Phase (1998-2005) 
The third phase runs from 1998 to 2005, a period when Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003) and 
Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-present) served as president of Korea. The financial crisis in 
Korea peaked in late 1997; the central bank's foreign reserves were almost exhausted, 
leaving the country on the verge of default, and many financial agencies and companies 
went bankrupt. The Korean economy fell into a comprehensive crisis caused by the 
immediate problems of a lack of foreign exchange liquidity and fundamental problems 
in the nation's economic structure. As a result, the economic growth rate in 1998 
plunged to minus 6.9 percent perea pita income dropped by 34 percent and the 
unemployment rate rose to 7 percent. The won-dollar exchange rate more than doubled 
between the end of 1996 and late 1997, and stock prices were cut in half. The Korean 
economy, which had been the forerunner of the East Asian economic miracle, fell into a 
serious crisis (BOK 2006). 
The third phase started in 1998 when Korean economy suffered after the 1997 
financial crisis. In 1997, the Korean government asked the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for bailout loans in order to overcome the financial crisis as the value of the 
Korean currency plummeted and foreign exchange reserves dwindled sharply. In 
exchange for the rescue funding, the IMF demanded that the Korean government 
undertake massive reform and restructuring measures (IMF 1997). The restructuring 
programmes included neo-liberal reforms that put emphasis more on market function 
than on the state's role. The restructuring, which began in 1998, resulted in massive 
market-driven reforms and openness in the financial, corporate, labour, and public 
sectors. These reforms significantly changed the nature of the Korean economy, and the 
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role of the Korean state was reshaped according to the ideals of neo-liberalism (Shin 
and Chang 2003). This was the 'Market over State' phase, in which the state's role 
weakened while market principles predominated. 
After the crisis in 1998, the Korean economy recovered rapidly, recording 
growth rates of 9.5 percent in 1999 and 8.5 percent in 2000. Once the government had 
repaid its loan to the IMF in its entirety in August 2001, the crisis appeared to be over 
and the Korean economy was expected to regain its momentum. However, since 2001, 
the performance of the Korean economy had been disappointing; the GDP growth rate 
had remained at the 3 to 4 percent level, which was low compared with the previous 
periods, and levels of capital investment had decreased substantially.3o Unemployment 
stood at around 3 to 4 percent; although this did not appear to be particularly high, the 
job market cannot be said to be stable given that half of all employees were temporary 
workers. Entrepreneurship, which flourished in the periods of rapid growth, seemed to 
have disappeared; as many companies are reluctant to expand their business, preferring 
to focus on short-term profit, and few are willing to take on adventurous and risky 
projects. The Korean economy seemed to have lost its former vigour, prompting the 
question; why has the economy lost its dynamism? 
If, as Hall and Soskice (2001) argue, the Anglo-American system is 
characterised by such factors as a flexible labour market, financial markets in which 
firms' current profitability is regarded as the critical factor for lending, and corporate 
30 As an economy matures its growth rate tends to slow. Thus, the growth rate of Korea since 2001 can be 
regarded as the general trend of mature economies. However, as Singapore and Taiwan, which are 
competitors of Korea, recorded growth rates of over 6 percent when they attained per capita incomes of 
USD 10,000 (1989 for Singapore, 1992 for Taiwan), the growth rate of Korea since 2001 can not be 
considered satisfactory (Park and Hur 2004: 12). In addition, according to the KDI report, while the rate 
of increase of total factor productivity (TFP) in the manufacturing sector between 1995 and 1999 was 
1.66 percent, the rate of increase between 1999 and 2003 was 5.78 percent mainly due to post-financial 
crisis restructuring efforts. This implies that the TFP was not a critical factor in the slow rate of growth in 
the Korean economy since the crisis (Shin and Han 1006: 443). 
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behaviour that emphasises short-term profits rather than long-term market share, then 
the post -crisis Korean economy has been transformed into something more akin to the 
Anglo-American system. Firstly, the labour market became more flexible with the 
revision of labour laws in 1998, allowing for the creation of a layoff system and the 
employment of temporary workers. Although, before the crisis, large firms traditionally 
offered lifetime employment to their workers, following the revision of the labour laws, 
firms were able to dismiss permanent workers and to hire cheaper, non-union temporary 
workers, which resulted in relatively higher rate of unemployment after the crisis and 
higher numbers of temporary workers (see Table E).31 The concept of lifetime 
employment has faded and the job market has become more flexible (Kim and Sung 
2005: 461). 
Secondly, the financial system changed after the cnSlS. The Korean 
developmental state was characterised by the 'state-banks-chaebol nexus' that allowed 
close cooperation among government, commercial banks, and large firms. This system 
also made large-scale and long-term investment possible by sharing financial risk 
among the state, banks, and the chaebol (Shin and Chang 2003: 119-121). Before the 
crisis, bank loans were the principal source of industrial capital, and the banks' major 
clients were corporations. The banks offered capital resources to industries in line with 
the government's goals rather than on the basis of firms' short-term profitability. 
However, after the crisis, the banks did not want to take risks because the risk sharing 
system had been dismantled. Therefore, they radically reduced the riskier practice of 
corporate lending and instead increased their levels of household lending. which was 
3) In 2000, 52.4 percent of workers had irregular jobs, including workers with temporary contracts and 
part time jobs, while 47.6 percent of workers had pennanent contracts (Crotty and Lee 2001: 18). 
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seen to be a relatively safer line of business. 32 Financial institutions became more 
concerned about their profits than before and channelled their efforts into safe and 
profitable investments. Accordingly, when banks offered loans, they focused on the 
current profitability of corporate clients as a guarantee of repayment. 
Thirdly, Korean companies began to focus on short-term profits rather than long-
term growth after the crisis, a development that was also related to the collapse of the 
Korean developmental system. Under the developmental state in which the state, banks, 
and businesses worked in close cooperation, the chaebol could undertake large-scale 
investments with high levels of risk, in the knowledge that they were protected by the 
state and the banks. However, the crisis of 1997 disrupted this coalition as the state 
officially announced a 'hands-off the market' policy. Without government protection, 
companies pursued safe and short-term profits instead of more risky long-term 
investments (Shin and Chang 2003: 119-121). In these new circumstances, firms could 
only secure financial resources or protect themselves from hostile takeovers through 
good short-term profit performance. 
In the MOS period, the Korean economy appeared to lose its vitality and 
aggressiveness. Between 1998 and 2005, the average annual GDP growth registered a 
rate of 4.2 percent, notably lower than that of the SOM (8.5 percent) and transitional 
phases (7.6 percent). When considering the growth rate of capital investment, the 
difference is even more substantial: the average rate of fixed capital formation in the 
MOS phase was just 1.5 percent, much lower than that of the SOM (20.3 percent) and 
transition phases (9.4 percent). This low level of investment is considered to be one of 
32 Banks increased their household lending activities while reducing corporate lending: in 1997, the 
respective shares of bank loans accounted for by corporate lending and household lending were 64.5 per 
cent and 32.6 percent, compared with 53.0 percent and 45.5 percent in 2003 (Cho 2004: 125). 
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the prime factors in low economic growth rate and unstable employment, prompting 
concerns and misgivings about the future of the Korean economy. 
3. Periodisation Used in This Thesis 
We have argued that the history of the Korean economy can be divided into three 
periods according to the relationship between the state and the market, namely the' State 
over Market,' 'transition' and 'Market over State' phases. As one period was replaced by 
another, the state's power diminished while market forces became stronger. During the 
State over Market phase (1962-1979) the state dominated the market, while in the 
transition phase the relationship between the two became more competitive. Finally, in 
the Market over State phase, the state was overwhelmed by the market. 
Despite the fact that Korean economic history since 1962 can be grouped into 
these three periods, this study will deal with only two phases: State over Market and 
Market over State. The transition phase will be omitted because we regard it simply as 
an evolutionary stage between the developmental and neo-liberal states. The nature of 
the state in the transition phase was ambiguous and had overlapping characteristics with 
both the SOM and MOS periods. In contrast, the SOM and MOS phases have the 
distinctive characteristics of developmental and neo-liberal states, respectively. 
Considering that one of the principal aims of this study is to provide an insight into the 
relationship between the state and MNCs, we argue that the discussion should focus on 
the typical developmental state phase in which the state regulates MNCs and the typical 
neo-liberal period when MNCs dominate state power. Therefore, the following analysis 
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will focus on a companson of these two distinct phases in order to highlight the 
changing nature of the state and to emphasise the shifts in the relationship between the 
state and multinational corporations. 
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Chapter Three: The Bargaining Power of the Korean Government 
In Chapter One, the Neo Bargaining Model (NBM) was set up and combined with 
developmental state theory. This chapter will apply the NBM to the Korean government 
in the SOM and MOS periods and, by so doing, will answer the following questions: 
firstly, how has the Korean government's bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs shifted? 
Secondly, what factors have affected the strength and weakness of the government's 
bargaining power? 
Before undertaking a closer examination of the bargaining relationships between 
the Korean government and multinationals, we first provide a brief review of the NBM. 
The key point of the Neo Bargaining Model is that the outcomes of MNC-host 
government interactions arise as a result of the relative bargaining power of MNCs and 
host governments. In other words, parties with a greater level of bargaining power are 
likely to obtain more favourable terms in the negotiation process (Levy and Prakash 
2003: 141). From this primary understanding of bargaining models, the three 
fundamental components of the model can be considered: host governments; MNCs; 
and bargaining outcomes. Based on this, an analytical framework for the bargaining 
relations between a host government and MNCs was developed: the Neo Bargaining 
Model. 
The NBM compnses three dimensions: resources, stakes, and constraints. 
Bargaining resources are the specific advantages that are possessed and required by 
each party in order to achieve its respective goals; for host governments, location-
specific advantages are its bargaining resources, whereas firm-specific advantages are 
the bargaining resources for MNCs. Resources are the means by which one party can 
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force the other to move closer towards its position. Therefore, a higher level resources 
(relative to the other party) produces a greater degree of bargaining power. The term 
Bargaining stakes, in turn, refers to the degree of importance placed on the bargaining 
objectives by each interested party; they are determined by evaluating the presence or 
absence of alternatives and commitment. Alternatives represent other options a party has 
to gain access to the resources it needs, while commitment represents how much a party 
is willing to pay the other party to get those resources. The more alternatives there are, 
and the lower the level of commitment to the negotiations a party exhibits, the lower the 
stake level; this, in tum, creates a higher level of bargaining power. Finally, bargaining 
constraints are the negative factors that restrict the exercising of potential bargaining 
power. In the NBM, constraints have two facets: internal and external constraints. 
Internal constraints refer to the pressures from interest groups and the strength of 
bargaining institutions, whereas external constraints refer to the pressures from home 
governments and supranational institutions. The lower the level of constraints the 
bargaining party faces, the greater the bargaining power the party possesses. This 
chapter applies these dimensions of the NBM - resources, stakes and constraints - to 
the Korean government in both the SOM and MOS periods, evaluates and compares the 
bargaining power of both periods, and finally draws the causes of the shift in the 
bargaining power of the state. 
1. State over Market 
From 1962 to 1979, when President Park Chung-Hee was in office. Korea was a typical 
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model of a developmental state and this era was dominated by 'plan rationality', 
represented by the Five-Year Economic Development Plans.33 At that time, the state 
was strong enough to both dominate and nurture the market. The state was not only an 
apparatus that reflected the interests of leading social groups but also an institution that 
set independent goals with autonomy and had the capacity to mobilise resources and 
unify interest groups for its goals using appropriate bureaucratic and policy measures. 
The state led and controlled the market by distributing resources according to its plans 
with the ultimate goal of economic development. In the 1960s and 1970s, the private 
sectors were minimal in Korea; thus, the state's plan practically replaced a market 
function. The state at that time was able to lead the private sector in accordance with 
state policy goals and plans through its ownership of the financial sector. In addition, 
the state exerted direct control by means of various administrative regulations, thereby 
forcing companies to fall in line with and achieve the state's policy goals and plans 
(Amsden 1989). 
As was mentioned in Chapter Two, the SOM period can be divided into two 
distinct parts: the first from 1962 to 1972 and the second from 1972 to 1979. In the first, 
the Korean government pursued export-oriented industrialisation focusing on labour-
intensive light industries while, in the second, the government shifted its emphasis from 
labour-intensive to capital-intensive industries. Although the focus of economic policy 
changed slightly in accordance with the government's long-term plans, the national 
development strategy - which can be summarised as 'government-led', 'outward-
looking' and "growth-first' (Sakong 1993: 50) - remained unchanged throughout the 
SOM period. FDI was considered to be one of the resources available to realise the 
33 For an account of 'plan rationality', see Johnson (1982: 17-34) 
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government's goals. In this section, we examine the bargaining power of the Korean 
government in the SOM period in tenns of bargaining resources, stakes, and constraints. 
In the SOM period, the level of bargaining resources was low because of limited 
markets and poor natural resources. However, the Korean government could maintain a 
relatively high level of bargaining power because of its low level of stakes and 
constraints. We analyse the reasons behind these levels in this section. 
Bargaining Resources 
According to UNCTAD (1996: 97-98), FDI can be classified by objective: traditional 
and non-traditional. Traditional FDI refers to market-seeking or resource-seeking FDI, 
which is detennined by traditional resources such as market size, natural and human 
resources. On the other hand, non-traditional FDI means efficiency-seeking FDI for 
which non-traditional resources including created assets, agglomeration economies, 
infrastructure facilities, or specialised workforces are becoming more important. 34 In 
the SOM period, Korea had few such non-traditional resources. In fact, the Korean 
government had few resources coveted by MNCs in the SOM period other than cheap 
labour and the small but rapidly-growing domestic market. According to a survey 
conducted in 1979 by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) (1981: 23-24) on the 
motivations of foreign investors in Korea, 33 percent of respondents cited 'cheap and 
abundant labour' as their major motivation for investing in Korea, while 23 percent said 
that the Korean market was the main reason for investing. These survey results 
34 For further discussion about the detenninants of FDI, see Root and Amed (1979), Agarwal (1980), 
Kravis and Lepsey (1982), Scheider and Frey (1985), Culem (1988), Weeler and Mody (1992), Lucas 
(1993), Singh and Jun (1995), Gastanaga et at (1998), UNCTAD (1998), Noorbakhsh et at (2001). 
Dunning (2002) and Blomstrom and Kokko (2003). 
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confirmed that labour and the domestic market were the most important resources of the 
Korean government in the SOM period. 
Until the late 1950s, developed countries' investments in developing countries 
were mostly made to exploit natural resources such as oil, copper, tin, and rubber (Jones 
2005: 33). Thus, access to natural resources was the decisive motivation for MNCs' 
investment in developing countries. Although the importance of natural resources 
declined after the 1960s, the natural resources of developing countries were still the 
crucial attraction for MNCs. Therefore, countries in the Middle East and Latin America 
with plentiful natural resources could maintain a strong level of bargaining power vis-a-
vis foreign extractors and developers in the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast, Korea is 
poorly endowed with natural resources: there are no energy sources such as oil and 
natural gas, most coal deposits are located in North Korea, and output of tungsten, 
which is the metal available in commercially significant amounts, stopped in 1993 (EIU 
2005: 18). That is, Korea was the last country in which any MNC would have been 
interested in investment for the purpose of extracting and developing natural resources. 
Thus, natural resources had little potential as a source of bargaining power for the 
Korean government. 
However, there were plentiful human resources in Korea during the SOM period. 
According to statistics published by the Bank of Korea (BOK) (2005), the 
unemployment rate in Korea in 1963 was 8.1 percent; the rate of unemployment in rural 
areas stood at 3 percent while the unemployment rate in urban areas was higher at 16 
percent. At that time, 64 percent of the population was engaged in primary industries 
such as agriculture and fisheries while the rest were engaged in manufacturing and 
service industries. Given the nature of agriculture. levels of unemployment could have 
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been understated and it is possible that real overall unemployment was much higher 
(Kim and Hong 1997: 8-9). Amsden (1989: 191) stated that there were almost two 
million people unemployed in 1960, a fifth of the economically active population in 
Korea. Thus, there was an almost unlimited supply of workers in industries and, at that 
time, the labour class had not formed and labour unions were not active at all. 
Furthermore, there was no pressure of wage increases due to the oversupply of unskilled 
workers in the 1960s. 
Table 3.1 Growth of Real Wages and Productivity in the Manufacturing Sector(Unit: %) 
Year 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Growth of Real Wages -1.2 -7.9 -6.5 0.8 10.9 10.9 14.1 
Growth of Productivity 2.4 10.0 8.8 17.5 4.0 17.7 19.9 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Growth of Real Wages 19.3 9.3 2.4 2.1 14.3 8.8 1.5 
Growth of Productivity 26.5 12.6 9.7 8.7 8.8 11.4 11.6 
Source: Kim and Sung, 2005: 94 
However, in the 1970s, unskilled workers were gradually absorbed into industries, 
resulting in wage increases (see Table E). As is shown in Table 3.l, although there had 
been continuous increases in real wages since 1965, they lagged the rise in labour 
productivity. This was because the Korean government coercively suppressed wage 
increases in order to sustain Korea's export competitiveness. In 1971, the Korean 
government established the 'Special Measures Law Concerning National Security' 
restricting the rights of workers to bargain collectively and to take strike action. In 1972, 
the government amended the National Constitution bringing in comprehensive 
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restrictions on the basic rights of workers.35 The oversupply of labour and government 
suppression of the labour movement kept wage levels low, and these low wage levels 
were attractive to foreign companies seeking to lower their production costs. 
Apart from the abundance of human resources, the education level of workers 
was comparatively high. According to Amsden (1989: 215-222), Korea recorded higher 
ratios for high school and tertiary education entry, and for education abroad than 
Singapore, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, and India in the 1960s and 1970s. In 
1963, the illiteracy rate of Korean workers was almost zero; middle school graduates 
accounted for 53 percent of the workforce and high school graduates for a further 34 
percent. The average education level was much higher than might have been expected 
based on Korea's per capita income at that time. Korea's high educational attainment 
was attributed to some key factors: firstly, Koreans placed great emphasis on education 
due to their Confucian legacy, and secondly education offered the opportunity to move 
up the ladder in Korean society because social stratification had not been established 
after the collapse of the traditional social class structure during the Japanese occupation. 
The oversupply of labour, low wages, and higher education levels enabled foreign 
companies to secure high-quality labour at lower costs, thereby serving as a motivation 
for MNC investment in Korea as well as a source of government bargaining power. 
Market size and growth potential are also essential factors in MNC investment 
abroad; in particular, market -seeking FD I is determined by the growth potential and the 
size of the market. Therefore, a host country with a fast-growing and large market will 
enjoy strong bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the size of 
35 On 17 October 1972, President Park proclaimed martial law and enforced an amended constitution. 
The amended constitution, called the Yushin Constitution, allowed the President an unlimited term of 
office and gave him extensive powers. In October 1980 when President Chun Doo-Hwan took office the 
constitution was revised through a referendum. 
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the Korean market was relatively small; statistics published by the Bank of Korea 
(BOK) (2005) show that the population of Korea in 1970 was 32 million, GDP was 
USD32 billion, and per capita income was a mere USD254 (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Population, GDP and GNI per capita: Korea 1962-1979 
Population (millon) GDP (USD billion) 
1962 26.5 2.3 (N/A) 
1965 28.7 3.0 (N/A) 
1970 32.9 7.8 (39/188) 
1975 35.3 21.5 (33/188) 
1979 37.5 63.3 (291190) 
Note: Korea's world ranking shown in parentheses 
Source: BOK 2004, BOK 2005 
GNI per capita (USD) 
87 (N/A) 
105 (N/A) 
254 (1261188) 
602 (114/188) 
1,676 (851190) 
In 1970, Korea's GDP was ranked 39th and per capita income was 126th out of 188 
nations around the world (BOK 2004: 16). According to Maddison (2003), the total 
national income of Korea in 1960 was less than that of several Asian countries such as 
the Philippines, Indonesia and Pakistan (see Table 3.3). In a word, Korea in the 1960s 
and the 1970s was one of the poorest nations in the world, and so MNCs seeking 
markets had little interest in Korea. However, market growth was incredibly rapid in 
Korea: from 1960 to 1970, the average economic growth rate was 8.6 percent, and 
between 1970 and 1979 it was 10.3 percent (UN 1983) making Korea one of the fastest-
growing countries in the world in the 1960s and 1970s. According to the UN (1983), 
Korea was one of just three nations that recorded an annual average economic growth 
rate of more than 10 percent in the 1970s, the other two being Saudi Arabia and Syria. 
As oil producers, both Saudi Arabia and Syria could achieve high rates of growth in the 
1970s; in fact, Korea was the only nation that achieved more than 10 percent growth 
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other than oil producing nations. 
Table 3.3 Total and Per Capita National Income: Selected Countries 1960 and 1970 
GDP Per Capita GDP 
1960 1970 1960 1970 
(million 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) (1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) 
Korea (South) 27,398 62,988 1,105 1,954 
Egypt 21,010 33,235 783 990 
Nigeria 34,081 60,814 869 1,233 
South Africa 52,972 91,986 3,041 4,045 
Argentina 114,614 174,972 5,559 7,302 
Brazil 167,397 292,480 2,335 3,057 
Mexico 121,723 227,970 4,320 5,293 
Philippines 42,114 68,102 1,475 1,761 
Indonesia 97,082 138,612 1,019 1,194 
Pakistan 32,621 62,522 647 952 
US 2,046,727 3,081,900 11,328 15,030 
Japan 375,090 1,013,602 3,988 9,715 
UK. 452,768 599,016 8,645 10,767 
Source: Maddison (2003) 
In summary, during the State over Market period, Korea had few natural resources and a 
small domestic market, but could provide plenty of inexpensive labour. Korea was 
attractive to firms seeking cheap labour whose priority lay in simple assembly 
production. For market seekers, Korea was too small to be attractive; accurately 
described pre-industrialisation Korea as 
truncated into a half a country, with almost no natural resources. a 
thoroughly uprooted and aggrieved population. no domestic capital to 
speak of and a minuscule domestic market (Cumings 1997: 300). 
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Bargaining Stakes 
The bargaining stake dimension is comprised of two elements: commitment and 
alternatives. The Korean government's bargaining stakes in FDI will be analysed in 
terms of commitment (how much the object of bargaining is valued) and alternatives 
(how many other options exist). In this period, the government could maintain a low 
level of stakes because of the low commitment level, which was derived from the 
industrial policy of the Park Chung-Hee government, and high level of alternatives, 
which were attributed to the 1960s and 1970s international political economy. 
Commitment 
A host country seeks to attract FDI in order to acquire the benefits that investment by 
foreign companies can bring; thus, its commitment level to FDI is determined by the 
demand for the potential benefits that FDI can bring to a host country. In other words, 
the greater the host country's demand for the firm-specific assets possessed by MNCs, 
the higher its commitment to attracting FDI. In the SOM period, the Korean economy 
was in desperate need of foreign capital. This might suggest that there was strong 
demand from the Korean government on FDI, which could raise the level of 
commitment. However, the Korean government could maintain the low level of 
commitment to FDI because in this period the government put more priority on 
promoting domestic capital under the strong industrial policy and this consideration 
lowered commitment to FDI, which could undermine the economic autonomy of the 
state. 
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In the 1960s, Korea was experiencing dire poverty, low levels of income led to 
low savings rates, resulting in low levels of investment which, in tum, perpetuated the 
low income situation. In order to break this vicious circle, increased investment would 
have to boost income, leading to higher savings which, in tum, would serve as financial 
resources for expanding investment. 
To expand investment, it was necessary first of all to increase the savings rate; however, 
with the national savings rate was at a low level in the 1960s, the inducement of foreign 
capital was inevitable. Foreign capital contributed to the quantitative expansion of the 
Korean economy by bridging the gap between domestic savings and funds needed for 
investment and thus boosting the utilisation of the labour force. Therefore, the Korean 
government desperately sought foreign capital in the SOM period. The government was 
primarily interested in the capital transfer effect of FDI and regarded inward investment 
as one of the means of capital transfer together with loans and foreign aid. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the technology of Korean industries remained at a low level, which might 
suggest that there was strong demand among Korean companies for foreign firms' 
technologies. However, the demand was not as high as might be assumed because the 
technologies required by Koreans firms were of a standard or matured form, easily 
transferable in various ways (Amsden 1989: 20).36 Generally speaking, as factories 
imported outdated machinery and employed labour-intensive processes using 
inexpensive labour, high-level MNC technology was not in great demand among 
Korean companies. As low-level technologies were accessible and most technologies 
were embedded in the imported machines, the demand for MNC technology was 
36 Amsden describes the Korean way of obtaining technology as follows; "'They visit international 
expositions, attend conferen,ce and l~ctures" read technical joun:lals, hire ~xperienced ~vorkers, visit 
overseas plants, engage foreIgn technIcal aSSIstants, consult machmery supplIers, and bu), borrow, beg 
and steal foreign designs (1989: 20)," 
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Table 3.4 Foreign Capital Inflows: Korea 1955-1979 (Unit: million USD) 
Year Aid Borrowing37 FDe8 Technical Licence 
1955 236 
1956 326 
1957 382 
1958 321 
1959 222 
1960 245 
1961 199 
1962 232 3 23 
1963 216 67 
1964 149 24 
1965 131 40 
1966 103 183 
1967 97 230 98 1 
1968 105 378 5 1 
1969 107 579 3 2 
1970 82 507 9 2 
1971 51 738 4 
1972 5 670 518 7 
1973 2 913 5 12 
1974 1 1,206 2 18 
1975 1 1,478 6 27 
1976 1 1,683 5 30 
1977 0.9 2,177 143 58 
1978 0.1 3,058 181 85 
1979 0.2 4,189 195 94 
Total 3,562 18,123 1,194 341 
Source: BOK 2006, Lee 2005, MOF and KDB 1993 
37 Borrowing statistics show the sum total of public loans, commercial loans and bank loans. 
38 The Korean government collects statistics on both notification and arrival bases. The notification-
based statistics are compiled according to the investment amount reported when foreign investors are 
registered as a foreign investment company. The arrival-based statistics are compiled according to the 
actual amount of money transferred from the home country to Korea to start the business after reporting. 
Therefore, arrival data is more correct than notification data. The figures in the table are based on arrival. 
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relatively low in the SOM phase. 
President Park, who seized power in 1961 in a military coup, put economic 
development at the top of his agenda in order to secure a political foothold and to escape 
the severe post-war poverty. Although President Park was committed to banishing 
poverty across the nation, he had few resources with which to develop the country. As 
we have seen, the grant-type aid which had bolstered the Korean economy in the 1950s 
started to decrease in the 1960s due to the shift in US aid policy from giving grants to 
providing loans (Krueger 1979, Sakong 1993: 102).39 An economic development plan 
was established, but the resources to implement the plan were minimal. Since the only 
abundant resource that Korea possessed in the 1960s was labour, economic progress 
was only practicable through the export of labour-intensive light industrial products. 
Raw materials and machinery were required in order to produce goods for export, but 
the government's foreign reserves were not sufficient imports of these items. 
Mobilisation of capital was the crux of realising the goals of the economic plan and, as 
we have seen, the beginning of the 1960s, the mobilisation of domestic savings was not 
a viable solution. The Korean government had accumulated few savings and private 
savings also were minimal during the first half of the 1960s (Kuznets 1994: 43). Table A 
shows that the saving-investment ratio in the 1960s remained at around 51 percent due 
to the low levels of domestic savings.4o Since the government put the highest priority 
on economic development, it needed capital and, with few domestic financial resources 
39 President Kennedy, who took office in 1961, gradually replaced the grants to less developed countries 
with loans in the belief that short-term grants would not help the economic development of the 
beneficiaries (Jung 2000: 69-76). 
40 The 'saving-investment ratio' is the ratio of gro.ss savings ~o gross ~xed capital ~o~ation, which 
means the ratio of domestic savings spent on domestIc fixed capItal formatIOn. If the ratIO IS 100 percent, 
it means domestic gross capital is solely funded by domestic savings, and if the ratio is less than 100 
percent, foreign capital is needed to fill .the gap between ~omestic savings and d?mest.ic fixed capital. 
When the ratio is more than 100 percent. It means that there IS an outflow of domestlC savmgs. 
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available for economic development in the 1960s, the Korean government inevitably 
turned its gaze overseas. 
This dependence led to a high commitment to foreign capital during the 1960s, 
and this was reflected in foreign policy. Upon taking office in 1961, President Park paid 
a visit to the United States to obtain American support for his economic plans (Cha 
2004: 108-109) and in 1965, when national anti-Japanese sentiments were still strong 
after the liberalisation from Japanese occupation two decades earlier, President Park 
pushed for the normalisation of diplomatic ties between Korea and Japan in order to 
gain access to Japanese economic support. The Korean government also dispatched 
300,000 troops to the Vietnam War to ensure continued US economic assistance and the 
United States paid USD1 billion from 1965 to 1970 in return for Korea's military 
support (Woo 1991: 94; Cumings 1997: 321). Thus, in the 1960s, Korea had to make 
significant sacrifices to earn the foreign capital that the Korean government desperately 
needed. Although the government's main concern was foreign aid and loans, it 
endeavoured to attract FDI as well. In 1960, the Korean government established the 
'Foreign Capital Inducement Promotion Act' to provide a legal basis for the inducement 
of foreign capital including FDI and, in 1962 the EPB established a department 
responsible for FDI. As we shall see in the following chapter, at this time, there were 
few restrictions on the ratio of investment or on the type of businesses available for 
foreign companies doing business in Korea, making it easier for them to enter the 
Korean market (EPB 1981: 29-30). 
However, in the 1970s, the external political and economic environment made 
the Korean government's policy more nationalistic in nature, which lowered the level of 
commitment of the government. In terms of the external political environment. there 
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were changes in the international political order caused by the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 
and the subsequent 1972 Sino-US rapprochement. President Nixon declared in 1969 
that Asian countries should take primary responsibility for their own security (Cha 
2004: 143). Under the Nixon Doctrine, 20,000 troops (one infantry division) were 
withdrawn from Korea in 1971; this was roughly one third of all troops stationed in 
Korea. In 1973, the US government withdrew all soldiers stationed in Vietnam and, in 
1972 the United States and China issued the Shanghai communique, formally 
establishing diplomatic ties seven years later. With the formalisation of diplomatic 
relations between the United States and China, the US government severed diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan by abrogating the mutual defence agreement between the two 
nations and pulling US military establishments and troops out of Taiwan. Such changes 
in international relations in East Asia in the early 1970s made the Korean government 
realise how fragile its security dependence on Washington was and how important 
economic independence was for survival. 
The changes in the international political order threatened Korea's national 
security, thereby prompting President Park to make his top priorities 'economic 
independence' (Jarip Gyeongje) and 'self-reliant defence' (Jaju Gukbang). For these 
reasons, President Park decided to promote the development of the heavy and chemical 
industries in the 1970s.41 In other words, the Korean government's nurturing of the 
heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s resulted from political and security concerns 
(Weiss and Hobson 1995: 189). Until the early 1970s, the North Korean economy had 
surpassed that of South. which had been under constant threat from its economically 
~1 On January 12, 1973, President Park declared the 'promotion of heavy and chemical industries' at the 
first news conference of the year (Oh 2006: 206). 
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and militarily superior neighbour in the 1960s and 1970s. 42 With North Korea 
continuing its policy of aggressive provocation, South Korea naturally became anxious 
when the US government, on which Seoul relied for its defence against North Korea's 
aggression, announced the Nixon Doctrine and began overtures to communist China. 
President Park endeavoured to remove this sense of insecurity by achieving economic 
independence and strengthening the nation's defence capability. He saw the heavy and 
chemical industries as a solution to achieving both goals because of its close links with 
the defence industry. 43 
The nurturing of the heavy and chemical industries, by its nature, required 
enonnous capital, something the Korean government did not possess at that time. 
However, the Korean government believed that neither the defence industry nor the 
heavy and chemical industries should be under foreign control. Although several 
government officials, who had a US academic background, recommended cooperating 
with MNCs, President Park equated these ideas with the relinquishment of industrial 
sovereignty to foreigners (Cumings 1997: 324-325). Since 1973, FDI had been allowed 
in Korea only when a business type was on the list approved by the Korean government, 
and full foreign ownership of a company operating in Korea investment was, in 
principle, not allowed. Even when the government allowed FDI, it attached conditions 
42 The North Korean economy grew an average of 10 percent annually for the decade after the Korean 
War. For the 20 years after the Korean War ended in 1953, North Korea's economic growth exceeded that 
of South Korea (Cumings 1997: 433-434). Examples of North Korea's acts of provocation include a 
surprise attack on the South Korea presidential office by North Korean spies on 21 January 1968 and the 
kidnapping of the 83 crew members of the US naval vessel, Pueblo by the North Koreans two days later. 
43 After President Park announced the development plans for the heavy and chemical industries on 12 
January 1973, he directed his senior economic advisor, Oh Won-Cheol, to explain the close relationship 
between the heavy and chemical industries and the defence industry to cabinet members, as a way of 
encouraoing them to cooperate in his development plans for those industries. Oh Won-Cheol (2006: 221) 
claimed ~hat the heavy chemical industry and the defence industry were two different sides of the same 
coin sayino: "The heavy and chemical industries and defence industries are the same industries. 
Wea~onry i: the product of the heavy and chemical indus~ies; he~vy ~~d chemical industrial plants make 
industrial machinery in peace time and produce weaponry In war tIme.· 
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such as export quotas and technology transfers (EPB 1981: 31). This is the political 
background to the low level of commitment of the Korean government in the SOM 
period. In addition, there were economic reasons. 
Economic factors in relation to the shift of FDI policy can be found in the 
sudden increase of Japanese investment in the early 1970s. Japan's FDI activity in 
Korea was slow in the 1960s but started to rise dramatically in the early 1970s. In 
particular, in 1973, Korea recorded unprecedented FDI inflows of USD 318 million, 
which was eight times greater than the levels seen in 1971. Japanese investment 
accounted for 94 percent of FDI in 1973 while US and European firms supplied only 
five percent and one percent, respectively (Invest Korea 2006). The Korean government 
was alarmed at the sudden increase in FD I and even more concerned at the fact that 
Japanese investment was the main reason for the rise in inward investment. Japan 
became the leading investor in Korea ahead of the US in the early 1970s for two main 
reasons: firstly, Japanese companies began to look for a low-cost production base due to 
wage increases in Japan's manufacturing sector after the second half of the 1960s (Jones 
2005: 93) and, secondly, Japan severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan because of the 
country's normalisation of diplomatic relations with China in 1972, which channelled 
Japanese investment from Taiwan to Korea (MOF and KDB 1993: 152). As Japan's FDI 
in Korea increased, the Korean government became aware of the possible dependence 
of the Korean economy on Japan's capital and technology. Therefore, the Korean 
government revised the 'Foreign Capital Inducement Law' in 1973 to strengthen 
restrictions on foreign investment. 
In short, the circumstances described above called for a shift in the government's 
attitude to FDI, which we will discuss in the following chapter. Although the Korean 
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government had a strong need for foreign capital to fund economic development in the 
SOM phase, there was no overriding demand for FDI before the late 1970s, which 
consequently lessened the level of commitment of the government in the SOM period. 
Alternatives 
As discussed earlier, the main focus of the Korean government with regard to FDI in the 
SOM period was on the capital transfer effect of FDI rather than other benefits that FDI 
could bring to a host country. In other words, the government's commitment to FDI 
mainly came from the need for capital from MNCs. This section will examine 
alternatives to FDI as a source of capital in the SOM period. The bargaining power of a 
host country vis-a-vis MNCs differs according to how many alternatives to FDI it has. 
Alternatives to FDI imply means for a host country to obtain capital, technology, and 
jobs other than FDI. In the SOM period, Korea had a strong demand for MNCs' capital 
as the accumulation of domestic capital and domestic savings remained at a low level. 
However, demands for capital could be fulfilled through foreign loans, which 
contributed to diminishing the stakes in FDI. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the Korean economy in the 1950s entirely relied 
on foreign aid; from the liberation from Japanese rule in 1945 until the late 1950s~ 
Korea's sole source of foreign capital was grant-type foreign aid, most of which came 
from the US and the rest from the United Nations. However, as we have seen foreign 
aid from the US started to decline in the latter part of the 1950s and so foreign 
borrowing became more important as a source of import financing. As Table 3.4 shows. 
the amount of aid was higher than foreign borrowing up until 1965, but foreign 
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borrowing started to exceed aid after 1966 and, as foreign borrowings increased, 
Korea's foreign debt rose rapidly from USD8.9 million in 1962 to USD1.8 billion in 
1969. After the first oil shock in 1973, debt levels grew even faster; in the 1970s, 
foreign debts increased rapidly due to the import of capital goods for the promotion of 
the heavy and chemical industries, pushing total foreign debts to USD20 billion by 1979 
(see table D). 
Table 3.5 Foreign Borrowing: Korea 1962-1979 (Unit: million USD) 
Year Public Loans Commercial Loans Bank Loans Total 
1962 3 0 0 3 
1963 43 24 0 67 
1964 12 12 0 24 
1965 5 35 0 40 
1966 73 110 0 183 
1967 106 124 0 230 
1968 70 268 40 378 
1969 139 410 30 579 
1970 115 367 25 507 
1971 303 345 90 738 
1972 324 326 20 670 
1973 403 461 49 913 
1974 385 603 218 1,206 
1975 477 801 200 1,478 
1976 713 839 131 1,683 
1977 636 1,241 300 2,177 
1978 817 1,913 328 3,058 
1979 1,089 1,578 1,522 4,189 
Total 5,713 9,457 2,953 18,123 
Source: Lee 2005: 624-625 
. 1 were provided to the Korean government by international Some foreIgn oans 
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institutions or foreign countries (public loans), some came from foreign individuals, 
companies or private financial institutions to Korean companies (commercial loans), 
and others were loans from foreign financial institutions to Korean banks (bank loans) 
(MOF and KDB 1993). There were three factors that helped the Korean government to 
obtain loans in the SOM period. 
Firstly, the Cold War provided Korea with favourable circumstances under 
which to access loans; in the 1960s, when competition heightened between the US and 
the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was strengthening its foothold in less developed 
countries by increasing economic aid. The Kennedy administration regarded the 
Soviet's economic aid to less developed countries as more threatening to US security 
interests than the military threat posed by the country. President Kennedy believed that 
building a self-reliant economy was the best way for less developed countries to protect 
themselves from the communist threat and, therefore, he put more emphasis on 
economic aid than military aid. As for the means by which economic aid was delivered, 
he introduced a 'national development programmes' approach to ensure that the 
provision of aid was more consistent. In Kennedy's opinion, previous aid programs 
merely aimed to deal with crisis situations or achieve short-term political objectives and, 
as a result, they did not help the economic development of recipient countries (Gardner 
1962: 150). The new approach aimed to draw on the self-help efforts of recipient 
countries; the recipients set sensible targets and the US government would provide 
development loans in line with the beneficiaries' goals.44 The shift of US aid policy was 
partly due to US financial restrictions and partly due to the intention of encouraging 
44 From the mid 1950s onwards, there was intense debate oabo~t US ~id policy in Congress a~~ aca~em!c 
o I h O h led to the adoption of the 'Rostow line' foreIgn aId polIcy by the Kennedy admmIstratIOn m CIrc es, w IC 0 0 °d fr 01 0 °d d hIt 1950so The main idea of the Rostow Ime was to separate economIc al om ml Itary al an to ~r~vfd: development loans based on recipient countries' long-term development plans (lung 2000: 1)0 
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recipient countries to increase capital productivity (Jung 2000: 69-76). In line with this 
policy, the US government provided public loans worth USD 311 million to Korea, 
which accounted for 69 percent of total public loans received by Korea in the 1960s 
(MOF and KDB 1993: 198). 
The second factor that served the Korean government in accessing foreign loans 
in the SOM period was the Korean government's efforts to secure loans; President Park 
paid a visit to President Kennedy in 1961 and to the West German President Heinrich 
Lubke in 1964.45 As we have seen, Park normalised diplomatic relations with Japan in 
1965 and sent Korean troops to Vietnam between 1965 and 1973, partly in order to get 
loans from the US government. Such efforts were successful in that they led to more 
loans on better conditions; moreover, by guaranteeing repayments, the government 
improved private companies' access to loans. In the 1960s, the Korean economy was so 
unstable and weak that Korean companies could not access commercial loans on the 
basis of their own credit. Thus, the government enacted the 'Law for Payment 
Guarantee of Foreign Borrowing' in 1962, making it easier for Korean companies to 
earn loans from abroad. Between 1962 and 1979, public loans from foreign 
governments and international institutions accounted for 31 percent of Korea's total 
foreign debt, while commercial loans guaranteed by the government took a share of 
almost 52 percent. Therefore 83 percent of all loans were public loans or government-
guaranteed commercial loans, which meant foreign lenders took a smaller risk in 
making loans to Korea. During the 1960s and 1970s, the confidence of Korea continued 
45 'T k· I·n May 1961 President Park ordered his aides to draw up economic development plans 1 a mg power , , ... 
in June of the same year; Park established the Economic Pla~nmg Board In Ju~y, finalIsed the 
d I t I ns I·n August and visited President Kennedy In November. ThIS suggests that the purpose eve opmen p a . . . d 
. development plans was mostly to acqUIre aId and loans from the UnIte States (Oh 2006: of the economIC 
59-60). 
114 
to increase due to the strong growth of the Korean economy and the country's good debt 
service performance, which raised the creditworthiness of the Korean economy and, in 
tum, enabled the Korean government and Korean companies to access more loans from 
abroad (Sakong 1993: 109-113). 
Finally, the situation in the international financial market in the 1970s made it 
more affordable for Korean financial institutions to borrow money from international 
financial institutions (Stopfold and Strange 1991: 14). After the first oil shock in 1973, 
substantial amounts of capital flowed from the OPEC nations, who were benefiting 
from higher oil prices, to the European dollar markets, where they waited for potential 
borrowers (O'Brien and Williams 2004: 237). Due to the oversupply of money, 
borrowers drove the international financial markets in the 1970s and Korea, which was 
experiencing steady and fast economic growth, was considered to be a reliable borrower. 
The international political economy in the 1970s facilitated the government's securing 
of foreign loans, which expanded alternatives and consequently lowered levels of stakes 
in the SOM period. 
With foreign loans, the Korean government was able to fill the savings gap that 
was caused by the discrepancy between domestic savings and investment. Thus, the 
government's demand for FDI was at a low level as long as foreign loans served as a 
good source of capital, particularly because the government regarded FDI only as one of 
a number of potential sources of capital. In fact, the government preferred foreign loans 
to FDI as a source of foreign capital for a number of reasons; firstly, there was a general 
fear of foreign domination of Korean industries. This fear is rooted in Korea's history of 
Japanese colonisation. The Japanese occupation in the early 20th century made Koreans 
't' to any potential loss of industrial sovereignty or domination by a foreign senSI lve 
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power, a sensitivity that lasts to this day (Sakong 1993: 119). Foreign loans enabled 
companies to maintain ownership control as long as they paid their debts. while FDI 
usually involved the loss of ownership. 
The second reason for preference for foreign loans was that the government 
could reinforce its control over domestic companies through control of foreign 
borrowings. As has been mentioned earlier, Korean companies in the 1960s could not 
qualify for loans from foreign banks or companies on the basis of their own credit. To 
solve this problem, the Korean government established a law in 1962 that enabled the 
government to co-sign the foreign loans for the private sector and required companies to 
obtain the government's approval and guarantee when they applied for foreign loans.46 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the government maintained high domestic interest rates to 
encourage domestic savings and so domestic interest rates were much higher than 
international interest rates.47 Thus, access to foreign loans was profitable and was 
considered a preferential favour for Korean companies. The authority regarding the 
approval and guarantee of foreign loans enabled the government to strengthen its 
control over companies (Gang 1995: 63); the foreign loans reinforced the government's 
dominance over domestic companies while FDI might weaken government's power to 
control the economy. 
Thirdly, in the 1960s and 1970s the Korean economy was at a fledgling stage, 
focused mainly on producing labour-intensive goods and not in need of the advanced 
46 This law was included in the Foreign Capital Inducement Law in 1966; in its revision. in .19~3, ~he co-
signatory changed from the government to financial institutions. However, as all fmanc!al mstItutlOns at 
that time were owned by the government, it was no different from the guarantee bemg made by the 
Korean government. . 
47 Nominal interest rates in Korea ranged between 15 and 17 p~rce?t from 1961 to 196~, mcreased to 20-
26 t b tween 1965 and 1971, and declined a little but mamtamed an average of 1') percent between percen e . I I . d· 
197' and 1980 (Lee 2005: 621). Comparing domestic and intematlOna rea mterest rates, omestIc rates 
~h· h b 3 I percent from 1966 to 1970 4.1 percent from 1971 to 1975 and 3.7 percent from 1976 were Ig er y . , 
to 1980 (Woo 1991: 104). 
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technologies, sophisticated management, or marketing skills that FDI could offer. These 
circumstances changed as Korean industry advanced but, in the SOM phase at least, the 
sophisticated technology or management that usually accompanied FDI was not crucial 
to businesses (Sakong 1993: 119). In conclusion, the Korean government and Korean 
companies in the SOM period did not favour FDI as a source of capital because they 
had other options for raising foreign capital and this presence of alternatives reduced the 
government's stake level. 
Bargaining Constraints 
In the NBM, the dimension of relative constraints comprises two elements: internal and 
external constraints. Internal constraints include pressure from interest groups and the 
capabilities of the government agency responsible for FDI. The ability to deal with 
pressure from interest groups is closely related to the autonomy of the state; greater 
autonomy is likely to produce stronger bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs because it can 
reduce obstacles in implementing its policy. As for the capabilities of the government 
agency, several factors such as its capabilities for coordination, implementation and 
resource mobilisation together with the level of decision making affect the bargaining 
power of a host country. External constraints include pressure from the home country 
and international institutions, which is closely related to the international political and 
economic order. In this section we consider the internal and external constraints that the 
Korean government had to face during the SOM period. In the SOM period, the 
developmental state could maintain a low level of internal and external constraints. The 
strong developmental state in the SOM period, which had strong autonomy and capacity. 
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could cont I d . . I . . . ro omestIc SOCIa groups and It could maIntaIn a competent bargaining 
agency, which enabled it to restrict internal constraints to a low level. In addition, the 
international political circumstance, that is, the Cold War context, insulated the state 
from external pressures. We examine that how was it possible for the state to keep low 
levels of constraints internally and externally. 
Internal Constraints 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Korean developmental state maintained relatively strong 
autonomy, which offered the power to control domestic social groups. Korea's 
economic development during the SOM period was characterised as 'state-led economic 
development'. This was partly because, at this time, social groups lacked the power to 
challenge the state. After the Japanese occupation in the early 20th century (1910-1945), 
the US military administration (1945-1948) and the Korean War (1950-1953), the 
country in the SOM phase was not fully recovered from a period of confusion and 
destruction. New ruling classes had not yet formed after the collapse of the traditional 
class system under the Japanese domination and, with the SOM period covering the 
beginnings of industrialisation in Korea, neither a capitalist nor a labour class had yet 
established a firm influence (Seo 1991: 78_124).48 
With the help of the state, the industrial capitalist class appeared during the 
SOM phase. Immediately after taking office in 1961~ President Park accused most 
industrialists of illicit wealth accumulation.49 However. realising that their management 
48 Seo (1991) argued that Korea's industrial cap.ital clas~ emerged i~ the early 1960s as i~dustrialis~tion 
d . t and consolidated in 1970s With the ImplementatIOn of the controverSial HeaV) and starte m eames 
Chemical Industry Policy. .., , 
49 After liberation from Japan in 1945, there were few mdustrIal properties that were owned by Koreans 
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resources were required to develop the economy, he decided to encourage them to 
contribute to the country rather than to punish them. After that the state controlled 
domestic capital in order to achieve its goal of industrialisation; the government 
deliberately concentrated resources on a small number of businesses (chaebol) to 
develop core industries because it had to achieve economies of scale in order to compete 
with forerunners despite the limited availability of resources. During the SOM period, 
the chaebol were at such an early stage of development and so nurtured by government 
support that it was unimaginable for companies to resist the government's directions. 
The government controlled the chaebol with the traditional 'carrot and stick' 
method; the government supported specific companies or sectors by offering generous 
financial subsidies, guaranteed their foreign loans, provided them with 'policy loans' 
that had lower interest rates, and sometimes even froze the loans of companies when 
they were in trouble due to high debt levels (Woo 1991).50 On the other hand, when 
companies failed to satisfy government criteria or demonstrated incompetence, they 
were disciplined by the state and were essentially removed from the market (Amsden 
1989: 14-15). The main tool of discipline was the banks; when Park Chung-Hee took 
power in 1961, he immediately made nationalised the existing commercial banks, 
established special-purpose, state-owned banks, and amended the Bank of Korea Act to 
facilitate the central bank's cooperation with the state's long-term development efforts 
as the majority of properties were owned by the Japanese .. I~ the 19?Os, .most ~orean companies bought 
these Japanese properties from the government or participated m aid projects. Trade cam~ to be 
dominated by politics rather than by competitiveness in the market and, therefore, most companIes were 
involved in corruption (Lee Seung-Hun 2004: 126) ., . 
50 PI' I s refer to those earmarked for specific sectors or mdustrles and proVided at lower rates than 
o ICY oan . h' d . I 
those of standard bank loans. They are one example of pohcy me~sures t at alme to su~port partlC~ ar 
. d tr' (W 1991' 12) A typical example of government actIOn to support companIes by freezmg m us les 00 . . . . . 
h . I . th '83 Actl'on' or to give it its official name the 'Emergency Order for Economic StabIllh t elr oans IS e ., '. . .. 
and Growth' announced by President Park on 3 August 1972. He exercised an e~ergency preSidential 
d anl'es whl'ch were sufferinu from a heavy burden of debt from prIvate money lenders. or er to save comp e· . 
. h h t' 'vate loans were frozen interest rates were lowered and funds were proVided to the Wit t e ac IOn, pn , 
companies (Lee 2005: 437). 
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(Sakong 1993: 33). The government had a firm grip on the nation~s financial resources, 
and, with this, it could mobilise the companies to achieve its goal of industrialisation. 
The chaebol were well aware of their lack of political and economic power and, as long 
as the state's policy conformed to their interests, the chaebol did not have any reason to 
challenge the state. Therefore, domestic capital was not constraining the power of the 
government during the SOM period. 
Nor could labours challenge the government. In the 1960s, when labour was in 
oversupply and unemployment stood at more than five percent, there were few labour 
disputes and, therefore, no necessity to control the labour movement. Entering the 1970s. 
as the oversupply of unskilled workers gradually diminished and industrialisation 
progressed, the labour movement began to grow; in tum, the government attempted to 
rein in labour. To maintain price competitiveness in exports, it was necessary to stabilise 
wages at a low level and keep industries free from labour disputes. In 1971. the 
government outlawed the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike when it 
announced the 'Special Measures Law Concerning National Security'. In 1972, the 
revised 'Yushin' Constitution comprehensively restricted the basic rights of labour. 
Especially for foreign companies, the 'Interim Special Law on the Coordination of 
Labour Disputes and Labour Union of Foreign Companies' was implemented in January 
1970, virtually blocking any movement by workers to organise labour unions and stage 
labour disputes at foreign-invested companies in Korea (Koo 2001: 56_57).51 The 
state's power was strong enough to suspend the basic rights of labour while the labour 
force had not grown to the point where it could challenge the state. The weakness of 
societal forces and the lack of a dominant class brought about a power vacuum in 
51 ft b' . d on two occasions the' Interim Special Law on the Coordination of Labour Disputes A er emg reVIse . . 
and Labour Union of Foreign Companies' was abolIshed m 1986. 
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society, and the state was ready and willing to fill it (Bishop 1997: 71). Under these 
circumstances, the government was able to carry out its goals without encountering 
many obstacles from opposing forces; the state in the SOM phase was a strong state, 
able to remain aloof, to say 'no,' and to impose its will (Weiss and Hobson 1995: 148). 
The capacity of bargaining institutions is one of the factors that affects internal 
constraints. According to Encarnation and Wells (1985a: 52), a government agency's 
bargaining power increases if the agency occupies a monopolistic or dominant position 
in the task; if the agency has the authority to evaluate the rest of the government; if the 
agency has access to resources such as financial revenues or political support; and if the 
agency has the capacity to integrate all functions within its domain. In other words, a 
bargaining agency with a superior position and powerful authority increases the host 
government's bargaining power. The Economic Development Board (EDB) of 
Singapore and the Ireland Development Agency (IDA), the two most successful 
bargaining agencies, indicate that competent institutions are crucial in achieving good 
performance in FDI. 
As for bargaining institutions in Korea, there was a powerful and competent 
institution in SOM period: the Economic Planning Board (EPB). The EPB, created 
immediately after President Park took office in July 1961, was the key agency with 
responsibility for economic development. The most powerful institution in the 
administration, the EPB was in charge of drafting and implementing economic 
development plans and appropriating budgets for those plans (Sakong 1993: 26). The 
EPB's extensive duties included planning, resource sourcing, budget distribution, and 
1· d' atl'on and in fact the head of the EPB served concurrently as deputy po ICY coor In , . . 
. . . t to give him the authority to coordinate the different interests of each prIme mInIS er 
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ministry and its policies. Ministers in economy-related positions, such as the Minister of 
Finance and the Minister of Commerce and Industry, were required to consult with the 
head of the EPB prior to making important decisions. The head of the EPB chaired the 
Economic Ministers' Consultation, where economic policies were coordinated, 
reflecting the EPB's dominant status as the pilot agency leading other ministries 
(Bishop 1997: 56-57). 
Because the EPB's major role was to source and distribute resources and 
because, in the 1960s, the major resource for the economy were foreign capital, the EPB 
naturally undertook the functions relating to foreign capital. The Department of Foreign 
Capital Inducement (later renamed the Economic Cooperation Department) was the 
division in charge of sourcing foreign capital within the EPB (Gang 1995: 145). Its 
main function was sourcing foreign borrowing because foreign loans were the major 
source of capital inflows. Nevertheless, FDI was another major source of foreign capital 
and, accordingly, attracting and screening FDI became one of the functions of the 
Department. The EPB, as the chief economic planning institution as well as the resource 
distribution institution, was aware of what resources were required and where to 
allocate them. The EPB carefully selected the foreign firms and sectors which it wished 
to attract, negotiated individually and distributed the resources secured to selected 
domestic firms and sectors (Bishop 1997: 74-75). This strong authority and superiority 
contributed to boosting the EPB's bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs. 
In conclusion, the developmental state in the SOM period demonstrated a high 
level of autonomy as internal challenges were minimal. In addition, the EPB - with its 
team of elite officials and strong influence over policy-making - was able to increase 
the bargaining power of the Korean government. 
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External Constraints 
The external environments in the 1960s and 1970s acted as favourable conditions rather 
than constraints for Korea. As a result of its geopolitical location Korea became a 
significant beneficiary of US assistance during the Cold War; Korea was in the forefront 
of the Cold War, and the US government wanted Korea to be strong enough to counter 
the threat of communism. The US provided assistance to Korea with grant-in-aid in the 
1950s and with development loans throughout the 1960s and the 1970s and was willing 
to be a market for Korean products, (Weiss and Hobson 1995: 166). In terms of the 
economy, once again the Cold War created advantageous circumstances for Korea rather 
than a threat. From 1946 to 1976, Korea received economic and military aid worth USD 
12.6 billion from the US, USD 1 billion from Japan and USD 2 billion from 
international financial institutions. In terms of per capita aid, Korea ranked third (after 
Israel and Vietnam). From 1946 to 1976, the American government provided Korea 
with economic aid and loans worth USD6 billion, which almost equalled its aid to 
Africa (USD6.9 billion) and amounted to slightly less than half of the aid provided to 
Latin America (USDI4.9 billion) (Woo 1991: 45, Stubbs 2005: 106). 
The US government provided Korea with 69 percent of its public loans and 32 
percent of its commercial loans in the 1960s, and 28 percent of its public loans and 24 
percent of its commercial loans in the 1970s (MOF and KDB 1993). At the same time, 
the US succeeded in making Japan share its financial burden in East Asia. The 
American government acted as an invisible hand for normalising diplomatic relations 
between Korea and Japan in 1965, thereby succeeding in making Japanese funds 
contribute to Korea's economic development. As a result of the Korean rapprochement 
1:23 
with Japan, Korea received USD 300 million in grant-in-aid, USD 200 million in public 
loans and USD 300 million in commercial loans as reparations (although Japan refused 
to call it that, preferring the term 'grant') (Woo 1991: 85-87, Cumings 318-322). Until 
1979, the sum of public loans provided by the Japanese government to Korea amounted 
to USD800 million, which accounted for 15 percent of total public loans during the 
SOM period. Apart from capital assistance, the US served as a major export market for 
Korea; after 1966, the US was always Korea's most important export market. In 1962, 
Korea's exports to the US accounted for only 22 percent of the total exports, but the 
share increased to 50 percent by the end of 1960s, which meant that half of Korea's 
exports went to the US (Lee 2005: 623). 
Against the backdrop of such support, the US government's motivation for 
assisting Korea lay not only in the prevention of the Korean peninsula succumbing to 
communism but also in providing economic compensation for Korea's dispatch of 
troops to the Vietnam War. Under US stewardship in the Cold War, the protectionist 
trade policy of Korea was tolerated and the Korean government could proceed with its 
regulatory policy regarding FDI without much pressure from outside. Korea deliberately 
blocked foreign MNC dominance of the Korean market and instead nurtured the 
chaebol. The Park regime faced virtually no significant pressure from external actors for 
the liberalisation of FDI; as a frontline state and a crucial part of the capitalist world's 
strategy, Korea used its geographical situation to insulate itself from external pressure 
on its domestic policy (Bishop 1997: 77). 
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Evaluation of the government's bargaining power 
So far, each element of the Korean government's resources, stakes and constraints vis-a-
vis MNCs during the SOM period has been discussed. Based on the findings of that 
discussion, we will now evaluate the level of each dimension and, using the NBM, will 
determine the bargaining power of the Korean government during the SOM period. 
The model consists of three dimensions: resources, stakes, and constraints. Each 
dimension includes several elements: the resource dimension is determined by the host 
country's specific advantages; the stakes dimension is made up of commitment and 
alternatives; and the constraints dimension consists of internal and external constraints. 
Each dimension is divided into five levels: 'high', 'medium-high', 'medium', 'medium-
low', and 'low'. Each element is categorised into three levels: 'high', 'medium' and 
'low'. A high-level dimension refers to a situation where the levels of all the elements 
are high while a low-level dimension indicates that the levels of all the elements are low. 
A medium-level dimension refers to a case where each element is at medium level or 
when two elements are high and low, offsetting each other. Medium-high dimensions 
have high and medium elements, and medium-low dimensions have medium and low 
elements. 
Firstly, we evaluate the dimension of resources. During the SOM period, Korea 
did not have an abundance of natural resources and was one of the poorest countries in 
the world in 1970: thus, Korea was not attractive to MNCs. Therefore, it was natural 
that there was little FDI aimed at gaining access to Korea's natural resources or market 
during the SOM period. However, Korea had a large pool of cheap but well-educated 
labour and these abundant human resources attracted MNCs that were looking for 
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production bases for labour-intensive industries. From the late 1960s onwards, FDI 
began to flow from Japan into Korea in labour-intensive industries such as electronics 
and textiles. At least for companies that wanted to reduce production costs, Korea 
during the SOM period was a good location in which to invest. In conclusion, Korea's 
resources were 'low' in terms of the market size and natural resources but 'medium' 
solely in terms of human resources. In all, the resource dimension can be determined 
'medium low' . 
Secondly, two elements determine the stakes level for Korea: the Korean 
government's level of commitment to FDI and the level of alternatives to FDI. Higher 
commitment and lower alternatives both result in an increase in the level of stakes. In 
terms of commitment, the Korean government in the 1960s was in desperate need of 
foreign capital since domestic capital was lacking and this raised the commitment level 
for all sources of foreign capital including FDI. However, as the Korean government 
promoted the heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s for security reasons, its 
commitment to FDI became lower. Moreover, the surge in Japanese FDI in light 
industries in the late 1960s caused the Korean government to worry about possible 
domination of the Korean economy by Japanese companies. Thus, the commitment 
level of the Korean government to FDI during the SOM period can be said to be 
'medium'. As regards alternatives, Korea had easy access to loans from the US, Japan 
and international financial institutions for international political reasons during the Cold 
War era in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, oil money from the first oil shock in the 
early 1970s flowed in the Euro money market, allowing less developed countries to 
access abundant development funds. Thus, the level of alternatives to FDI for the 
Korean government can be put at • high', thus lowering the stakes. If we combine 
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commitment and alternatives to FDI, the Korean government's stake during the SOM 
period is 'medium-low'. 
Thirdly, the level of both internal and external constraints on the Korean 
government during the SOM period was 'low'. In terms of internal constraints, the 
Korean government was capable of autonomous decision-making with little 
interferences from domestic social groups and the bargaining institution of the 
government in the SOM phase was the powerful EPB. This autonomy and capacity put 
the internal constraints on the Korean government at a 'low' level. As regards external 
constraints, the international environment of the SOM period was favourable for the 
Korean government as the international community at that time was sympathetic to 
Korea, a poor nation at the frontline of the Cold War and the US governmenfs attitude 
to Korea was concessive rather than competitive. These circumstances led external 
forces ignore Korea's protectionist policies and, therefore, the level of constraints on the 
Korean government during the SOM period was 'low'. Table 3.6 provides a summary of 
the discussion above. 
Table 3.6 Korean Government's Bargaining Power: SOM Phase 
Dimensions Level of Dimensions Level of Bargaining Power 
Resources Medium Low 
Stakes Commitment Medium Medium Low 
A lternati ves High Medium High 
Constraints Internal Low Low 
External Low 
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Figure 3.1 The Position of the Korean Government's Bargaining Power: SOM Phase 
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The NBM is three-dimensional and allows us to understand the level of each party's 
bargaining power by analysing their respective bargaining factors. With this model, the 
strengths and weaknesses of bargaining parties and the bargaining power of each party 
can be assessed. The Korean government's bargaining power during the SOM period 
was applied to the model, as is shown in Figure 3.1. When we put into position the 
levels of dimensions such as resources, stakes and constraints in the SOM phase, 
Korea's bargaining power is situated at point SOM. Point SOM is quite close to point S, 
which represents the highest level of bargaining power, but is further away from point 
W, which represents the lowest level of bargaining power. This implies that the 
bargaining power of the Korean government l'is-a-\'is MNCs in the SOM phase was 
relatively "high'. It also confirms that this stronger bargaining power during the SOM 
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period can be attributed to Korea's low stake in and the low level of constraints in terms 
ofFDI. 
2. Market Over State 
The Asian crisis in 1997 forced Korea into the new phase of Market over State. This 
period began with the severe economic slump in 1998, when the economic growth rate 
plummeted to -6.9 percent, the unemployment rate soared to seven percent, the value of 
the Korean currency and stocks was cut in half, and, as a result, national income level 
fell by 34 percent. After the economic collapse in 1998, the nature of the Korean 
economy shifted rapidly as a result of these external forces and internal demands. The 
radical program required by the IMF as a condition for bailout funding brought about 
massive, market-driven reforms; in addition, the then-President Kim Dae-Jung wanted 
to use these foreign pressures as leverage to push through delayed domestic reforms 
(Mathew 1998). These forces completely reshaped the economy into a more neo-liberal 
model. 
Government officials tried to distance themselves, both from developmentalism, 
identifying it as a cause of the crisis and from the state that brought about the collapse 
of the economy. Companies became more concerned about shareholders and short-term 
profits rather than stakeholders and long-term market shares and the banks were no 
longer the instruments of the state's industrial policy. Now they could focus their 
attention on securing safe and short-term margins for themselves instead ensuring 
uncertain but long-term gains for society. The job market was extremely unstable, with 
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layoffs becoming easier and companies switching to short-term hiring policies. All 
economic subjects - that is, the state, companies, banks, and workers - were more 
concerned about their short-term interests instead of their long-term visions and the 
economy fell into the short-termism. 
Under the dominance of neo-liberalism, FDI policies also changed, becoming 
more open and market-friendly on the basis of this short-term view. The government 
abandoned its previous long-term approach to FDI and lost the power to implement its 
wishes. During the SOM period, FDI policy was regarded as an industrial policy; the 
government selected foreign firms using long-term considerations, and FDI was used as 
an instrument for realising the state's long-term goals. However, during the MOS period, 
the government lost its power to control foreign businesses and focused on the short-
term goal of attracting certain amounts ofFDI regardless its impact on the economy. No 
longer trying to manage FDI, the government instead tried to see what MNCs wanted, a 
situation that resulted from the shift in relative power between the government and the 
MNCs. 
In the MOS period, though the bargaining resources of the country were 
significantly enhanced compared with the SOM period, the bargaining power of the 
government considerably shrank because of a high level of stakes and constraints. As 
the nature of the state became more akin to a neo-liberal state, the government increased 
its commitment to FDI. As the economy no longer enjoyed the advantages of a late 
, 
developer, the industries required more sophisticated technology from MNCs for further 
development, which reduced alternatives to FDI. These factors contributed to raising the 
level of the stake in FDI. As for constraints, the Korean state in the MOS period, almost 
lost its developmental state attribute, faced with strong challenges from social groups. 
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At the same time, globalisation pressures acted as serious external constraints. The 
following section identifies these elements that weakened the Korean government's 
bargaining power in the MOS phase. 
Bargaining Resources 
According to the survey carried out by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 
(KOTRA) (1999) of the investment motivations of MNCs in Korea, the highest 
motivation for investment was the market (67 percent), followed by high productivity 
and efficiency in production (25 percent), and then by strategic resources such as new 
production technology (8 percent). These results indicated that market-seeking 
investment had increased significantly since an earlier survey carried out by the EPB in 
1979.52 Market-seeking investment was becoming the increasingly dominant form of 
FDI after 1998. In the past, production-oriented investment primarily sought low-cost 
labour but now, it pursued high productivity and efficiency, meaning that Korea's 
resources were shifting from the traditional to non-traditional. The advantage of low-
cost labour disappeared and was being replaced by non-traditional resources such as 
infrastructure or specialist workers for efficiency-seeking investors. The following 
section analyses Korea's attractiveness to MNCs after 1998, focusing on market size, 
technological and human resources, and knowledge-based resources. 
52 The EPB and KOTRA surveys were carried out in 1979 and 1999, respectively. In the intervening 
period, the MOF and KDB carried out a survey in 1993. The result of the MOF and KDB survey (1993: 
566-567) showed clearly the transition characteristics of the location motivations. According to the survey, 
the motivations for foreign companies' investment in Korea were firstly, securing market access (42.6 
percent), secondly, access to low-cost labour (26.3 percent) and, thirdly. securing a foothold for moving 
into third-country markets (16.2 percent). 
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Table 3.7 Population, GDP and GNI per capita: Korea 1998-2005 
Population (Thousand) GDP (USD billion) 
1998 46,287 3,461 (17/210) 
2000 47,008 5, 1 18 (12/210) 
2003 47,849 6,080 (111210) 
2005 48,294 7,875 (12/210) 
Note: Korea's world ranking shown in parentheses 
Source: BOK 2005, NSO 2006 
GNI per capita (USD) 
7,355 (N/A) 
10,841 (46/210) 
12,720 (50/210) 
16,291 (29/210) 
In terms of relative market size, Korea was the 12th biggest market in the world in 
terms of GDP by 2005, positioning itself as an attractive country in which market-
seekers could invest. Although Korea's GDP recorded an economic growth rate of -6.9 
percent in 1998 due to the economic crisis, the economy recovered its stability after 
1999 (see Table A). In 2005 Korea's GDP was USD 787billion; per capita GDP stood at 
USD16,291 in 2005, ranking 29th in the world (NSO 2006). The relatively high per 
capita GDP, the population of 48 million and high levels of consumer sophistication 
made Korea an attractive market. 
Table 3.8 Average Monthly Wages: Selected Countries, Manufacturing Industry (USD) 
Year Korea Taiwan China Japan US 
1998 917 1,086 71 3,113 2,442 
2000 1,386 1,241 88 3,773 2,569 
2002 1,486 1,106 110 3,207 2,718 
Source: KLI 2004: 161 
As regards resource-seeking investment, Korea made the transition from a traditional 
resource base to a non-traditional resource base; this, in turn reflected the transition in 
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terms of the technological nature of Korean products in the product life-cycle. 53 The 
period of producing mature or standardized products came to an end during the MOS 
period. The labour costs of Korea were notably higher than those of China or Southeast 
Asian countries; as can be seen in Table 3.8, wages in Korea were 13.5 times higher 
than those of China in 2002. From the late 1980s onwards, surging wage levels in Korea 
eroded the country's attractiveness as a location for cost-cautious investors. As a result 
of these high labour costs, Korea lost its competitiveness in the production of the 
standardized products and has reached a stage where the production of higher value-
added, innovative products was demanded. That is, Korea was at a stage where the 
quality of the workforce was more important than the cost and where technological 
progress was more significant as a production factor. 
As innovation and technology assumed a greater role in economic growth, the 
quality of human capital became both more critical than its cost and it is also the crucial 
factor in attracting FDI (Blomstrom and Kokko 2003, Noorbakhsh et al 2001, Porter 
1990, Dunning 1998b). Therefore the role of education, which improves the quality of 
human capital, becomes more and more essential, not only for long-term economic 
growth but also for inducing FDI. The quality of a country's workforce is in many ways 
related to the country's educational environment and system because human capital is 
essentially produced through a country's educational system. Therefore, to assess the 
quality of the workforce, it is essential to evaluate the educational environment in a 
country. 
In terms of the quality of Korea's human resources, evaluations are mixed in that 
53 Vernon (1966) claimed in his product life cycle theory that, as the nature of US corporations' products 
changed from the developing stage to the maturing stage and then to the standardized stage, their 
production bases also moved from the US to other developed countries and then to developing countries. 
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they highlight both positive and negative aspects. Assessing the educational 
achievement in Korea by quantitative criteria, the performance of the educational 
system was quite positive. Its primary and secondary school attendance was virtually 
100 percent, and the tertiary enrolment exceeded 80 percent, which was the second 
highest in the world (WEF 2005: 538). According to the DE CD (2006), Korea invested 
7.1 percent of its GDP in education, giving the country a ranking of 5th among the 28 
DECD member countries. Furthermore, it should be noted that these figures were based 
only on the public education sector; when investment in private education was included 
(estimated to be 3.2 percent of GDP), total investment in education exceeded 10 percent 
of GDP, which was the highest level in the world (Yang et a12004: 168). According to 
quantitative criteria, accomplishments in the educational sector in Korea were at the 
highest level, but, when it came to qualitative standards, the performance of its system 
receives a negative assessment. According to the IMD's 1999 analysis of 47 countries, 
Korea ranked 44th in terms of the educational system's contribution to the country~s 
competitiveness, 47th in the quality of university education, 43rd in the availability of 
qualified engineers, and 40th in the availability of skilled labour (IMD 1999). Despite 
the highest levels of investment in the educational system, its quality was considered 
low, and thus the educational system could be considered to suffer from low 
productivity. The low productivity of the Korean educational system led to high demand 
for overseas education, and Korean students accounted for the majority of foreign 
students in the US.54 However, as can be seen from the high brain-drain rate~ it remains 
54 In September 2006, the number of Korean students at US universities was 87,724, making up 14.4 
percent of the total students from overseas - the highest percentage of any single group in the US 
overseas student community. The Koreans are followed by students from India (68,451 studentsl12.1 
percent). China (54,486 students/9.3 percent), Japan (49,338 students/8.6 percent), and Taiwan (37.627 
students/5.6 percent). The ratio of Korean students is remarkably high considering that Korea's 
population is 4.4 percent of that of India, 3.6 percent of China, and 37 percent of Japan. (Chosun I1bo 2 
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doubtful whether Korean students overseas would return home and contribute to Korean 
economy after their graduation. 55 Accordingly, it is wrong to say that MN Cs are 
investing in Korea because of its high-quality human capital. 
In the globalizing economy, knowledge-intensive assets are an increasingly 
critical factor in the enhancement of a company's competitiveness. A company that tries 
to increase its competitiveness through FDI must seriously consider the issue of access 
to technology and innovation capacity as well as matters relating to cost reduction or 
market access (UNCTAD 1998, Dunning 1993b). Korea's knowledge-based assets 
recently grew rapidly; according to OECD statistics (2006), Korea's investment in R&D 
in 2003 amounted to 2.36 percent of GDP, positioning Korea as the 6th highest among 
OECD member nations, while investment in knowledge industries accounted for 5.9 
percent of GDP, resulting in a ranking of 4th among OECD nations. Korea, in particular, 
is showing strength in the ICT industry; in the percentage of households with access to a 
home computer Korea was ranked 3rd among OECD nations and the investment ratio of 
the ICT industry as a percentage GDP is 16.4 percent, which is the 11th highest among 
the OECD member nations (OECD 2006). 
While it is true that Korea has experienced rapid growth in knowledge-based 
resources, it cannot be said that these resources are sufficiently advanced to attract 
world-class MNCs. Korea's investment in R&D amounted to 2.63 percent of GDP in 
2003, which was similar to that of the United States (2.68 percent), but in terms of 
absolute investment value, Korea accounted for only four percent of the amount 
invested by the US and 11 percent of that invested by Japan. As for patent the US held 
November 2006) 
55 According to the IMD (1999), Korea is ranked 33rd of 47 countries in terms of the brain drain, which 
means that the outflow of gifted human capital in Korea is relatively high. 
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36.4 percent of the world's patents and Japan held 25.7 percent, whereas Korea's share 
was only 1.4 percent in 2002.56 Korea is still highly dependent on foreign technology, 
which was revealed in the size of the deficit in the technology balance of payments in 
2001 (USD2.1 billion or 0.61 percent of GDP), ranking Korea 23rd among the OECD's 
24 member countries (Ha 2004: 144, Yang et a12004: 164). In terms of absolute scale or 
level of the knowledge industry, Korea lagged far behind the United States or Japan and 
still relied to a great extent on foreign technologies and knowledge for its industries. In 
1999 the IMD ranked the overall attractiveness of Korea's R&D activities as 32nd 
among 47 countries; therefore, it is too early to say whether or not Korea's knowledge 
assets are working to attract foreign companies. 
As MNCs seek to invest in knowledge-intensive industries, they gravitate to 
spatial clusters of related activities. These industrial clusters create external economies 
that help to upgrade the competitive advantage of the participating firms, and these 
externalities, in tum, attract firms to locations where such clusters exist. The presence of 
a cluster is becoming a critical factor in the choice of location for firms, and the creation 
of clusters of certain industries has emerged as a critical task for governments seeking to 
attract foreign companies (UNCTAD 1998: 114). Infrastructure quality and the degree 
of industrialization are considered to be important factors in the creation of clusters 
(Wheeler and Mody 1992), and Korea seemed to be strong in both regards. 
Firstly, Korea earned a relatively high reputation for the quality of its 
infrastructure; in 1999 the IMD ranked Korea as 7th among 47 countries in terms of air 
transportation services, 7th in telecommunications and 8th in terms of the cost of 
56 The share of patents is based on the 'triadic patent families' which the OECD has developed as a patent 
indicator. 'Triadic patent families' are a set of patents registered at all three of the major patent office -
the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) (OECD 2006: 134). 
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electricity for industrial clients (IMD 1999). In 2005, Incheon International Airport was 
one of the top three airports in the world in terms of cargo handling capacity and Busan 
port was the 5th largest container port in the world. Korea was also the 10th largest 
electricity producing country, providing electricity at the lowest cost among the Asian 
industrialized countries (Invest Korea 2005). Secondly, as for the level of 
industrialization, Korea's manufacturing industry had a relatively sturdy foundation, 
showing strength in electronics, automobiles, steel, and shipbuilding. In 2003, Korea's 
automobile production was ranked 6th in the world, shipbuilding was ranked 1 st, steel 
production 5th and electronic production 3rd (NSO 2005). Other than these traditional 
manufacturing industries, Korea performed remarkably well in new industries such as 
the information and leT fields. The OEeD (2006) reported that Korea~s leT equipment 
exports ranked 4th in terms of value among the OEeD member countries in 2004. 
However, despite the relatively well-prepared infrastructure and the sturdy 
industrial structure, there were no outstanding industrial clusters in Korea, which 
reduced the country's attractiveness as an industrial location. Moreover, unstable labour-
management relations were often pointed out as a weakness of Korean industry; in 1999 
the IMD ranked Korea 46th out of 47 countries in terms of labour-management relations. 
Table 3.9 The Ranking of Major industries: Korea 2003 
Automobile Shipbuilding Steel Electronics ICT equipment 
US Korea China US China 
') Japan Japan Japan Japan US 
3 Germany China US Korea Japan 
4 China Gennany Russia Gennan)' Gennany 
5 France Italy Korea Malaysia Korea 
6 Korea Spain Gennany Taiwan The Netherlands 
Source: NSO 2005, OEeD 2006 
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Korea had many strong factors in terms of resources: the 12th largest market in the 
world, relatively high purchasing power arising from relatively high income, and a 
sturdy industrial foundation where traditional and new industries are balanced in terms 
of their development. These factors are what attract MN Cs to Korea, and these are also 
the bargaining resources for the Korean government. However, the lack of quality 
human capital as well as leading technology and innovation capacity were the reasons 
that Korea's attractiveness for foreign investors had not yet turned away from the 
traditional resource base towards the non-traditional resource base. 
Bargaining Stakes 
Commitment 
In terms of commitment, the Korean government in the MOS period had high levels of 
commitment to attracting FDI. In the 1997 presidential election, which took on 18 
December amid the confusion of the economic crisis, Kim Dae-Jung was victorious and 
his government began its five-year term of office in February 1998 at the height of the 
crisis. President Kim, a proponent of neo-liberal economic policies, had a strong 
commitment to FDI which is clearly demonstrated in his inaugural address on 25 
February 1998: 
Our government will make as much effort to attract foreign capital as to 
promote exports. Attracting foreign capital is the most effective way to pay 
back our foreign debt, to strengthen local companies and enhance the 
transparency of our economy (Kim 2004: 22). 
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As he stated in his inaugural address, Kim Dae-Jung saw foreign capital not only as a 
means to make up for the lack of domestic capital, but also as a way to accelerate 
competition among domestic companies, which could promote the strengthening of 
their competitiveness and the implementation of the corporate restructuring process. 
This is also clearly stated in the 'Economic Blueprint of the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration,' which was published early in the administration: 
The opening of the economy, which promotes unlimited competition, can 
lead to a fundamental change in the economic structure in which the 
structural problems of the economic crisis such as collusion between 
politics, business and government-dictated-finance, created (MOFE and 
KDI 1998: 211). 
President Kim recognized that the crisis occurred as a result of the legacy of the 
previous interventionist policy, specifically the strong connection between state, 
business and banks. In order to dismantle the old system, he needed strong power to 
break the nexus between them; he found this power outside the system in the form of 
pressure from the IMF and foreign companies. To Kim, the pressure from the IMF 
provided strong support for his reforms and foreign companies were the tool for 
carrying out reforms (Mathew 1998). In this situation, attracting foreign capital was 
publicized, not just as the means to overcome the crisis, but also as the shortcut for 
Korea to upgrade its economy (KIEP 1998). 
According to the Kim government, the mam causes of the economIC CrISIS 
included the inefficient chaebol, operating on the basis of excessive debt, the financial 
agencies that followed government directions and the previous government's failure to 
supervise capital movement (MOFE and KDI 1998). Therefore. the chaebol and 
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domestic financial agencies were labelled as the principal offenders in the economic 
crisis; they became the targets for reform while foreign companies became the means to 
rescue the Korean economy from crisis (Shin and Chang 2003: 103). The Kim 
administration carried out policies that favoured foreign companies to such an extent 
that domestic companies complained they were suffering reverse discrimination and the 
government's focus on FDI was sometimes seen as an 'obsession for attracting foreign 
investment' (FKI 2005: 1). Therefore, it is clear that the Kim administration's 
commitment to FDI was very high. 
President Roh Moo-Hyun (February 2003 to present), as Kim Dae-Jung's 
successor, followed the ideology of the previous administration and there were no great 
differences in economic policies from those of its predecessor. Initially, the Roh 
government presented its central goal as 'the establishing Korea as the hub of Northeast 
Asia' and launched a presidential committee to promote the project. 57 His 
determination to make Korea the hub of Northeast Asia is shown in his inaugural 
address on 25 February 2003: 
The Korean Peninsula is located at the centre of Northeast Asia. The 
Korean Peninsula is the bridge that connects China and Japan, the continent 
and the ocean. This geographical position brought us pain in the past, but 
today it offers us an opportunity. It demands that we play the central role in 
Northeast Asia in the 21 st century. We have gifted minds, creativity and a 
first-class foundation for the information age. We are also constructing the 
57 The basic idea of the Roh Moo-Hyun government's vision of the 'Northeast Asia hub' was presented at 
the press conference of his predecessor, Kim Dae-Jung in January 2002, and therefore the Roh 
administration's goal of 'building the hub of Northeast Asian economy' is in line with the policies of the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration. The law governing the policy, the 'Act on the Designation and 
Manaoement of Free Economic Zones,' was enacted on 30 December 2002 under the Kim Dae-Jung :;:, 
administration. Therefore, the Roh Moo-Hyun government's idea of 'building the hub of the Northeast 
Asian economy' should be seen not as a new policy but rather as the implementation of a plan that had 
already been decided under Kim Dae-Jung (Lee and Park 2003: 65-68). 
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logistics fundamentals in the sky, the ocean and on the land by building 
Incheon International Airport, Busan Port, Gwangyang Port and producing 
bullet trains. We are constructing the foundations for the Northeast Asia era 
in the 21 st century. The Korean Peninsula can be born again as the hub of 
Northeast Asian logistics and finance (Presidential Secretary 2003: 27). 
'Building the Hub of Northeast Asia' refers to the building up of Korea into the centre 
of logistics, finance, and economy in Northeast Asia, exploiting its central position 
between China and Japan (PCNACI 2003). To achieve this goal, the Roh government 
designated Incheon, Busan, and Gwangyang as special free economic zones, offering a 
foreign business-friendly environment. The idea was to develop the three regions as 
international business locations by attracting foreign companies from locations such as 
Hong Kong or Singapore. At the heart of this strategy stands FDI; the promotion of FDI 
was central to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration's goal and, in this sense, the Roh 
Moo-Hyun government's commitment to the FDI is also very strong. In summary, 
during the MOS period since 1998, the Korean government's commitment level can be 
said to be high. 
Alternatives 
During the SOM period, the government treated FDI as one of source of foreign capital, 
and concerned itself principally with the capital transfer effects of FDI. However, as the 
economy developed, the government became more interested in the technology transfer 
effects of FDI, particularly since the 1990s. Hence, during the MOS period, we should 
examine the alternatives to FDI in tenns of both of these aspects: the capital and 
teclmology alternatives to FDI. During the MOS period when the economy was in crisis, 
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the capital effects of FDI were stressed whereas the technology effects of FDI became 
more important to the economy when the crisis was over. In both forms of FDI effects , 
the Korean government could find few alternatives to FDI in the MOS period. 
Firstly, with respect to the capital transfer effects, FDI was emphasised as an 
important source of foreign currency when the country faced an extreme shortage of 
foreign currency at the beginning of MOS period. In late 1997, there was a rapid 
outflow of foreign exchange that caused the Korean won to depreciate to half its former 
value and exhausted the foreign capital reserves of the central bank (see Table D). These 
economic troubles led to a drastic decline in Korea's sovereign credit rating and the 
downgrading of Korean corporate bonds to junk bond status (MOFE 2002: 55).58 
Foreign financial agencies rushed to redeem their bonds in Korea, and were reluctant to 
extend credit or issue further credit to Korean interests. By early 1998, the situation had 
become desperate, as was illustrated by the 'gold gathering campaign' that was 
launched in January 1998 with the aim of gaining access to gold held in private hands.59 
In this situation, it was extremely difficult and costly for the Korean government or 
Korean companies to obtain new loans or to issue bonds.6o When borrowing becomes 
problematic, the final option is the sale of assets to obtain foreign currency. The 
government therefore pressured domestic businesses to sell their assets, resulting in the 
58 Korea's sovereign credit rating decreased from AA before the crisis down to B+ on 23 December 1997, 
a 10-step drop in the Standard and Poors (S&P) rating. Under Moody's system, Korea's rating dropped 
six steps, from Al to Ba1 (21 December 1997). S&P rated Korean bonds as unsuitable for investment 
from December 1997 to January 1999 as did Moody's from December 1997 to February 1999 (MOFE 
2002: 55). 
59 The 'gold gathering campaign' was a public-initiated campaign that aimed encouraged people to sell 
their gold to the banks, where it was converted into foreign exchange. This campaign raised about USD2 
billion from the sale of gold by private owners (Chosun Ilbo 19 October 1998) 
60 In response to the instability of the Korean currency, the Korean government issued foreign exchange 
stabilization fund bonds to the value of USD 1 0 billion worth in New York in April 1998. The spread of 
the bond became the index of the loan interest of the domestic financial agencies when they obtain 
foreign loan. The spread of the government-issued foreign exchange stabilization fund bond (FESFB) was 
3.55 percent above the US Treasury bond (TB) rate when it was issued fust in April 1998. In August 1998, 
it rose by more than 10 percent but dropped by 3.82 percent in late 1998 (BOK 1998: 78). 
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high levels ofFDI activity shortly after the crisis (Shin and Chang 2003: 104). 
Table 3.10 Foreign Debt: Korea 1990-2004 (Unit: USD billion~ 0/0) 
Total foreign Net foreign Short-tenn Foreign Short-tenn Total foreign 
debt debt foreign debt exchange foreign debt debt / GDP 
reserve / total 
foreign debt 
1990 31.7 4.8 14.3 14.8 45.2 12.0 
1991 39.1 11.9 17.2 13.7 44.0 12.7 
1992 42.8 11.0 18.5 17.1 43.2 13.0 
1993 43.8 7.8 19.1 20.2 43.7 12.1 
1994 89.8 18.2 38.4 25.6 42.8 2l.2 
1995 119.8 25.4 54.8 32.7 45.8 23.2 
1996 157.3 46.2 75.8 33.2 48.2 28.2 
1997 174.2 68.0 63.7 20.4 36.6 33.7 
1998 163.8 34.5 39.5 52.0 24.2 47.3 
1999 152.9 6.8 43.0 74.0 28.2 34.4 
2000 148.1 -18.8 49.6 96.1 33.5 28.9 
2001 128.6 -34.7 40.2 102.8 31.3 26.7 
2002 141.7 -42.0 48.1 121.4 34.1 25.9 
2003 157.5 -71.6 50.8 155.3 32.2 25.9 
2004 172.2 -111.9 56.3 199.0 32.7 25.3 
Source: BOK 2006 
In addition, after the crisis the government placed emphasis on the stability of 
capital because it recognised that one of most immediate causes of the financial crisis 
was the sudden outflow of large amounts of unstable capital (Lee Jay-Min 2002: 214). 
The most serious problem was the amount of short-term debt, which exceeded the 
Korean central bank's foreign exchange reserves. While Korea's foreign debt problem 
in the early 1980s was due to the volume of foreign debt, which was equivalent to 50 
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percent of GDP, the 1997 financial crisis resulted from the foreign debt structure, with 
short-term debt accounting for more than 40 percent of total foreign debt in 1997. As 
can be seen in Table 3.10, short-term debt in 1996 amounted to USD 75.8 billion and 
foreign exchange reserves were just USD 33.2 billion (BOK 2006). These short-term 
loans were recalled or were not rolled over after October 1997, as a result of which the 
economy plunged into crisis.61 This painful experience led the government to avoid 
volatile capital. In contrast, FDI was regarded as a relatively stable way to secure 
foreign capital because it was assumed that foreign companies make investment 
decisions in line with their long-term strategies and that, once they make such an 
investment, it is difficult to withdraw. Therefore, there were few alternatives to FDI as a 
stable source of foreign capital. 
Secondly, FDI became an important means of technology transfer at a time when 
Korean industry was most in need of new technology. According to Amsden (1989: 20-
21), Korea was originally industrialised by means of acquired technology and imitation, 
and later industrialisation was primarily achieved through the purchase of foreign 
licences and technical assistance. These methods were possible because the 
technologies during the SOM period were standard or matured ones. However, during 
the MOS period, technology became a decisive factor for further development. As the 
gap in production costs between developed countries and Korea was narrowing, a 
development strategy based on low labour costs and purchased technology was no 
longer viable; enhancing productivity and creating innovation were critical for further 
development. 
61 In one year in 1997, foreign financial institutions retrieved USD37.6 billion in short-term loans. In 
particular, during November and December in 1997, USD20.7 billion (55 percent of whole amount 
retrieved in 1997) was withdrawn. On the other hand, the central bank's foreign exchange reserves were 
maintained around the USD30 billion level from January to September in 1997 (Gang 2005: 573-575). 
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Krugman (1994) argued that the economic growth of East Asian countries was 
driven mainly by increases in factor inputs and not by increases in productivity or 
technological progress. This is also applicable to the Korean economy as the increase in 
factor inputs has been main contribution to its economic growth. Sources of economic 
growth for Korea, the UK and Germany show that Korea's economic growth has been 
the result of increasing factor inputs rather than improved productivity (See Table 3.11). 
Table 3.11 Growth Accounting: Korea, UK and Germany 
GDP Contribution of Contribution of Contribution of 
Growth Capital Labour TFP 
Korea (1966-90) 10.3% 4.7% (46.2%) 4.3% (42.2%) 1.2% (11.6%) 
UK (1960-90) 2.4% l.3% (52.3%) -0.1% (-4.2%) 1.9% (51.9%) 
Germany (1960-90) 3.2% l.8% (58.7%) -0.2% (-8.1%) 1.5% (49.4%) 
Note: TFP: Total Factor Productivity 
Source: Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995: 380-381 
This increase of capital and labour input reached its limit during the MOS 
period; the marginal productivity of capital continued to decrease, and the input of 
workers was no longer increasing as in the previous period.62 The limitations of factor 
input growth became one of the reasons for the slowdown in the rate of economic 
growth during the MOS period. Table 3.12 shows that the average economic growth rate 
between the crisis and 2005 was 4.2 percent, which is a much lower rate than that 
recorded in the SOM period (1962-1979) and the transition period (1980-1997).63 
62 Comparing the US and Korea in 2000, Korea's per capita physical capital formulation and per capita 
human capital formulation accounted for 93 percent and 85 percent respectively of the levels seen in the 
US. However, Korea's productivity was only 50 percent of the level achieved in America (Ha 2004: 141-
144). 
63 According to Shin and Chang (2003), the collapse of the developmental state in Korea resulted in the 
disappearance of economic vitality and the slowdown of economic growth rate. 
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Table 3.12 GDP Growth Rate and Gross Fixed Capital Fonnation Increase Rate: Korea 
Year 
Average ofGDP Growth Rate 
Average of Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation Increase Rate 
Source: BOK 2006 
SOM period 
8.5% 
20.3% 
Transition period MOS period 
7.6% 4.2% 
9.4% 1.5% 
The Korean economy had reached a stage where it was seeking growth through 
innovation and technological progress; however, its relatively weak innovation capacity 
curbed its potential and so Korea had to find a new engine for growth. Furthennore, 
during the MOS period, Korean companies found it increasingly difficult to obtain 
technology because they were no longer seeking matured or standard technologies but 
rather cutting edge, innovative knowledge. Foreign companies did not want to transfer 
their new technology to Korean companies who were seen as potential competitors 
(Bishop 1997: 128-129) and this situation limited Korea's alternatives for obtaining 
technology other than through FDI. In summary, the capital alternatives other than FDI 
were unstable and costly, and the technology alternatives other than FDI were difficult 
to access during the MOS period. 
Bargaining Constraints 
Internal Constraints 
In the MOS period, the state, whose autonomy and capacity was weakened, faced 
serious challenges from labour and capital, even though their challenges abated for a 
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while just after the crisis. The strong state's autonomy with regard to social groups 
during the SOM period started to weaken in the transition period. In accordance with 
Evans' 'gravediggers' thesis (1995: 227-233), as the developmental state grew, grave-
diggers emerged within the economy, who eventually would dismantle the 
developmental state. In the case of the Korean developmental state, private capital and 
the labour class were the major social groups that posed a challenge to the state. 
Firstly, the chaebol, who had been obedient in their relations with the state 
during the SOM period, started to challenge it during the 1990s. This was enabled by 
several significant changes: firstly, the government's financial control over business was 
weakened. The government in the SOM phase was able to control businesses by 
directing financial institutions to follow its bidding but, beginning in the 1980s, the 
government policy loans while the conglomerates diversified their sources of finance, 
thus curtailing their dependence on bank loans (Park 2005: 33). Secondly, the chaebol 
were able to move their capital and products around the world as the mobility of 
international capital increased. This afforded them more liberty and, at the same time, 
fuelled their desire to escape government control. Private companies began to obtain 
finance from abroad without the assistance of the government and expanded their 
production locations, eventually reducing the state's influence over the chaebol (Kim 
Yun-Tae 2003: 307-308). Emboldened by their size and economic influence, the 
chaebol made it clear that they opposed the government's intervention and demanded 
the government's retreat from the market. Thus, the relationship between the 
government and the chaebol progressively became more equal from the 1990s onwards 
(Evans 1995: 229). 
Secondly, the labour class began to challenge the government from the late 
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1980s. The labour class, which had grown in power along with Korea's industrialisation, 
started to demand its due rights, becoming more organised as democratisation 
progressed. The challenge from labour erupted in the late 1980s; in 1987, labour 
disputes spread throughout the country, increasing 12-fold compared with 1986 (see 
Table E). After 1990, labour disputes decreased but the labour movement reinforced its 
solidarity by creating the radical and combative Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KCTU), a nationwide progressive labour conference. Meanwhile, the Korean 
government acknowledged the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) - which 
was relatively moderate and conservative - as the only national labour organisation 
and suppressed any other movement that aimed to organise a national organisation of 
labour unions (Koo 2001: 298)~ Such an intensification and organisation of labour 
movements made foreign companies avoid Korea (Bishop 1997: 113). 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, both groups grew sufficiently powerful to 
challenge the state. However, moving into the MOS period, their power rapidly shrank 
because they were regarded by the public as major factors in the creation of the crisis. 
Specifically, they were for the collapse in the competitiveness of Korean industries 
which led to the increase in the current account deficit and, ultimately, to the crisis. The 
deterioration of Korea's competitiveness was caused by what is called the 'high-cost, 
low-efficiency structure' of Korean industry, in which productivity levels were low in 
contrast to the high cost of finance, land and labour costs. There was a perception that 
behind this problematic structure stood the chaebol and the labour force (Beck 1998). 
The chaebol and labour - which were both major challengers to the state before 
the crisis - came to be labelled as the ringleaders that had pushed the country toward 
economic crisis, and therefore they became the target of public criticism. The IMF 
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included the chaebol and the labour force in its restructuring program, and the Kim 
Dae-Jung government took advantage of the external pressure and the negative public 
sentiment to re-establish control over both the chaebol and labour. The Kim Dae-Jung 
government identified the inefficiency and moral hazard of the chaebol as the major 
reason for the crisis and labelled labour's collective action 'collective selfishness' that 
had reduced the country's confidence. 
The Kim Dae-Jung government carried out comprehensive reforms in order to 
strengthen the regulations relating to the chaebol (MOFE and KDI 1998); the 
conglomerates had to lower their debt-to-equity ratio within a short period of time and 
were banned from using internal transactions and mutual payment guarantees among 
their affiliates. The chaebol were forced to concentrate their resources on their core 
business or competitive sectors, and in order to do so, they were compelled to sell, close, 
or exchange their peripheral businesses. To introduce free market principles in more 
radical way, legislation was enacted allowing for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) by 
foreign companies and even hostile M&A transactions were allowed. 
Labour also started to lose its power after the crisis. The government tried to 
launch the Tripartite Commission - consisting of representatives of the government, 
management, and labour - as the institution to produce social consensus to cope with 
the crisis. In fact, the launch of the commission was motivated by the desire to bring in 
a layoff system. At first, the labour unions strongly resisted, but they gave in to public 
pressure for compromise rather than conflict at a time of crisis and this was soon 
followed by the launch of the Tripartite Commission (5 January 1998) and the 
promulgation of a joint agreement (6 February 1998) (Go 2005: 172-173). The core of 
the joint agreement was that labour accepted the 'layoff system' and the 'labour dispatch 
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system' on condition that the government allowed the establishment of labour unions for 
government workers and teachers and gave them the right to engage in political activity. 
64 This commitment by labour, which led to a weakening of their rights, would have 
been unthinkable in former administrations. The Kim Dae-Jung administration made an 
effective use of public sentiment and IMF pressure to control the labour force and 
achieve its goal. Through dealing with this critical situation, the power of both the 
chaebol and labour was weakened, and the Kim Dae-Jung administration was able to 
maintain relatively strong autonomy without facing critical internal challenges (Weiss 
2003b). 
However, the autonomy of the Kim Dae-Jung government was not as strong as 
that which former President Park Chung-Hee exercised during the SOM period. The 
Kim Dae-Jung government took advantage of the crisis to weaken internal resistance in 
the immediate post-crisis period, but internal forces were no longer restrained in the 
latter part of the Kim Dae-Jung government and under the following Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration. In the crisis, the growth of the chaebol halted briefly, but after the turn 
of the 21 st century, the chaebol expanded once more, becoming global multinational 
companies. Labour founded the Democratic Labour Party to represent them on the basis 
of the tripartite agreement and thus came to participate officially in the political process; 
since 2000, labour disputes have been on the rise again (see Table E). State autonomy 
during the MOS period was enhanced just after the crisis, but, overall, it was lower than 
that seen in the SOM period. 
64 In July 1998, the National Assembly passed the bills governing the layoff system and the labour 
dispatch system. The 'layoff system' means that the compan ies can dismiss the workers in case of urgent 
management issues. Through the legislation of the layoff system, it became easier for companies to 
dismiss their workers. The 'labour dispatch system' means a system where human resource supply 
agencies hire workers to dispatch them to other companies, working under that companies' orders and 
instructions. The user of the agency came to have the flexibility in employment as they did not have to 
hire full-time workers and, on the other hand, the workers lost the stability in employment. 
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In terms of the capacity of bargaining institutions, which is one of the factors of 
internal constraints, there was a significant change with the enactment of the Foreign 
Investment Promotion Act (FIPA). As the title suggests, the 1998 FIPA was designed to 
promote, rather than control or manage FDI and this demonstrated the dramatic shift in 
the government's attitude toward FDI after 1998. The act called for the establishment of 
the Korea Investment Service Centre (KISC) within the Korea Trade-Investment 
Promotion Agency (KOTRA) to serve as the institution charged with responsibility for 
realising the goals of the FIPA.65 
As the agency charged with the implementation of FDI policy, KOTRA 
undertakes a variety of roles and activities related to FDI: conducting investment 
promotion activities to encourage foreign companies to choose Korea as an investment 
location; offering administrative support while the investment is in progress; and 
monitoring the complaints of foreign companies through its after-care service. 
However, as a quasi-government organization, KOTRA has its limits lowering 
the bargaining power of the Korean government in several ways. Firstly, KOTRA is not 
a government organisation, so it does not have the authority to make decisions on the 
issues that can arise when foreign companies invest in Korea. Therefore, it has a lower 
negotiating power with foreign companies. Secondly, KOTRA does not have the 
authority to coordinate the conflicting interests among the ministries and local 
governments, so it has very little capacity to settle these issues or to pursue national 
65 KOTRA is a state-run company established in 1962 by then-President Park in order to support export-
driven economic policies. The initial purpose of the agency was to promote exports, but since the late 
1980s, as the outward FDI of Korean companies increased, KOTRA founded additional functions to 
satisfy the demand for related services and information. In 1994 KOTRA changed its name from former 
'Korea Trade Promotion Corporation' to the current 'Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency' and it 
began to undertake investment promotion activity as well. In April 1998 KOTRA launched KI SC, whose 
main role was to attract inward FDI, as one of its arms. FIPA of 1998 officially designated the KISC as 
the Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) of Korea. KISC changed the name in December 2003 to Invest 
Korea. 
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goals. As a matter of fact, when foreign companies invest in Korea, many unexpected 
issues can arise which require prompt cooperation and coordination among ministries: 
therefore, coordination capacity is vital for the institutions responsible for attracting FDI. 
However, the head of KOTRA - the president of a state-run company - lacks the 
authority and capacity to resolve the various conflicts among ministries or local 
governments. 
Thirdly, KOTRA does not have a policymaking function, so it is hard for 
KOTRA to reflect the policy demands which are created through contact with foreign 
companies. During the SOM period, the EPB established FDI policy and during the 
transition period (1980-1997) the Ministry of Finance (MOF) held that responsibility.66 
However, in May 1999, the policymaking function of FDI was transferred to the 
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE),67 since when MOCIE has 
established FDI polices while KOTRA implemented them. However, this sharing of 
roles has aggravated problems regarding both the policy-making and the 
implementation capacity of the state: policies are not made on the basis of real, specific 
problems and they are implemented without proper authority. 
Acknowledging KOTRA's as the nation's bargaining institution, the Act also 
designated the 'Committee on Foreign Investment' (CFI) and the 'Working-level 
Committee on Foreign Investment' (WCFI) as the higher level decision-making body 
for FDI. The CFI is chaired by the Finance Minister and its membership comprises 
minister from related ministries and the governors of the local governments, and 
66 On 8 November 1981, the function relating to FDI was relocated from the EPB to MOF (Gang 1995: 
54) 
67 However the transfer of the FDI function from the MOF to MOCIE was not completed. Many FDI-, 
related functions are still under the charge of the MOF. For example, the head ofCFI is not the minister of 
MOCIE but the minister of MOE and the Free Economic Zone, whose major client is foreign companies, 
is under the responsibility of the MOF. Therefore, the FDI policy making function itself is spread in the 
MOCIE and MOF. 
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deliberates and decides on issues relating to established policies and major FDI issues. 
The WCFI carries out working-level tasks, chaired by the deputy minister of MOCIE, 
with director-level members from related ministries and the deputy mayors or deputy 
governors of the local government. However, the CFI, which is assumed to act as the 
decision-making institution for FDI policy, is not a standing committee; thus, the chair 
and other members of the committee can hardly be expected to make prudent 
decisions because FDI is not their own responsibility and concern. Consequently, it 
cannot be assumed that CFI conducts substantial negotiations with MNCs. The WCFI 
also suffers from similar defects as its structure is akin to that of the CFI. 
As the competition among countries to attract investors becomes increasingly 
intense, the function of bargaining agencies comes into sharper focus (Wells and Wint 
2000). For example, the Singaporean government concentrated all its marketing-related 
functions in the EDB, the Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) of Singapore, and 
allowed it to act as the 'marketing arm' of Singapore. The centralization of the state's 
marketing functions made these activities more systematic and efficient and also 
strengthened the bargaining power of the host country by preventing firms from 
engaging in the sub-national level competitions (Encamation and Wells 1985b: 274, 
Walter 1998: 291). 
In contrast, the Korean government had not created and managed this kind of 
centralised and efficient promotion activity; the Korean government's FDI promotion 
activities were carried out by a variety of government organisations and by the 
provincial governments. Many ministries such as the MOCIE, the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy (MOFE), and the Ministry and Information and Communication (MIC) 
were involved in FDI promotion activities and all local governments were competing 
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with each other to attract foreign companies. In addition, the three authorities of the 
Free Economic Zones (FEZ) were making efforts to publicise themselves and even the 
Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (PCNACI) was 
involved in promotion activities. This dispersed and disorderly system caused confusion 
among potential investors and also resulted in an inefficient use of resources. 
Furthermore, actions by local governments to attract investors undermined the 
bargaining power of the central government by providing alternatives to foreign 
companies. In short, there were many problems relating to the bargaining institution in 
the MOS phase: the vulnerability of KOTRA, the implementation agency of the FDI 
policy, as a quasi-government organisation; the limitations of CFI and WCFI as non-
standing committees; and the inefficient and dispersed promotion system. These 
shortcomings regarding the bargaining institutions of the Korean government in the 
MOS period weakened its bargaining power vis-iI-vis MNCs. 
In conclusion, evaluating the level of internal constraints of the MOS period, the 
financial crisis led to a weakening of internal resistance, enabling the government to 
maintain relative autonomy over the internal interest groups for a short while during the 
crisis situation. However, when the crisis was over, the autonomy of the state 
significantly abated. On the other hand, after the crisis, KOTRA became the official 
agency for FDI, but it could not be expected to possess strong bargaining power due to 
its limited capacity. In summary, the internal constraints level can be described as 
'medium' during the MOS period. 
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External constraints 
During the SOM period, Korea was placed under little external pressure for 
liberalisation of FDI due to the Cold War advantages described above. However~ 
entering the 1980s, the situation began to change. China renounced its socialist 
economic policy and adopted an open-door policy. In 1989, the Berlin Wall came down 
and the Soviet Union collapsed, opening a new chapter in the post Cold-War era. The 
end of the Cold War also meant the end of competition between the East and the West in 
their efforts to assist developing countries, and it demolished the solidarity that had 
existed within each camp. The world, which had been divided by ideologies, was 
merged again into a capitalist economic model, accelerating globalisation and rushing 
the world into an intense competition. The US was placing greater emphasis on its own 
economic interests rather than on acting as a protector in East Asia, which prompted the 
US government to put pressure on the Korean government to open its market. As 
globalisation progressed, the Korean government had to react to it, sometimes passively 
and sometimes proactively. These changes in circumstances acted as external pressures 
on Korea, making it impossible to maintain the FDI system of the SOM period. 
The US, which had been Korea's biggest economic supporter in the past, was no 
longer tolerant of Korea's protectionist policy because of the reduced strategic value of 
Korea in the post-Cold-War era. Moreover, the US government took an aggressive 
position on Korea's market opening in the late 1980s, putting direct pressure on the 
Korean government. International institutions such as the OECD and the WTO asked 
Korea to increase the level of liberalisation as a precondition of membership. External 
pressures on the Korean government intensified in the late 1980s: although the Korean 
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government increasingly faced external pressures for the liberalisation of the FDI 
system, the level of pressure was not so strong that it overwhelmed the Korean 
government. The Korean government was able to absorb the pressures into its gradual 
institutional refonns.68 
However, in contrast with its handling of pressures in previous periods, the 
Korean government was not able to manage the external pressures during the MOS 
period and, at the beginning of the MOS period, the Korean state was overwhelmed by 
external pressures. On 3 December 1997, the Korean government signed a Letter of 
Intent to request a relief loan of USD21 billion from the IMF; the Letter of Intent 
included a Memorandum of Economic Programme. In return for the IMF's bailout loan, 
the Korean government had to faithfully carry out the IMF program under constant 
supervision. However, in August 200 1, the Korean government repaid the IMF relief 
loan, freeing itself from IMF intervention, but the IMF program had significantly 
changed the appearance of the Korean economic system. The legacy of the 
developmental state was almost destroyed as it was replaced by a neo-liberal economic 
system. The Korean government encountered extremely strong external pressure in this 
period, and the changes stemming from that pressure were immense. Commenting on 
post-crisis refonn in Korea, Shin and Chang (2003: 4) observed 
. . . it may be reasonable to say that the scale of the corporate reform 
implemented in Korea since 1997 is the largest in the world since the 
forceful break-up of Japanese and Gennan finns by the Allied occupation 
forces after the Second World War. 
68 For example, in order to satisfy the qualification of the membership of OEeD and WTO, the 
government set up the long-tenn plan for the liberalisation of the FDI system, which was called the 
'Foreign Direct Investment Opening Five Ye~ Plan': According to this plan. the government gradually 
lowered the entry barrier and eased the regulatIOns (KIm et aI2002). 
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Seeing the CrISIS In the chaebol and the financial system and the legacy of the 
developmental state, IMF undertook far-reaching reforms in these areas, reforms that 
were directed towards creating a more Anglo-American economic system. The reform 
program, agreed upon by the IMF and the Korean government, comprised three 
elements: the retrenchment of the macro-economy, structural reform, and the opening of 
the domestic market. These programs not only exerted extreme pressure on the 
government but also led to significant principal changes in the relationship between the 
government and MNCs (Go 2005, Gang 2005, Shin and Chang 2003, IMF 1997). 
The key points of the IMF program and its effects are as follows: firstly, the 
retrenchment of the macro-economy was designed to stabilize the value of the Korean 
currency by keeping the current account in surplus and promoting the inflow of foreign 
capital through a combination of high interest rates and a tight budgetary policy. This 
retrenchment policy made a vital contribution to stabilizing the value of the won, but 
domestic companies had to face a credit squeeze as domestic financial institutions 
reduced loans and interest rates surged to more than 30 percent. Problems raising funds 
were compounded by the collapse of the stock market which made it difficult to obtain 
funds through direct financing. The macroeconomic retrenchment resulted in many 
bankruptcies: between January and April 1998, the number of bankruptcies nationwide 
was 11,920, with an average of 3,000 companies going bankrupt each month. The 
unemployment rate was only 3.1 percent in December 1997, but it surged to 7.0 percent 
in June 1998 (Go 2005: 177). 
As the financial crisis turned into an economic crisis companies had no choice 
but to sell their assets to overcome their liquidity constraints. Considering the soaring 
value of the US dollar, which rose more than twofold after the crisis, and the desperate 
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situation of Korean companies rushing to sell their assets in order to avoid bankruptcy, 
it can be easily assumed that the corporate assets would be sold at considerably 
discounted prices. The macroeconomic retrenchment weakened the bargaining power of 
Korean businesses, and the drastic surge in FDI activity directly after the financial crisis 
largely resulted from asset sales by Korean companies (Shin and Chang 2003: 104). 
The second feature of the IMF programme was structural reforms which were 
applied to three sectors: the financial system, the corporate sector and the labour market. 
In the financial sector, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) was established to 
supervise financial institutions comprehensively and insolvent financial institutions 
closed down or became the target for mergers and acquisitions. The government could 
no longer intervene in the management of banks and decision-making on loans and 
financial policy, which had been the main vehicle for industrial policy, was virtually 
prohibited. The opening of the domestic financial sector to foreign investment was 
agreed upon as a means of accelerating the process. In the corporate sector, the chaebol 
system was the primary target of reform. The chaebol had to reduce their debt-equity 
ratio, which had averaged 400 percent in late 1997 to 200 percent by late 1999 (Shin 
and Chang 2003: 56). As the government was banned from offering subsidies or tax 
benefits to save failing companies by the program, many companies had to sell their 
assets quickly and at a discounted price in order to reduce the debt-to-equity ratio in the 
short time available. However, there were no domestic buyers for these assets and so the 
government encouraged firms to sell their assets to foreign companies. In addition to 
implementing the IMF's measures to enhance the flexibility of the labour market. the 
Korean government took further action by offering a 'layoff system' which was beyond 
the demands made by the IMF. The banks, the chaebol and labour all had been obstacles 
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to foreign MNCs seeking to penetrate the Korean market, but the IMF programs 
effectively removed these impediments to investment. 
Finally, the trade and capital markets were liberalised; import licensing and 
trade-related subsidies were all abolished together with the 'Import Diversification 
Program', which aimed to address Korea's chronic trade deficit with Japan by 
restrictions on imports from Japan. In the capital markets, the domestic stock market 
and the bond market were completely liberalised and the remaining barriers for FDI 
were eliminated. The IMF program thus removed institutional and legal barriers to 
investment in Korea and weakened the chaebol and labour, which acted as hindrances to 
MNCs seeking to conduct business in Korea. The US Deputy Treasury Secretary 
Lawrence Summers acknowledged that "the IMF has done more to promote America's 
trade and investment agenda in Korea than 30 years of bilateral trade talks" (Weiss 
1999: 31). Needless to say, the external pressure that the Korean government faced 
during the MOS period was very high. 
Evaluation of the Government's Bargaining Power 
So far each factor of the Korean government's resources, stakes, and constraints vis-a-
vis MNCs during the MOS period has been discussed. Based on this discussion, we will 
now move on to assess the level of each dimension, and will identify the Korean 
government's bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs during the MOS period by applying the 
NBM. 
Firstly, in terms of resources, Korea was an attractive sales location for market-
seeking investors during the MOS period but was not a first-rate production base for 
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production-seeking investors. With per capita GDP standing at more than USD20,000 
by purchasing power parity (PPP) Korea was categorized as a high-income country 
(WEF 2005).69 With the population of 48 million, Korea was the 12th largest market in 
the world and, therefore, -Korea's resource level was 'high' market-seekers. However~ 
for investors seeking production bases, Korea did not offer attractive resources. 
Roughly speaking, the production factor seeker can be categorised in two groups: cost-
cautious seekers and efficiency-cautious seekers (Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2002). The 
former seek access to traditional resources to reduce their costs while the latter seek 
access to non-traditional resources to enhance their production efficiency. Korea could 
not satisfy either of these needs: labour costs were higher than those of late developing 
countries, while non-traditional production factors could not match the level found in 
developed countries. Accordingly, Korea's resource level remained at a 'low' level for 
production factor seeking investors. In conclusion, Korea's resource level during the 
MOS period was 'low' in terms of investment motivated by production but 'high' in 
terms of investment motivated by market access; we can say, therefore, that the 
resources level was 'medium' overall. 
Secondly, as we have seen, the stake level is determined by a combination of the 
level of commitment and the level of alternatives. In terms of commitment, both 
President Kim Dae-Jung and President Roh Moo-Hyun showed a high level of 
commitment to FDI during the MOS period. In particular, Kim Dae-Jung actively used 
foreign companies as leverage to reform the legacy of the developmental state. The high 
priority placed attracting FDI gave rise to claims that Korean companies were the 
subject of discrimination. The Roh Moo-Hyun government also emphasised the 
69 Korea's GDP per capita in 2004 by PPP is USD 21.305, the 28th biggest in the world. (WEF 2005: 
476) 
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importance of FDI; in particular, the top priority for the Roh government was 'building 
a Northeast Asia economic hub' for which the core means were foreign companies. 
Therefore, the Korean government's commitment to FDI during the MOS period can be 
categorized as 'high'. When it comes to alternatives, there are two categories: the 
alternatives to the capital provided by FDI and the alternatives to technology that 
accompanied FDI. After the crisis, alternatives to FDI in terms of sourcing capital were 
seen as unstable and costly and, as the foreign companies were reluctant to offer their 
technology to Korea, FDI emerged as important channel for the transfer of advanced 
knowledge. Therefore, the level of alternatives was 'low.' In summary, the level of 
commitment was 'high' while the level of alternatives was 'low' in the MOS phase, so it 
can be said that the Korean government's stake for FDI was at a 'high' level. 
Thirdly, regarding constraints in the MOS phase, the Korean government faced a 
high level of constraints, both internal and external. First, in terms of internal 
constraints, since the 1980s, two powerful social groups - chaebol and labour - had 
challenged the state, but the Kim Dae-Jung government was able to weaken this 
resistance by using negative public sentiment and IMF pressure in the crisis situation. 
However, state autonomy was not as high as it had been during the SOM period; the 
increase in autonomy was only a temporary outcome of the crisis and it declined as the 
crisis passed. With respect to the bargaining institutions in the MOS phase, the official 
body responsible for FDI was KOTRA which, as a quasi-government agency, did not 
have the appropriate authority to maintain strong bargaining capacity. KOTRA had 
neither the power to coordinate the conflicting interests among ministries or local 
governments nor any means to offer incentives or to impose sanctions on the foreign 
firms which would strengthen its bargaining power. In summary. the leyel of internal 
, 
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constraints in this period can be described as 'high'; in tenns of external constraints, the 
Korean government during the MOS period faced a high level of external pressure, 
especially from the IMF. After the crisis, the government had to carry out IMF programs 
in return for the relief loan and consequently, the institutional barriers for FDI were 
mostly eliminated. Therefore, during the MOS period, the level of external constraints 
can be seen as 'high'. Table 3.13 summarize the results of the discussion above. 
Table 3.13 Korean Government's Bargaining Power: MOS Phase 
Dimensions Level of Dimensions Level of Bargaining Power 
Resource Medium 
Stakes Commitment High High 
Alternatives Low Medium Low 
Constraints Internal High High 
External High 
Figure 3.2 The Position of the Korean Government's Bargaining Power: MOS Phase 
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The application of the Korean government's bargaining power during the MOS period 
to the NBM is shown in Figure 3.2. Locating the level of each dimension in the three-
dimensional model, Korea's bargaining power is situated at point MOS. Point MOS is 
close to point W, which represents the lowest level of bargaining power but further 
away from point S, which represents the highest level of bargaining power. This 
indicates that the level of bargaining power of the Korean government vis-a-vis MNCs 
during the MOS period was 'low'. 
3. Conclusion 
Figure 3.3 The Transition of the Korean Government's Bargaining Power 
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The transition of the Korean government's bargaining power is illustrated in Figure 3.3: 
by applying the NBM to the Korean case, several implications can be drawn. Firstly~ the 
bargaining power of the Korean government has declined almost continuously since 
1962. This is evidenced by the fact that point SOM is situated at the closest position to 
point S, the strongest point, while point MOS lies at the closest location to point W, the 
weakest point. Secondly, stakes and constraints are the main factors that have reduced 
the Korean government's bargaining power. As shown in Figure 3.5, despite the fact that 
resource levels have constantly increased, the bargaining power of the Korean 
government has declined due to the increased level of stake and constraints. Thirdly, as 
is self-evident, in order to increase its bargaining power, the Korean government has to 
endeavour not only to increase its resource level, but also to reduce the level of its 
stakes and constraints. 
During the SOM period, the government could maintain relatively strong 
bargaining power despite the low level of resources. In contrast, during the MOS period, 
the bargaining power of the government was weak even though its resources were much 
higher than those of MOS period. The low level of stakes and constraints during the 
SOM period led to strong bargaining power for the state, whereas the high level of 
stakes and constraints resulted in weak bargaining power for the state during the MOS 
period. Why was the state in the SOM period able to maintain low levels of stakes and 
constraints whereas the state in the MOS faced high level of stakes and constraints? The 
reasons can be found both inside and outside the state. 
As regards external causes, during the SOM period, the Cold War context and 
international economy were favourable to the state; as a result of the Cold War situation. 
foreign governments not only allowed Korean government's protectionist policy but 
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also provided generous and abundant developmental funds. In addition, the 1970's 
international economy enabled the country to access foreign capital relatively easily. 
These external circumstances reduced the level of external constraints and expanded the 
alternatives to FDI. Unfortunately for the Korean state during the MOS period, the 
external circumstances favoured MNCs; freed from the restrictions imposed by the Cold 
War, countries entered into free-market competition and Korea no longer received any 
lenient treatment. Strong home countries supported their corporations and global actors 
demanded that obstacle to business be removed. External pressures intensified and the 
alternatives to FDI slowly disappeared. In many respects, these external circumstances 
greatly affected the weakening of the Korean government's bargaining power. 
However, in addition to these external factors, internal factors also played a 
critical role in weakening the state's bargaining power. In fact, the decline of the 
developmental state weakened the government's bargaining power by affecting the level 
of stakes and constraints. During the SOM period, when the Korean state was a typical 
developmental state, it had an ultimate vision for development and approached 
development tasks with long-term strategies, as seen in the Five-year Economic 
Development Plans. The state mobilised the available resources to achieve its goals and 
FDI was seen as just one of the resources to be used for attaining those goals rather than 
as an end in itself. This perception of FDI reduced the state~s level of commitment. On 
the contrary, during the MOS period, when the Korean developmental state significantly 
was weakened, the state abandoned its long-term approach to development and let 
market principles, which are dominated by short-termism, rule the economy. The state 
lost its long-term vision and FDI policy was no longer used for long-term considerations 
but instead for short-term gains. During the MOS period, attracting foreign companies 
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became the country's goal. This change in goals, that is, the means becoming the ends, 
increased the govemmenfs commitment to FDI. 
Moreover, during the SOM period, the state was able to maintain close relations 
with domestic capital, control labour's demands, and enhance the capacity of its 
bargaining institutions by hiring competent bureaucrats and vesting powerful authority 
in the bargaining agency, all of which lowered internal constraints. In contrast, during 
the MOS period, the state capacity to cooperate (or control) business and labour 
weakened; state and business relations became more distant, and insecurity fostered 
discontent among the labour force. The bargaining institution had little power to 
actually bargain and the participation of many bargaining actors in the process 
decreased its bargaining power further. 
The globalisation process obviously affected the decrease of the country's 
bargaining power, and this is generally accepted (Stopford and Strange 1991). However, 
in this chapter we identified one more factor that weakened the host country's 
bargaining power vis-ii-vis MNCs in Korea's case: the decline of the developmental 
state. Therefore, we have to find a way in the state in order to resurrect the bargaining 
power. 
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Chapter Four: Bargaining with Multinational Corporations (Empirical 
Evaluation) 
Chapter Three analysed the transition of the Korean government's bargaining power by 
applying the Neo Bargaining Model and presented the following findings: (1) the 
bargaining power of the Korean government had decreased during the SOM and MOS 
periods and (2) the weakening of the bargaining power was affected by internal factors 
(the decline of the developmental state) and external factors (the process of 
globalisation). This chapter will use statistical analysis and case studies to support the 
arguments made in Chapter Three. The first section of this chapter measures the level of 
bargaining power in both periods, demonstrating that bargaining power in the SOM 
period was stronger than in the MOS period. In this section we focus on all foreign 
manufacturing companies at specific times within the SOM and MOS periods and we 
thus give a generalised picture of the bargaining power of foreign firms in Korea at 
specific periods. However, it provides only the results of the bargaining, limiting our 
view of the process. The shortcomings of the first section will be complemented by the 
second section. In the second section, the Neo Bargaining Model is applied to specific 
cases to demonstrate the different ways in which the government dealt with MNCs in 
the SOM and MOS periods. This section reveals the dynamic process of bargaining by 
examining specific bargaining cases. 
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1. Measuring Bargaining Power 
By applying the Neo Bargaining Model to the case of the Korean government, it was 
seen that the bargaining power of the Korean government had declined continuously 
over time. This section will provide statistical evidence to support the argument made in 
Chapter Three by showing that the government's bargaining power in the SOM period 
was higher than in the MOS period. 
In comparing the level of bargaining power in both periods, we face a critical 
problem: how to measure intangible, invisible power. The issue of how to measure 
power has always been controversial in the bargaining power school because, despite 
the abstract nature of power, measuring it is essential for the bargaining power model. 
According to the bargaining hypothesis, if the bargaining power of both sides can be 
measured, the bargaining outcomes can be anticipated and vice versa. Therefore, in their 
efforts to prove the bargaining hypothesis, many scholars have studied the relationships 
between bargaining power and bargaining outcomes. 70 Although bargaining school 
scholars share the view that the resources of each party have an impact on the outcomes, 
they have employed different methods to demonstrate the relationship. Among the 
methods of measurement, two methods are frequently used: the ownership level 
d h · .. 71 Th C measurement an t e InterventIOn expenence measurement. e lormer assesses 
bargaining power by measuring the ownership level of subsidiaries; the latter estimates 
the strength of bargaining power by relying on the subjective judgment of the MNCs' 
70 Representative of the studies that examine bargaining relationships between the host country and 
MNCs by measuring the bargaining power of the both parties are: Fagre & WeBs (1982), Lecraw (1984), 
Kobrin (1987), Gomes-Casseres (1990), Vachani (1995), Poynter (1982), Kim (1988), Grosse (1996) and 
Minor (1994). 
71 Influential studies in which the ownership measurement is applied include Farge and WeBs (1982), 
Lecraw (1984), Kobrin (1987) and Gomes-Casseres (1990). The intervention experience measurement 
was used by Poynter (1982, 1985) and Kim (1988). 
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managers In terms of the level of host government intervention in their business 
activities. Both methods have strengths and weaknesses. However, the latter method -
which requires that the researcher conduct a survey ofMNC managers - is not a viable 
option for this thesis because this method is only available for companies still operating 
in Korea. As the subjects of this study are all cases of FDI made in the past and since 
1962, the study must rely only on statistics. In this case, the ownership level of foreign 
companies is an effective indicator to measure the relative bargaining power of MNCs 
and the host government. Thus, this section will evaluate the bargaining power of 
foreign companies through the analysis of the MNC's ownership level, as this is data 
that is both available and objective. 
The measurement of ownership levels is based on the premise that MNCs pursue 
a higher level of ownership while developing host governments are reluctant to grant a 
higher level of ownership for political and economic reasons. That is, the stronger the 
bargaining power of MN Cs (and the weaker bargaining power of host governments), the 
greater the likelihood that the subsidiary of an MNC will achieve a higher level of 
ownership. This method has been advocated by many researchers on account of its 
appropriate premise, objectivity and simplicity of measurement. However, it has two 
main disadvantages: firstly, there are factors other than the ownership level involved in 
the negotiation between a host government and MNCs, including employment, 
technology transfer and incentives. Sometimes such factors are regarded as more 
important than the ownership level. Secondly, MNCs do not always pursue full 
ownership; they often want a lower level of ownership in order to share risks with a host 
government and their counterpart in the country (Grosse 1996, Moon and Lado 2000). 
The ownership measurement is, nevertheless. the most frequently used method 
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of measuring the bargaining power of either MNCs or a host government. There are 
legitimate grounds for adopting this measure, both theoretically and practically. Firstly, 
it is based on internalization theory, according to which the motivation of a company for 
foreign investment is to internalize firm-specific advantages (Buckley and Casson 1976). 
MNCs try to maximize the profits that they would get from the internalization of their 
advantages and, in addition, do not want their firm-specific advantages to be transferred 
to other companies. Hence, companies with more firm-specific advantages tend to 
pursue full ownership and avoid joint ventures (Lecraw 1984, Kobrin 1987, Gomes-
Casseres 1990). 
Secondly, the ownership level approach is based on general practice. Host 
governments in developing countries generally want to have more control over MNCs 
and thus they are reluctant to allow high ownership levels in foreign companies. 
Therefore, the stronger the bargaining power of the host governments, the lower the 
ownership level of MNCs, and vice versa (Fagre and Wells 1982, Kobrin 1987). Thirdly, 
this method is objectively measurable without restrictions of time and space. In contrast, 
the measurement of bargaining power through a survey investigating managers' 
perceptions of the level of a host government's intervention is dependent on the 
subjective judgment of the managers and hence it does not guarantee that the findings 
are objective (Kobrin 1987, Moon and Lado 2000). 
Despite the above-mentioned advantages, there is criticism that in the past 
developing host governments imposed restrictions on the ownership level, but now most 
countries do not restrict ownership levels any more; thus, measuring ownership levels is 
meaningless. However, this research focuses on the period after 1962 when, in most 
cases, the ownership level was the subject of bargaining in relation to an MNC's entry. 
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Considering this point, the problem described above can be applied only to the most 
recent few years. Moreover, the liberalization of FDI implies the weakening of the 
bargaining power of host governments vis-a-vis MNCs. Thus, the increase in the 
ownership level of foreign subsidiaries following the liberalization of FDI may be the 
best evidence of the weakening bargaining power of host governments. Therefore, the 
measurement of ownership levels of foreign subsidiaries is the most appropriate method 
to apply to this research. This section will measure ownership levels in the SOM and 
MOS period; the transition period is excluded because our main concern lies with these 
two periods as mentioned before. 
Hypothesis 
The purpose of this analysis is to prove statistically that ownership levels in the MOS 
(1998-2005) period were higher than in the SOM period (1962-1979) by comparing the 
average levels of ownership level in both periods. The hypothesis as follows: 
The ownership levels of foreign manufacturing companies are different in 
the two periods; that is, ownership levels in the MOS period are higher than 
in the SOM period. 
Sampling and data collection 
The population of this research is the foreign-invested companies in manufacturing 
seCtor that invested and registered in Korea, as defined under Korean FOI legislation.72 
72 A d' t the Foreian Investment Promotion Act of 1998, foreign investment, 'foreign investor' 
ccor 109 0 b ., fi .. , fi 
d fi . . ted cOlllpany' are defined as follows (ArtIcle 2): The term orelgn mvestment re ers to an 'orelgn-mves 
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The sample includes companies active in Korea in 1979 and 2005, which were the last 
years of the SOM period and MOS periods, respectively. Statistics show that there were 
708 foreign companies operating in the Korea manufacturing sector in 1979 and 4,424 
in 2005. This study took all of the foreign manufacturing companies that existed in 1979 
and 2005 into consideration but excluded foreign companies that had already withdrawn 
their investment from Korea as of 1979 and 2005. Some companies may fall into both 
periods: that is, foreign companies that invested in Korea in 1979 and were still 
operating in Korea between 1998 and 2005. Although it would be logical to remove 
duplicate data in analysing ownership levels at the time of entry, we did not remove 
duplicate data as we assume that ownership levels continued to change after entry. The 
samples have been obtained from the database of foreign investors in Korea managed 
by Invest Korea (2006). 
Findings and Implications 
The t-test assesses whether the average of two groups are statistically different from 
each other. The hypothesis is that the ownership levels of foreign companies differ 
according to the times of entry. The null hypothesis is that the ownership levels of the 
two groups are the same. The null hypothesis is overruled when the averages for two 
groups are statistically different from each other. A two-sided test was conducted and 
(a) cases where a foreigner purchases, under the conditions as prescribed by the Presidential Decree, 
stocks of or stakes in a Korean corporation or a company run by a national of the Republic of Korea, for 
the purpose of establishing a continuous economic relationship with and participating in the management 
of the said Korean corporation or company in accordance with this Act; and (b) where a loan with the 
maturity of not less than five years is extended to a foreign-capital invested company by its overseas 
holding company or by a company in a relationship w~th t~e sa.id holdi~g company of capital invest~e~t 
as prescribed by the Presidential D~~ree. The t~rm forel~n Investor refer~ to .a f~relgner who IS I~ 
possession of stocks under the condItIOns preSCrIbed by thIS Act. The term foreIgn-Invested company 
refers to a company financed by a foreign investor. 
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the significance was 0.05. 
Table 4.1 Independent Samples Test for the Ownership Level in SOM and MOS Phase 
Number of A verage of ownership 
Group samples level Standard Deviation t-value 
SOM 708 52.72 24.37 6.249*** 
MOS 4,424 59.28 33.97 
***p<O.OOl 
The table above shows the results of the t-test of the ownership levels of 708 companies 
in 1979 (SOM) and 4,424 companies in 2005 (MOS). The average of ownership levels 
are 52.72 percent in the SOM period and 59.28 percent in the MOS period. The standard 
deviation values are 24.37 and 33.97 respectively. According to the t-test results of the 
independent sample, the null hypothesis is overruled (t-value = 6.249 < 0.05), therefore 
the ownership levels of the SOM and MOS periods are statistically different from each 
other. The average of ownership level in the MOS period is higher. 
The purpose of this analysis of the ownership levels of foreign companies in 
manufacturing sector during the SOM and MOS periods is to measure the bargaining 
power of foreign companies in both periods. The fact that the ownership level in the 
MOS period is higher than in the SOM period implies that the bargaining power of 
foreign companies in the MOS period is stronger than in the SOM period. In other 
words, the bargaining power of the Korean government in the MOS period is lower than 
in the SOM period. Such results serve as statistical support for the findings in Chapter 3. 
In following section, three case studies will show how the bargaining power of the 
government shifted, what factors affected the bargaining power of the goYernment, and 
how the government approached the bargaining process differently in both periods. 
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2. Case Studies 
This section applies the Neo Bargaining Model to three involving three MNCs: Dow 
Chemical and General Motors (GM). The three negotiations examined are (1) Dow 
Chemical and Korea Pacific Chemical Corporation (KPCC), (2) GM and Shinjin Motor, 
and (3) GM and Daewoo Motor. Dow Chemical, which entered the Korean market by 
establishing KPCC - a joint venture company with the state-run Chungju Fertilizer 
Corporation (CFC) in 1968 - pulled out of Korea in 1982 after it sold its share of the 
company. GM left Korea in 1992, having entered in 1972 by setting up OM Korea in 
partnership with Shinjin Motor. In 2002, GM re-established its presence in Korea by 
acquiring Daewoo Motor, a successor to Shinjin Motor. 
Dow Chemical is a good example of how the Korean government was able to 
maintain a high level of bargaining power with relatively low resources during the SOM 
phase. The GM case shows two different attitudes of the Korean government to the 
same company's market entry in two different phases. Thus, this research identifies two 
cases from the SOM phase and one case from the MOS phase: Dow Chemical-KPCC 
and GM-Shinjin Motor for the SOM phase, and GM-Daewoo Motor for the MOS phase. 
These case studies are effective in displaying the stark difference in the relationship 
between the host government and MNCs in the two phases. By comparing a typical 
developmental state in the SOM phase and, in the MOS phase, a state under the strong 
influence of neo-liberalism, the chosen case studies highlight the difference in the level 
and components of the government's bargaining power in the two phases. 
There are two options when the government exercises its bargaining power with 
respect to multinational companies: the government can either participate directly in the 
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negotiation as one of negotiating parties, or control the negotiation indirectly. The 
second option is more common, wherein the government suggests guidelines and directs 
negotiating parties to stay within them, and such guidelines are often expressed in the 
form of laws and regulations reflecting the government's intention. Generally, it is rare 
for a government to hold direct negotiations with multinational companies; still, we 
have selected cases where the government acted as one of negotiating parties in order to 
examine the changing bargaining power and the attitudes of the government toward 
MNCs. In the case of GM-Shinjin Motor, the government's role was rather indirect but 
the state still exerted a strong influence over the negotiation by setting the guidelines for 
negotiation. 
The analysis of each case comprised two parts: in the first part, we present the 
context and background for each case study and in the second part, the Neo Bargaining 
Model is applied to each case in order to determine the level of the government's 
bargaining power. 
Dow Chemical and Korea Pacific Chemical Corporation 
Background 
Dow Chemical entered Korea in 1968 by establishing a joint venture called Korea 
Pacific Chemical Corporation (KPCC) in partnership with Chungju Fertilizer 
Corporation (CFC). Dow Chemical was successful in the 1970s as it rode on the wave 
of the rapid economic development of Korea. However, in 1978, due to internal 
conflicts, Dow Chemical decided to sell its entire stake in KPCC, and it eventually 
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pulled out of Korea in 1982. This particular case allows us to analyse the components of 
the Korean government's bargaining power in the 1960s. 
In the early 1960s, the Korean government focused on nurturing light industry as 
part of its economic policy to promote export industries such as shoes, textiles, and 
plastics. Most of the export goods were labour-intensive products, which were 
combinations of inexpensive labour, and imported machinery and raw materials. The 
increase of light industrial exports created a soaring demand for imported raw materials, 
petrochemical products such as ethylene and propylene. However, this was a period 
when the petrochemical industry did not even exist in Korea and, therefore, the more 
this industry sector exported, the more it had to import, and thus the international 
balance of payments of Korea showed a chronic deficit. This situation led the Korean 
government to have strong desire to strengthen the petrochemical industry which could 
reduce the reliance on imported materials COh 1995b: 17).73 
However, the Korean government did not have sufficient capital and technology 
to establish petrochemical factories in the mid-1960s. The petrochemical industry is a 
large-scale process industry that requires massive investment in capital and technology 
and it is typical of economy-of-scale industries in which greater volumes cost less per 
unit. Due to the peculiar attributes of the petrochemical industry, the government 
inevitably intervened in its development and provided support from an early stage, 
especially in the 1960s and 1970s when the mobilisation of private funds was almost 
impossible due to the absence of affordable domestic capital. 
73 Oh Won-Chul, who was in charge of nurturing the petrochemical industry as industrial director of 
Ministry of Commerce, explained the importance of nurturing the petrochemical industry in his book: 
"The development of the petrochemical industry allows us to localize synthetic resins and textiles using 
fuels from domestic refineries. In that sense, we will achieve 'the independence of light industry.' The 
same goes for the steel industry. The development of the steel industry will bring us 'the independence of 
heavy industry.' Thus, both the petrochemical industry and the steel industry can be designated as two 
major national industries in that they provide raw materials to other industries" (Oh 1995b: 17). 
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Although the Korean government decided to join hands with foreign companies 
in order to develop the project due to the lack of domestic capital and technology, it did 
not allow foreign companies to invest and operate at will. The government established 
principles that the foreign companies had to follow if they wanted to participate in the 
projects: firstly, equal partnership was required (a 50:50 joint venture) and, secondly, 
foreign investors had to follow the Korean government's policy and accept its plans for 
the development of the petrochemical industry. The Korean government was in charge 
of formulating any action plans and selecting joint venture partners. The government 
also set the principles regarding the creation of petrochemical industrial complexes, 
such as location and standardisation, which foreign firms had to follow (Oh 1995b: 68-
69). 
In 1965, the Korean government designated petrochemicals as a core industry in 
the Second Five-year Economic Development Plan (1967-1971) and the development of 
the industry began in earnest (Oh 1995b). In 1966, the Petrochemical Industry 
Development Plan was announced, its main idea being the building of a petrochemical 
complex in the city of Ulsan. The complex would consist of a naphtha-cracking centre 
(a fundamental facility of the petrochemical industry) and eight related projects (KDB, 
1969: 52).74 The Korea Oil Corporation (KOC) 75 was in charge of the naphtha-
cracking centre, and CFC was responsible for relatively large-scale projects such as the 
74 The eight related projects include the following: 1) polyethylene and vinyl chloride monomer (YCM), 
2) acrylonitrile, 3) caprolactam, 4) alkyl benzene, 5) synthetic rubber (SBR), 6) polyprophilene, 7) 
acetaldehyde, 8) methanol. Naphtha-cracking centres process , naphtha, the basic material for the 
petrochemical industry. The main process of petrochemical industry is the decomposition of carbon 
compounds; in the decomposition process, naphtha is used as a raw material and numerous chemical 
materials such as ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene, and xylene are produced. (KPIA 
2006) 
75 KOC was a state-run corporation established in October 1962 to ensure a stable supply of oil. It was a 
joint venture between the Korean government and Gulf Oil with the ownership shares of 75 percent and 
25 percent, respectively (Yoo Gong 1983). 
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production of polyethylene, vinyl chloride monomer (VCM), acrylonitrile, and 
caprolactam.76 
Table 4.2 Foreign Candidates for the Petrochemical Industry Projects 
Project 
Naphtha Cracking Centre 
Polyethylene 
VCM 
Acrylonitrile 
Caprolactam 
Alkyl Benzene 
Synthetic Rubber (SBR) 
Acetaldehyde 
Source: KPIA 1977: 48 
Candidates 
Gulf Oil (US) 
Union Carbide (US), Gulf Oil (US), Dow Chemical (US) 
Gulf Oil (US), Dow Chemical (US), Skelly Oil (US) 
Skelly Oil (US), Union Oil(US), Litwin(France), TEC (Japan) 
Nippon Steel (Japan) 
Allied Chemical (US), Union Oil (US) 
Monsanto Chemical (US), Arco (US) 
Good Year (US), Good Rich-Gulf Oil (US), 
Phillips Petroleum (US), Polymer (US) 
National Distillers (US), Gulf Oil (US), Celanese (US) 
Union Carbide (US), AID (US) 
The Korean government sought joint venture partners for the projects In 
accordance with the above-mentioned principles. For the naphtha-cracking centre, this 
was a relatively easy process since Gulf Oil and KOC already had a joint venture 
relationship. Gulf Oil was chosen to participate in the joint venture by increasing its 
share in KOC. 77 The remaining task was to find a partner for the projects led by CFC. 
76 The Korean government financed the establishment of CFC in 1964 to supply fertilizers. In addition, 
the Korean government set up Youngnam Chemical in partnership with an American company, Swift, in 
1965 and Jinhae Chemical in partnership with Gulf. CFC changed its name to the Korea General 
Chemical Corporation in 1973 when it merged with state-run Honam Fertilizer (KPIA 1977). 
77 After taking office in 1961, President Park Chung-Hee tried to build a local refinery using only 
domestic capital by establishing the state-run Korea Oil Corporation (KOC) in 1962. However, the lack of 
technology and capital became obstacles to this ambition. Therefore, the Korean government forged a 
partnership with Gulf Oil in 1962 on the condition that Gulf Oil would buy a 25 percent share of the 
business. In 1967. the Korean government designated KOC as the main body in charge of building the 
naphtha-cracking centre but had difficulty in obtaining financing. In 1970, the Korean government asked 
Gulf Oil to buy an additional 25 percent share in order to finance the building of the naphtha-cracking 
178 
The Ministry of Commerce (MOC), which was in charge of the development of the 
chemical complex and CFC drew up a list of potential partners and contacted them (see 
Table 4.2). Most were big companies and many of them showed interest in participating 
in the projects (Oh 1995b: 88). 
When the Korean government and CFC negotiated with potential investors, they 
emphasized the following points in order to increase the attractiveness of their offer. 
Firstly, on the Korean side, the joint venture partner was essentially the Korean 
government as CFC was a state-run company that was fully financed by the government. 
Hence, it was tantamount to forging a partnership with the government, which was 
expected to reassure foreign candidates in terms of the prospects for the business. 
Secondly, the Korean government promised to provide raw materials (such as ethylene) 
and utilities (including electricity) at lower prices to their partners. The petrochemical 
industry would have to reach a certain size before it could achieve price competitiveness, 
but, at that time, building a large-scale plant that enabled economies of scale in 
production was impossible due to the lack of capital mobilization capacity, the limits of 
the domestic market size, and the country's poor infrastructure. Consequently, Korean 
petrochemical products would inevitably be more expensive than those of other 
countries, including Japan and this inability to lower prices acted as a barrier to 
investment in Korea. The government wanted to remove these disadvantages for 
prospective investors by guaranteeing an appropriate unit price for their products and 
guaranteeing lower prices for raw materials. Thus in many cases the Korean 
government distorted the domestic price structure in the name of industrial policy. In the 
case of the petrochemical industry, the prices of raw materials and utilities· did not 
centre (Yoo Gong 1983). 
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comply with domestic pricing but were forcibly lowered to below international price 
levels, thereby allowing petrochemical companies to be competitive. For example, the 
price of ethylene per pound was 4 cents in the United States, 4.5 cents in Japan, and 5.5 
cents in Taiwan, but the Korean government fixed the price at 3.9 cents and supported 
the providers in various ways so that they could sustain those prices (Oh 1995b: 62). 
This exemplifies what Amsden (1989) refers to as 'getting the price wrong' . 
In November 1968, the Korean government and CFC chose Dow Chemical, a 
multinational company with headquarters in the US as its joint venture partner in both 
the polyethylene and VCM businesses and established KPCC on an equal partnership 
basis (Chosun Ilbo 17 November 1968). Dow Chemical was well aware that producing 
its products in Korea would be less competitive: Korea had a shortage of the natural 
resources required as raw materials for the chemical industry, and electricity was 
expensive due to the lack of power-generating facilities. Nevertheless, Dow decided to 
invest in Korea, believing that its investment would generate profits for the following 
, reasons. Firstly, they observed that the Korean market was growing rapidly. Secondly, 
they realized that the Korean government was protecting the domestic market by 
establishing import barriers and, thirdly, the government supported the development of 
the chemical industry in every possible way, including subsidies, tax incentives, and 
favourable financial support (Wall Street JournalS January 1983). 
In 1972, KPCC opened a plant in Ulsan with an annual production of 60,000 
tons which generated significant profits in the 1970s due to Korea's rapid economic 
growth and the government's protection of market. The government saw the 
petrochemical industry as an important source for basic materials, so they protected the 
chemical industry with various policy measures. Firstly, the government banned the 
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import of most petrochemical products by designating them as import-restricted 
products. Secondly, the Korean government made it legal to offer assistance to the 
petrochemical industry by enacting the 'Petrochemical Industry Promotion Act' in 1970; 
the law included the subsidisation of R&D activities and gave the Ministry of 
Commerce the authority to set prices for the utilities which were provided to 
petrochemical companies. Thirdly, the Korean government granted tax breaks by 
revising the 'Tax Reduction and Exemption Regulation Act' and the 'Customs Act' in 
favour of petrochemical companies (Koo 1980). 
However, after Dow Chemical opened its wholly-owned subsidiary - Dow 
Chemical Korea (DCK) which produced the raw materials for KPCC - in 1979, 
discord began to grow between Dow Chemical and KPCC's Korean executives. In 1979, 
the world economy was in a turbulent state because of the second oil shock and the 
Korean economy was experiencing a slowdown, not· only because of the global 
economic downturn but also because of the political tunnoil brought about by the 
assassination of President Park. In fact, in 1980, the Korean economy recorded a 
negative growth rate for the first time since 1962. Due to the deterioration of the 
business environment and an excess of production, both KPCC and DCK faced 
enormous deficits in 1980 and 1981 (Wall Street Journal 5 January 1983). While the 
earnings of the two companies declined significantly, DCK and KPCC started showing 
discrepancies in the trade between the two companies. DCK had supplied the raw 
materials for VCM and chlorine to KPCC, but KPCC's Korean executives raised 
objections to DCK's price for and supply volume of chlorine, quoting the lower 
international price for chlorine.78 On the other hand, KPCC's American executives 
78 Chlorine was a major ingredient for KPCC's production ofVCM. At that time, the international price 
of chlorine was $145 per ton while the domestic price was more than double that at $380 (KCC 1987). 
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insisted that the company bought the entire volume of chlorine from DCK, even at those 
higher prices, because they believed that KPCC, a joint venture company of Dow 
Chemical, should use DCK's products as it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dow 
Chemical. For these reasons, a significant conflict was brewing between the Korean and 
American executives within KPCC (KCC 1987). 
The struggle between the two sides became so intense that the case was brought 
to court, but the court dismissed the case (Chosun Ilbo 1 September 1982). In addition 
to the law suit, Dow Chemical attempted to contact the Korean government on various 
occasions. Dow Chemical's Chairman, Robert Lundeen, visited then-President Chun 
Doo-Hwan and other high-ranking government officials attempted to defuse the 
situation. When Lundeen asked the Korean government for the approval of a merger 
between DCK and KPCC, the Korean government avoided giving a clear answer (KCC 
1987: 148). This was probably because the government favoured domestic competitors 
over companies with partial or total foreign investment (Wall Street Journal 28 October 
1982). In fact, Dow Chemical had lost most of its bargaining power after it had 
transfered capital and technology to Korea. 
In August 1982, Dow Chemical finally decided to pull out of Korea and notified 
the Korean government of its decision. The government took swift action to minimize 
the effects of Dow Chemical's withdrawai; the Korean government considered several 
domestic companies as potential candidates for the acquisition of Dow Chemical's share, 
ultimately choosing Korea Explosive Group (KEG) to be the biggest shareholder of 
KPCC and DCK. 79 After the acquisition, KEG merged KPCC with DCK and the 
Korean government offered generous support to the firm, lowering the electricity rate 
79 KEG was renamed the Hanhwa Group in 1993 (Hanh\\'a Group, 2002). 
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for KEG and providing other financial allowances. As a result, KEG gained the 
momentum to grow into one of the major chaebol in Korea (Hanhwa Group, 2002: 185-
187). 
Bargaining Power of the Korean Government 
As mentioned in previous section, larger MNCs usually require a higher ownership 
level. As of 1967, Dow Chemical ranked 53rd in Fortune magazine's list of the 500 
largest US industrial companies and was ranked in third place in the US chemical 
industry (Fortune 15 June 1968). Although the company may have preferred 100 
percent ownership in order to seek rents from its firm-specific advantages, as it entered 
Korea in an equal partnership with the state-owned CFC in 1969, the Korean 
government's bargaining power was clearly strong enough to convince Dow to accept 
these terms of partnership. By applying the NBM to this case, this section will explain 
how the Korean government convinced Dow to enter into the partnership and will thus 
determine the level of bargaining power of the Korean government in the Dow 
Chemical case. The discussion will follow the three dimensions of the N eo Bargaining 
Model: resources, stakes, and constraints. 
When it comes to the resources of the Korean government in this case, the 
government's resources remained at a very low level in the late 1960s when Dow 
Chemical entered Korea. Consequently, the government's bargaining power could not 
be based on its resources. As we argued in previous chapter, the country had little to 
attract foreign companies in late 1960 as it was one of the poorest countries in the world 
and had not been industrialised (BOK 2004: 16). The manufacturing sector had not yet 
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developed: manufacturing sector production accounted for only 19.6 percent of GDP 
and employment in the manufacturing sector was only 8.7 percent of the total workforce 
in 1968. The natural resources for the chemical industry were insufficient, and 
infrastructure such as ports, roads, and airports were poor or almost non-existed. 
Electricity, the main source of power for factories, was expensive due to a lack of 
power-generating facilities (BOK 2005) and Korea's only abundant resource in the 
1960s was low-cost labour. However, due to the capital-intensive nature of the 
petrochemical industry, the cheap cost of labour was not seen as a key asset by Dow 
Chemical. The continuing confrontation between South and North Korea combined with 
unstable and unpredictable domestic politics, was enough to discourage foreign 
companies from investing in Korea. The only resource that Dow Chemical considered 
when it entered was the growth potential of the Korean market (Wall Street JournalS 
January 1983). In short, the government's resources were so minimal that it could offer 
few locational advantages to Dow Chemical. 
However, in terms of stake, the Korean government could maintain a low level 
and thus increase its bargaining power. Firstly, the government could lower its level of 
commitment despite the strong demands for the establishment of the petrochemicals 
industry. This was possible because the government's approach to FDI focused on a 
long-term strategy. As the 1966 Petrochemical Industry Development Plan shows, the 
government first formulated the long-term plan and then established the principles to 
attain its future goal. The attraction of foreign companies in petrochemical industry was 
subordinate to the ultimate goal of developing the domestic petrochemicals industry. 
When the government allowed foreign investment in its petrochemical projects. it 
applied the principle of joint ventures with equal partnership and the tirm~s 
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acqUIescence to government policy. The fonner principle ensured the transfer of 
technology to the domestic partner while the latter showed the government's finn 
detennination to hold finn to its initiatives on industrial development. These principles 
clearly showed that the government regarded foreign companies as tools to realise its 
goal. Thus, by subordinating FDI to the state's long-tenn goals, the government could 
lower its level of commitment. 
In tenns of alternatives, the government tried to increase alternative sources of 
FDI and its government's approach in selecting joint venture partners illustrated its 
efforts to find those alternatives. Before the government chose Dow Chemical as a 
partner for CFC, it had already secured multiple foreign candidates for joint venture 
partnerships (see Table 4.2). In the case of CFC's polyethylene project, the candidates 
were Union Carbide, Gulf Oil, and Dow Chemical, all of which were large, well-known 
companies. In selecting the foreign joint partner, the government carefully considered 
the technology leaders, who could bring the best technology available at that time to 
Korea (Bishop 1997: 35). Given Korea's poor resource situation, how could the 
government make big companies compete to be a part of a joint venture with Korean 
company? The answer is connected to the capacity of bargaining agency, which is 
discussed below. By lowering its commitment and increasing its alternatives, the 
government was able to have a low level of stakes. 
When it comes to constraints, the Korean government was able to benefit from a 
low level of both internal and external constraints. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter. the Korean government in the 1960s faced few external pressures thanks to the 
Cold War context. External actors tolerated the Korean government's protectionist 
policies, such as measures requiring equal joint venture ownership or compliance with 
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the government's industrial policy. The government did not encounter any senous 
external efforts to reform its attitudes towards foreign businesses until at least the late 
1970s. In addition, with respect to the internal pressures, the government was not 
confronted by significant challenges from any social groups; the traditional landowner 
class had been dismantled, and neither the industrial capitalist class nor labour class had 
yet formed. Hence, as the strongest and the most efficient institution, the state was able 
to push forward its policies with few obstacles. 
The most notable factor in this case was the role of the bargaining agency which 
on the host country side was the government itself, specifically the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOC). The Ministry actively participated in the bargaining process and 
played a critical role in selecting and attracting Dow Chemical as a partner for CFC. 80 
In order to attract foreign companies, the MOC enhanced Korea's attractiveness as an 
investment location by removing obstacles to entry and enhancing the benefits that 
foreign companies could obtain, as detailed below. 
The main obstacle for foreign investors in the chemical industry was the higher 
cost of production due to the lack of natural resources, poor infrastructure, and the 
absence of economies of scale - an obstacle that the government had to remove if it 
was to attract foreign chemical companies. In an ideal world, the government would 
build a strong infrastructure and create greater demand in domestic and overseas 
markets, thus realising economies of scale. However, this would require a long time and 
the Korean government could not afford to wait until such conditions had been realized. 
80 In the 1960s and 1970s, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was in charge of fonnulating policies for 
and approving cases of foreign investment. However, in the case of Dow Chemical, the Ministry of 
Commerce played a major role in attracting investment to the chemical complex, acting as the main 
negotiating party with foreign companies. However, the final decision was made by the Committee of 
Foreign Investment chaired by the Minister of the EPB. 
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Instead, the government opted for price controls; the idea was to control the factors 
contributing to the rising price of products by lowering the price of raw materials and 
utilities. The government thus guaranteed profitability and competitiveness by providing 
the raw materials and utilities required by petrochemicals companies at lower than 
market prices, and gave the Minister of Commerce the authority to control the prices.81 
The government created a more attractive investment environment through price 
distortion; however, while such measures could remove the disadvantages, they could 
not create actual advantages for foreign companies to invest in Korea. 
Thus, the second method used by the government was the strengthening of 
advantages. To motivate foreign investors, the Korean government created incentives by 
protecting the domestic market; the government designated most petrochemical 
products as import-restricted products, making them impossible to import without 
permission from the Korea Petrochemical Industry Association (KPIA). By doing so, 
the government completely shielded domestic players, including foreign companies in 
Korea, from external competition. Along with this measure, the government gave 
numerous tax breaks to petrochemical companies. 
With the removal of disadvantages and the creation of new advantages, the 
Korean government had much more bargaining power in their negotiations with foreign 
companies and Dow Chemical was motivated to invest by the Korean government's 
market protection measures and its various financial support measures (Wall Street 
Journal 5 January 1983). Clearly, the role of the government was crucial in attracting 
Dow Chemical, and its capacity to control the nation's scarce resources greatly reduced 
81 These price controls were shown in the 'Petrochemical Industry Promotion Act', which was enacted in 
1970 to protect and nurture the petrochemical industry and abolished in 1986. According to Article 10, the 
Minister of Commerce was granted the authority to approve prices of electricity and water as well as 
naphtha. 
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the internal constraints, which consequently increased the bargaining power of the 
government. 
Finally, as these three dimensions are drawn together, we can identify the 
location of the bargaining power of the Korean government within the framework of the 
NBM. As is illustrated below, the bargaining power of the government in this case is 
located at a position that is closer to point S (the strongest point) than point W (the 
weakest point). That is, the Korean government's bargaining power was relatively 
strong in the case of Dow Chemical-KPCC, and the strength of the government's 
bargaining power can be attributed to a relatively low level of stakes and constraints. 
Table 4.3 Korean Government's Bargaining Power: Dow Chemical-KPCC case 
Dimensions Level of Dimensions Level of Bargaining Power 
Relative Resources Low 
Relative Stake Commitment Medium Medium Low 
Alternatives High Medium High 
Relative External Low Low 
Constraints Internal Low 
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Figure 4.1 The Position of the Korean Government's Bargaining Power: Dow 
Chemical-KPCC case 
Strongest point 
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Weakest point 
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General Motors and Shinjin Motor 
Background 
In 1972, General Motors (GM) made inroads into Korea when it established GM Korea 
(GMK) in equal partnership with Shinjin Motor. Subsequently, GM changed its 
partnership from Shinjin to Korea Development Bank (KDB) and then to Daewoo 
Motor. In 1992, the company withdrew from Korea by ending its relationship with 
Daewoo Motor; in 2002, however, GM returned to the Korean market by acquiring 
Daewoo Motor, its fonner partner. This time, GM was in sole management control, 
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rather than acting as a joint venture partner. Thus, GM was active in Korea for 20 years 
in Korea following its entry at an early stage of the development of the Korean 
automobile industry and eventually returned to the market after a ten-year absence. The 
Korean economy has grown substantially over the past 30 years, thereby changing the 
Korean government's bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs. The scale of the Korean 
economy grew substantially during this period: Korea's GDP increased 63 times from 
just USD8 billion in 1970 to USD511 billion in 2000 and in addition, production 
capacity increased and the domestic market expanded. However, the bargaining power 
of the Korean government weakened, contrary to the common expectation that it would 
have increased in terms of resources. This section will examine the extent of and factors 
affecting the government's bargaining power by exploring GM's first entry into Korea 
in 1972 and, in the following section, GM's second entry in 2002. 
Shinjin Motor was founded in 1954 and, in its early years, was producing cars 
manually using second-hand parts sourced from the US garrison in Korea. In 1965, 
Shinjin Motor acquired Saenara Motor and its manufacturing facilities when Saenara 
closed its business of importing semi-knocked down (SKD) cars from Nissan Motors in 
Japan. 82 In 1966, after forming a technical alliance with Toyota, Shinjin Motor 
produced the Corona model by assembling SKD components imported from Japan (Kim 
Cheon-Wuk 2002). The Korean government, in constant need of foreign currency for 
economic development, did not welcome SKD manufacturing because it used valuable 
foreign currency to import automobile parts and deterred the growth of the domestic 
parts industry. The government encouraged Shinjin Motor to use domestic parts but to 
82 'Semi knocked down (SKD)' refers to a type of import in which products are sold in kit form (semi-
finished products) for later reassembly in local markets. 'Completely knocked down (CKD), is a type of 
import in which products are completely disassembled. 
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no avail. 83 At that time, the government had refused to authorize the establishment of 
another auto maker, tacitly approving Shinjin's monopoly. However, Shinjin's reluctance 
to follow government policy prompted the authorization of the establishment of 
Hyundai Motor and Asia Motor, bringing competition into the domestic automobile 
market. 
By 1968 the lack of progress in the localisation of automobile manufacturing led 
then-President Park Chung-Hee to order government officials to take action to 
accelerate local production of auto parts. The government announced its 'Blueprint for 
Fostering the Automobile Industry' (also known as the Three-Year Localization Plan) in 
1969. The aim was to localise the manufacture of automobiles and the policy included 
plans for the construction of an engine plant (Kim Cheon-Wuk 2002: 89-90). The lack 
of capital and technology at this time meant that forging an alliance with foreign 
automakers to set up this large-scale engine plant was inevitable. Shinjin chose Toyota 
as its joint venture partner and applied for official permission to establish the alliance. 
In its application, Shinjin proposed a shareholding ratio of 20:80 with Toyota. Although 
the government recommended a ratio of 50:50 and instructed Shinjin to modify its 
proposed ownership plan, Shinjin reapplied with only a nominal change to 30:70 (Oh 
1995c: 137). Before the Korean government could make a final decision, however, 
Toyota revoked the joint venture plan due to events in China: the Prime Minister, Zhou 
Enlai, announced the 'Four Principles of Zhou' in April 1970 during trade talks between 
83 Oh Won-Chul, the fonner presidential economic advisor said of Shinjin Motor: "(Shinjin Motor) did 
not create any benefits for the Korean automobile industry ... Because their concern was to import parts 
in kit form and assemble and sell them ... The Ministry of Commerce could not leave this matter 
unresolved. Thus, the government directed Shinjin to use a minimum of 32 percent of domestic parts yet 
they used 23.6 percent, making various excuses ... [Shinjin Motor] was not interested in localization at all. 
They just focused on making money." (Oh 1995c: 109-110). 
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China and Japan. 84 The maIn principle was that China would not allow Chinese 
companies to trade with any company that had business with Korea or Taiwan. Toyota, 
which was also seeking entry to China, dropped the joint venture attempt because it 
would have been a serious obstacle to its advancement into China. 
Because Japanese automakers were now avoiding Korea, Shinjin Motor had to 
find a new partner in the US. Given that Ford had already been in negotiation with 
Hyundai since the 1970s, Shinjin selected GM as its new alliance partner. GM had been 
actively exploring the possibility of entry to the Korean market since the early 1970s; as 
Toyota hinted at withdrawing from Korea in 1971 and Ford hesitated over forming an 
alliance with Hyundai,85 GM accelerated its joint venture talks with Shinjin Motor. 
Although the joint venture negotiations between Shinjin and GM went smoothly, the 
Korean government was disinclined to approve the deal. Oh Won-Chul, then-deputy 
Minister of Commerce noted in his book that he advised Kim Chang-Won, the president 
of Shinjin Motor to form a technical alliance with a foreign partner, but not with a big 
company (Oh 1995c: 156). Ignoring the government's recommendation, Shinjin set up 
General Motors Korea (GMK) an equal partnership joint venture with GM in 1972. GM 
invested a total ofUSD48 million to build and market cars in Korea and, in 1974, GMK 
opened an engine processing and assembly plant in Korea. 
84 The Four Principles of Zhou were: fIrstly, China would not trade with anyone or any corporation that 
helped Taiwan or Korea. Secondly, China would not trade with anyone or any corporation that invested in 
Taiwan and Korea. Third, China would not trade with any partner in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia that 
helped or sold weaponry to the United States. Fourthly, China would not trade with the subsidiaries of US 
companies (Oh 1995c: 138). 
85 The alliance between Hyundai and Ford began in 1968 when Hyundai imported the Cortina on a CKD 
basis. Joint venture talks began in the 1970s, but negotiations did not proceed smoothly. Hyundai wanted 
to manufacture small cars under its own brand and export them through Ford's distribution channel but 
Ford was interested only in boosting sales of its existing range of cars, vetoing Hyundai's plan to use its 
distribution channels to export to countries where Ford had a presence. Furthermore, Hyundai's ultimate 
goal was to produce finished products on its own while Ford wanted to produce only diesel engines in 
Korea under its 'one country one part' principle. These differences made the joint venture fall apart in 
1973, and Hyundai adopted a new strategy aimed at developing cars independently (Kim Seong-Hun 
1999). 
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In 1974, the Korean government released its 'Long-term Plan for the Promotion 
of the Domestic Automobile Industry', seeking to nurture the automobile industry as an 
export industry, and abandoning its import substitution strategy for automobiles. This 
policy would depend on developing a local vehicle model. 86 The Korean government 
asked four major automakers - GMK, Hyundai, Kia and Asia Motor - to design and 
build a completely new model which did not exist abroad. Although, considering the 
Korean automakers' capabilities at that time, it was too much to ask the four companies 
made a commitment to develop a new model according to the government's directive. 
However, the government pledged to support the development of a new model that 
would meet the official requirements by designating it a 'national vehicle' and offering 
preferential support in terms of taxes, finances, and administration (Kim Seong-Hun 
1999: 105). 
The government promised the following: firstly, the manufacturers of the new 
model would be entitled to tax cuts, including a 50 percent reduction in commodity tax 
and a two-thirds cut in the automobile tax. Secondly, the government would allow the 
firm to secure foreign loans and would provide tax breaks on importing raw materials, 
and, finally, the government would designate the new model as a 'national vehicle' and 
thus help to secure a share of more than 80 percent of the domestic passenger car market 
(Kim Seong-Hun 1999: 131). 
Hyundai faithfully followed the government plan. After its unsuccessful joint 
venture attempt with Ford in 1973, Hyundai had started to develop vehicles on its own. 
86 The Korean government defined an 'independent local vehicle model' as one that was economical, 
small (less than 1500cc), had never been developed overseas before, and that not require modification for 
a long time. The reason for developing a small vehicle was that it could avoid competition with foreign 
automakers and would also create greater domestic demand than would a big model (Kim Seong-Hun 
1999). 
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George Turnbull, who had been in charge of Austin Morris, part of the British Leyland 
Motor Corporation (BLMC), was appointed as chief technical officer by Hyundai's 
chairman, Chung Ju-Yung, with Ital Design of Italy working on the design.87 Hyundai 
also brought in key technologies for gasoline engines and transmissions from Mitsubishi 
of Japan. In 1975, Hyundai finally succeeded in producing the 1200 cc Pony, its first-
ever independent model. With the Korean government allowing Hyundai Motor a 
relatively higher profit margin by protecting the domestic market, Hyundai was able to 
dominate the domestic market after the launch of the Pony, accounting for 50 percent of 
the market in 1976, 58 percent in 1977, and 66 percent in 1978.88 As is shown in Table 
4.4, Hyundai's output began to increase rapidly, compared with that of GMK (KCC 
1987: 167). 
Table 4.4 Production Volumes of GM Korea and Hyundai Motor 
Year GMK Hyundai Motor 
1972 4,471 2,615 
1973 6,696 5,426 
1974 1,565 6,846 
1975 2,559 4,722 
1976 3,788 14,826 
1977 4,270 27,466 
1978 12,162 57,054 
1979 18,430 71,774 
Source: KAMA 2004 
87 In 1973, then-vice president of BLMC George Turnbull left his company, which had been going 
through management difficulties due to a strong trade union. In 1974, he was asked to provide technical 
advice to Hyundai Motor for the development of the Pony model (Hyundai Motors 1992). 
88 The production costs for the Hyundai Pony was USD3,700 in 1979; it sold domestically for USD5,000, 
and sold abroad for USD2,200 (Wade 1990: 310). 
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In contrast, GMK's response to the government's request was unenthusiastic, 
nevertheless, GMK made a proposal for developing a new compact car. As the deadline 
for the submission of the proposal approached in November 1975, GMK announced 
another plan to produce the Gemini model, which was manufactured by Isuzu, GM's 
Japanese joint venture, in Korea; however this plan never came to fruition. With slow 
progress on the Gemini, GMK introduced the 1500 cc Carmina, a smaller version of the 
Chivore 1700, without major changes in design and architecture. The reason for the lack 
of progress in developing an independent model lay in the fact that the parent company 
GM's strategy was fundamentally incompatible with the Korean government's policy. 
GM allowed GMK only a limited role in its global specialization structure, but the 
Korean government wanted GMK to build vehicles independently. MNCs generally 
allowed their overseas affiliates to build only existing models, and export them under 
their brand name through their existing sales network. GMK, in partnership with GM, 
was restricted to developing its own model, contrary to the firm's global specialization 
structure. GMK eventually went into receivership with the state-run Korea 
Development Bank (KDB) in November 1976 because of worsening financial 
difficulties. KDB took a 50 percent share of Shinjin Motor and renamed it Saehan 
Motor (Kim Seong-Hun 1999). 
It can be said that GMK's failure to respond positively to the Korean 
government's policy resulted in its management crisis and its subsequent acquisition by 
KDB. Hyundai Motor successfully developed a domestic model and increased its 
market share with the help of the government. On the other hand, GMK, reluctant to 
follow the government policy, fell behind in the race, aggravating its financial 
difficulties, and its collapse can be attributed to its refusal to embrace government 
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policy and comply with official goals. The main reason for this reluctance lay in the fact 
that GMK was a joint venture company with GM, which was not enthusiastic about the 
development of a new model (Cho and Choo 1998: 30).89 In the next section, we will 
apply the NBM will be applied to this case. 
Bargaining Power of the Korean Government 
In this case, we can assume that the Korean government's bargaining power was strong 
because the ownership level of GM was only 50 percent. GM, the largest automaker in 
the world in 1970s, had to settle for 50 percent rather than majority ownership because 
of the Korean government's restrictions on equity ratio. Although Korea was 
desperately in need of GM's experience and technology in the 1960s, the government 
discouraged automakers from forming alliances with foreign companies or limited 
foreign firms' shareholding ratio to less than 50 percent. The bargaining power of the 
Korean government in this case cannot be explained solely by elements such as 
resources; instead, the explanation requires the consideration of dimensions such as 
stakes and constraints. This section will examine the elements of the bargaining power 
of the Korean government vis-a-vis GM, when GM first entered Korea. 
Firstly, we will assess the government's resources when GM entered the market 
In 1972. The Korean government, which had been keen to foster the domestic 
automobile industry, announced a series of automobile industry development plans and 
89 At the time, the Korean government forced automakers who did not comply with its policy to lag 
behind by not authorizing the import of components while offering compliant companies tax breaks and 
financial support (Oh 1995c: 205). The government offered incentives or penalties according to the 
performance of companies. Sometimes, the government relieved companies' financial burdens by 
freezing the repayment of private loans and forced assembly outfits to close their factories, such as with 
the closure of Asia Motor in 1974 and the closure of small assembly outfits in 1972 (Cho and Choo 1998: 
26-30). 
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enacted relevant legislation from the 1960s (Cho and Choo 1998).90 At that time, the 
government's major concern for the automobile industry was the substitution of local 
production for imports, but automakers were building vehicles with parts imported on 
either an SKD or a CKD basis. Strictly speaking, there were assembly companies in 
Korea but no true automakers.91 In contrast, OM was the biggest auto maker in the 
world, holding 50 percent of the US market since its establishment in 1916 and ranked 
as the largest among the Fortune 500 US industrial corporations in 1971 (Fortune May 
1972). 
OM's entry to Korea was mainly motivated by a desire to access the growing 
Asian market. Firstly, OM regarded entry to Korea as securing a foothold to move into 
Japan, which was about to liberalize its automobile market in 1971. Secondly, Korea 
could serve as a platform for the rest of the Asian market and, thirdly, Korea could be a 
starting point for an advance into China in the long term (Hyundai Motors 1992: 144). 
However, production conditions in Korea in 1972 were poor. The automobile parts 
industry was not sufficiently mature to produce engines, and the country's infrastructure, 
including roads and ports, was underdeveloped; as of 1970, only 9.6 percent of roads 
were paved. The Korean government wished to export Korean-made vehicles, but, in 
the view of OM executives, that was unlikely to happen.92 Korea simply could not 
produce enough vehicles for export because the industry was still at an assembly phase. 
90 Major policies included the 1962 'Five-year Plan for the Automobile industry,' the 1964 'Master Plan 
for the Automobile Industry,' and the 1969 'Framework for Developing the Automobile Industry (Three-
year Plan for Localization).' 
91 In the 1960s, the domestic automobile industry and the components industry were not sufficiently 
developed enough to build vehicles independently, so all of the vehicles manufactured were assembled 
with imported parts. In 1962, Saenara Motor assembled the Nissan Blue Bird on an SKD basis but 
subsequently stopped production due to a shortage of foreign exchange. In 1965, Shinjin assembled the 
Toyota Corona after acquiring Saenara Motor and Hyundai Motor, which was established in 1968, 
assembled the Ford Cortina on a CKD basis. 
92 On hearing of Hyundai's plan to develop an independent model, the Chief Vice President of GMK said 
in 1974 "it is absolutely impossible for Hyundai to develop and export its own model." His remarks 
highlighted the low capabilities of the Korean automobile industry in the I 960s (Oh 1995c: 170). 
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All four automakers in Korea were manufacturing vehicles by assembling parts 
imported on a KD basis. Although the Korean government had tried to localize vehicles 
by promoting the automobile parts industry since the 1960s, the ratio of localization for 
components in 1971 stood at only 40 percent, with manufacturers relying on imports for 
major components including engines (Oh 1995c: 128). In 1972, Korea's GDP was 
USD10 billion, and its per capita income was only USD320. Annual production of 
vehicles was 15,000 units, which were mostly assembled and manufactured on a KD 
basis, and domestic sales volume was no more than 15,000 units a year. Not only was 
the market small, but also production capacity was weak. Korea was not attractive to 
multinational companies in either terms of production or consumption (Kim Cheon-
Wuk 2002: 86). Therefore, the Korean government's resources were relatively low. 
Secondly, the commitment of the Korean government, and the alternatives 
available to it, must be determined to assess the level of its stakes. In terms of 
commitment, the GM case is similar to that of Dow Chemical. FDI was considered in 
the context of the long-term plan for the development of the industry. The government 
established various plans for the development of the auto industry such as the 'Blueprint 
for Fostering the Automobile Industry' in 1969 and the 'Long-term Plan for the 
Promotion of the Domestic Automobile Industry' in 1974. This long-term approach to 
the development of the industry made the government consider FDI as one of the 
possible resources for realising its long-term aim; that is, FDI policy was subsumed 
under industrial policy. As, in the 1960s, the Korean automobile industry the lacked the 
necessary technology and capital to develop further the government's reliance on MNCs 
seemed to be inevitable. Yet the government was not eager to enter into a partnership 
with MNCs to pron10te the industry; instead, it urged domestic auto makers to develop 
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their own model. The government knew that the development of a local vehicle model 
was essential to encourage the domestic automobile industry to become an export 
industry. Their own brand model could not be achieved through partnership with MNCs 
because MNCs would not be willing to help potential competitors develop. For these 
reasons, government officials at that time were wary of foreign capital dominating the 
domestic market.93 As Kim Jae-Kwan, Assistant Deputy Minister of Commerce and 
Industry in the 1970s, explained, it was vital for an underdeveloped country seeking to 
become independent to develop its own vehicle model, in order not to be subordinated 
to multinational cannakers (Kim Jae-Kwan 1995: 270).94 Oh Won-Chul, who was an 
advisor to President Park in the 1970s on the heavy and defence industries, noted that he 
advised Chung Se-Young, the President of Hyundai Motors, 
... not to collaborate with foreign automakers. Mass-production is a key 
attribute in the automobile industry, inevitably creating oversupply. So, 
auto makers must strive to get rid of the excess supply. If you are a partner 
in an alliance, you easily end up being an outlet for clearing the excess 
stock. The same goes for every company. Who would be willing to help 
nurture the automobile industry of underdeveloped countries? Development 
with the help of multinational companies would be the same as raising a 
tiger cub with the pennission of its mother, which is absolutely impossible. 
The Japanese industry can be as prosperous as it is today because they 
pursued their own way (Oh 1995c: 140-141). 
The Korean government ultimately wanted to achieve its own production capability 
93 Until the 1960s, Japan had implemented a protective policy to nurture the industrial capital of its 
automobile industry. The Japanese government prohibited foreign capital from entering the country and 
instead encouraged technical alliances. As Korea modelled its industrial policy on that of Japan, both 
nations had a similar industrial structure (Cho and Choo 1998: 65). 
94 Kim Jae-Kwan drafted the 'Long-term Plan for the Promotion of the Domestic Automobile Industry: 
which was most important plan for the Korean government's automobile policy. 
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using foreign capital and technology and refused to be subordinated to multinational 
companies. Thus, the Korean government's industrial policies reduced its level of 
commitment toward foreign capital. 
In terms of alternatives, although the Korean government had tried to build its 
own production capability, reliance on multinational companies was inevitable due to 
the absence of capital and technology. However, as the case of Hyundai shows, the 
government was able to create alternatives to relying on MNCs by working with a loyal 
domestic corporation that would comply with its industrial policy. In the first place, the 
government provided seed money through various tax breaks and financial benefits to 
companies that complied with its policy and, if necessary, the government forced to 
transfer the wealth of specific groups to industrial capital. The '8.3' Action is an 
example of special favours offered by the government to promote specific industries 
(see Chapter Three footnote 18). Hyundai, which had overstretched itself to build a 
capital-intensive automobile production arm in the early 1970s, was borrowing money 
from private money lenders at annual interest rates as high as 45 percent because 
institutional financial sources could not meet the company's demand for money. A 
natural consequence of this was that Hyundai went into serious financial difficulties and 
under those circumstances, it was impossible for Hyundai to develop an original vehicle 
model without obtaining direct investment from foreign capital. However, the 
government saved Hyundai from such troubles through the '8.3 Action'. Although the 
"8.3 Action' was not designed specifically for Hyundai Motors, it turned out to be the 
biggest beneficiary of the action (Hyundai Motors 1992: 141). In addition, the Korean 
government assisted Hyundai in securing foreign loans to compensate for the lack of 
domestic capital. In all, the development of the Pony cost Hyundai Motors USD78 
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million, of which domestic capital contributed only USD 17 million. Hyundai borrowed 
the remaining 78 percent from overseas, with Bardays of England, Suez of France, and 
Mitsubishi of Japan being among the biggest lenders (Hyundai Motors 1997: 200). With 
interest rates abroad significantly lower than those at home, it was highly beneficial to 
borrow money from overseas 95 and the Korean government supported Hyundai's 
efforts to raise capital by co-signing the loans. 
The matter of technology could be solved though technology licence agreements. 
Hyundai signed agreements with Perkins of UK for diesel engine technology, 
Mitsubishi of Japan for gasoline engines and transmissions, and Ital Design of Italy for 
design. These agreements made it possible for Hyundai to access technology and design 
without the formation of a joint venture. Although the global automobile industry was 
controlled by a small number of multinational companies, many other automakers were 
competing on the basis of their own technology. Their technologies could be obtained as 
long as they were standard or matured; thus when Ford refused to transfer technology, 
Hyundai could rely on Mitsubishi (Baek 1990: 411). In short, the stake was not high as 
a result of industrial policy, which lowered the level of commitment and created 
available alternatives. 
Lastly, in terms of the Korean government's constraints, the Korean government 
in the 1960s and 1970s faced a low level of constraints. As we all know, Korea in the 
1960s and 1970s was one of the poorest countries in the world and was regarded as a 
country in need of help from the rest of the world; this enabled her to avoid external 
pressures in terms of opening the domestic market in terms of both trade and investment. 
In this case, the government's efforts to develop its automobile industry did not face any 
95 The difference between domestic and foreign borrowing rates ranged from 4.4 percent to 18 percent 
between 1965 and 1970 (Amsden 1989: 94). 
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external obstacles even though they were undertaken in an extremely protectionist way. 
Internally, as we have seen, the Korean state in the SOM phase maintained a significant 
level of autonomy over society. In fact, the government wielded power by nurturing or 
weeding out industrial capital, based on its relatively strong autonomy. According to 
Amsden (1989: 15), the Korean government could discipline the businesses by using a 
system of penalties and rewards; the Asia Motor case was a representative example of 
the government's control use of penalties for poor performers to control industries. Asia 
Motor was the product of the government's strategic choices. In 1965, the government 
decided to authorize another auto maker, Asia Motor, to foster competition with Shinjin, 
which had not been enthusiastic about developing a new domestic car model. 96 
However, Asia Motor was not passionate about developing a domestic model either and 
so the government eventually forced Asia Motor to merge with Kia Motor in 1976 
(Hyundai Motors 1992: 151). In other words, the government forced out companies that 
refused to follow its policy and, at that time, the government's power was strong enough 
to dictate market entry and withdrawal. In contrast, the government could help to make 
businesses successful in a short period of time through various rewards. It carefully 
selected companies that had potential and enthusiasm about following its goals, and 
then concentrated every possible resource on them to help them grow. The government 
encouraged competition among four major carmakers to develop a local vehicle model, 
and when Hyundai won the competition, the government fully supported Hyundai not 
only by offering numerous tax cut and subsidies, but also by designating its model as a 
'national vehicle~. This was the start of Hyundai Motors, which became the world's 6th 
96 Until the mid-1960s, the Korean government did not authorize the establishment of any more 
automakers and supported only one company in order to achieve economies of scale. 
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largest automaker in 2006.97 The government could use its power to control domestic 
companies and thus weaken internal constraints. In short, the government faced few 
constraints internally or externally and this low of constraints helped to strengthen its 
bargaining power. 
Applying the Neo Bargaining Model to the GM-Shinjin case, the Korean 
government's bargaining power can be illustrated as seen in the table and figure below. 
As in the Dow Chemical case, the position of the bargaining power of the government 
in this case is near point S (the strongest point), which indicates the relatively strong 
bargaining power of the Korean government. This strength is attributed to the low level 
of stakes and constraints. 
Table 4.5 Korean Government's Bargaining Power: GM-Shinjin case 
Dimensions Level of Each Dimensions Level of Bargaining Power 
Relative Resources Low 
Relative Stake Commitment Medium Medium Low 
Alternatives High Medium High 
Relative External Low Low 
Constraints Internal Low 
97 The ranking of global automakers in terms of 2005 global sales is as follows: 1 st General Motors (8.4 
million units), 1nd Toyota Motor Corp. (8.1 million), 3rd Ford Motor Co. (6.2 million), 4th Volkswagen 
AG (5.1 million), 5th DaimlerChrysler AG (4.9 million), 6th Hyundai Automotive Group (3.7 million), 
7th Nissan Motor Co. (3.6 miIlion), 8th PSNPeugeot-Citroen SA (3.4 million), 9th Honda Motor Co. (3.4 
million), 10th Renault SA (2.5 miIlion) (http://www.automobile.comlO June 2006) 
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Figure 4.2 The Position of Korean Government's Bargaining Power: GM-Shinjin case 
Strongest point 
s 
high 
Weakest point 
Resources .................................................................................................. W .. 
.... 0··. GM-Shinjin cas 
low .... O___________ ----JI 
low Stakes high 
General Motors and Daewoo Motors 
Background 
As was mentioned in the previous section, GMK suffered from a deterioration in its 
market share and experienced financial difficulties from 1974 because of its lack of 
response to government policy and the parent company's lukewarm attitude toward the 
Korean market. Eventually GMK went into the receivership of the KDB in 1976. KDB 
bought 50 percent of Shinjin's stake and renamed it Saehan Motor, thus changing GM's 
partner from Shinjin to KDB. The relationship between KDB, which was a state-run 
bank without any experience in the automobile industry. and GM, which lacked an 
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understanding of the Korean market, was never smooth. Hence, the government started 
looking for a buyer who would take over KDB's shareholding in Saehan Motor. The 
government asked the Daewoo Group to acquire Saehan Motor, appreciating its 
performance to normalize Hankook Machinery, an insolvent state-owned company. 98 
Daewoo was also interested in the offer since its affiliate, Daewoo Heavy Industries, 
was already producing diesel engines. Daewoo began participating in the management 
of Saehan Motor from 1978 and in 1982, when Saehan was still performing poorly 
under the management of GM, Daewoo took over management control through 
negotiations with GM and changed the name to Daewoo Motor.99 
In the 1980s, in order to compete with rapidly-growing Japanese competitors, 
GM made a plan to introduce an affordable compact car to the Korean market. In 1986, 
the Le Mans, which was developed by Opel, GM's affiliate, was introduced to Korea on 
an OEM basis.100 Although, from that time, GM used Korea as a production platform 
for export, the quality of the Le Mans produced by Daewoo failed to meet GM's 
expectations, and GM was unenthusiastic about the sales. In addition, GM did not 
undertake the export quota that it had promised to Daewoo. 101 Eventually the 
partnership began to fall apart. GM had been increasingly dissatisfied with Daewoo ~s 
98 Daewoo started as a trading company and advanced into the heavy and chemical industries in the 
1970s by acquiring insolvent companies. Its diversification included acquisitions of Hankook Machinery 
(Daewoo Heavy Industries) in 1976, Saehan Motor (Daewoo Motor) in 1978, Okpo Shipbuilding 
(Daewoo Shipbuilding) in 1978, and the home appliances sector of Daehan Wires (Daewoo Electronics) 
in 1983. Since then, Daewoo grew rapidly to become the second-largest conglomerate in Korea. However. 
in 1999, it was dissolved as a result of its highly-leveraged expansion. 
99 The joint venture between GM and Shinjin Motor started in 1972 with equal partnership on the 
condition that management control belonged to GM. In 1982, Daewoo gained management control, but 
had to transfer it back to GM in 1984 (Kim Seong-Hun 1998: 164). 
100 In the 1984 investment agreement, GM and Daewoo struck a deal to build a derivative of Opel's 
Kadett that was customized for the Korean market, investing USDI00 million each and raising USD450 
million from outside (Kim Seong-Hun 1998: 168). 
101 GM promised to produce no fewer than 100,000 vehicles a year in 1986 when Daewoo started 
producing the Le Mans model. However, in the seven years until 1992, total exports of the Le Mans to the 
US were as few as 240,000 units. As a result, the operating of the Le Mans production line remained at 
less than 40 percent (Cho 2001 a: 160). 
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declining price competitiveness as a result of labour disputes, frequent strikes~ and low 
quality. For Daewoo, GM's restriction on access to export markets was the biggest 
source of dissatisfaction. Furthermore, Daewoo could no longer tolerate GM's 
indifference to the sluggish sales of the Le Mans model in the US market and its refusal 
to invest in the development of a new model (Ryu 1993: 185-186). This growing dissent 
between the companies was perhaps inevitable as Daewoo grew in size and strength; 1 02 
in 1992, GM sold its share to Daewoo for USD 170 million and left Korea, 20 years 
after its entry. 
Now under independent management, in 1993 Daewoo Motor embarked on a 
bold overseas investment programme under the slogan of 'global management (Segyeo 
Gyeongyeong)' and backed by the government's liberalisation policy and the 
globalisation trends. Daewoo bought the Worthing Technical Center in the UK and 
began operations in India, China, Romania, Poland and Uzbekistan. The company 
continued to expand in Korea, building a complex in Gunsan and as a result of 
aggressive management including the concurrent introduction of three models (the 
Lanos, Nubira and Leganza). Daewoo Motor emerged as the 20th largest automaker in 
the world in 1996 (Lee Young-Myeon 2002: 44).103 When Korea was hit by the 1997 
financial crisis, Daewoo's excessive expansion increased the burden of its financial 
102 According to Kim, the limitations in their partnership on Daewoo's side were as follows: Firstly, 
Daewoo's sales in overseas markets were restricted by GM. Daewoo's advance into Europe -
traditionally the territory of GM's affiliate, Opel - caused friction with GM. Secondly, Daewoo's 
production costs increased as it manufactured only GM models; Daewoo had to depend entirely on GM or 
GM's affiliates for key components and GM did not allow Daewoo to cut prices or to diversify its sources 
of technology transfer. Therefore, Daewoo had to bear the increased costs of imported parts when the yen 
and German mark strengthened. Thirdly, due to the delay of important decisions, Daewoo could not 
properly respond to changes in government policies and the management environment. Finally, Daewoo 
was obliged to pay management and technology consulting fees to GM even though they were joint 
venture partners (Kim Seong-Hun 1998: 169-170). 
103 As of 1995, it ranked as the 52nd largest multinational company as well as the biggest multinational 
company in developing nations in terms of assets. As of 1997, Daewoo was the third largest chaebol in 
Korea, with 290 affiliates. It owned 343 subsidiaries in 62 countries and 153 overseas branches. Daewoo 
group was dissolved after its bankruptcy in 1999 (Park 1999). 
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costs. Finally, Daewoo Motor was placed in a workout programme (a corporate 
restructuring programme established by the Korean government) and then was put in 
the hands of its creditors in August 1999.104 Subsequently, Daewoo Motor was treated 
as a public company since its main creditor, KDB, was a state-owned bank. The Korean 
government took an active role in dealing with Daewoo Motor, taking into consideration 
the impact of its difficulties on the industry and the economy. 
In August 1999, when it was under the workout programme, Daewoo began 
talks on a strategic alliance with OM with the aim of surviving on its own. However, the 
talks fell apart in November of the same year due to disagreements on the proposed 
acquisition price and debt write-off. This time, the government's intervention was 
indirect, as officials urged for an early agreement while Daewoo's management 
exercised autonomy to a significant extent. After the failure of the negotiations, the 
government's intervention became more substantial and the government and creditors 
nationalized Daewoo Motor through a debt-for-equity swap. 
In December 1999, OM notified the Korean government of its intention to buy 
Daewoo Motor for USD5.5 billion and Ford also announced its willingness to acquire 
the company. Therefore, the Korean government and creditors decided to open it to 
international bidding and set the deadline at the end of June 2000. OM, Ford, and 
Hyundai-DaimlerChrysler participated in the international bidding; Ford offered the 
highest price of USD7 billion while OM offered USD4 billion (Ahn 2003: 606). 
Although the government designated Ford as the preferred bidder, in September 2000, 
104 • b h K . The workout program refers to a corporate restructurrng program y t e ore an government smce 
2002 to select promising companies among troubled companies and assist in normalizing their business as 
well as restructuring. In exchange for benefits such as extension of maturity, interest cuts, and additional 
loans, the companies have to undergo harsh restructuring under the leadership of creditors. The 
importance of this program is in normalising the company and allowing creditors to collect debts, 
benefiting the entire national economy. 
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Ford suddenly withdrew its bid because of internal problems. 105 Although Hyundai 
Motor indicated its willingness to acquire Daewoo Motor, the government's response 
was negative because it had decided to sell Daewoo Motor to a foreign company. In 
October 2000, GM submitted their letter of intention (LOI) with a bid ofUSD1.2 billion, 
less than a third of the previously proposed price and one month later, Daewoo was 
bankrupt and was placed under court receivership.l06 After Daewoo's bankruptcy, GM 
suspended negotiations and refused to make its intentions clear, contrary to the 
government's wish for and early settlement and a quick decision from GM. In March 
2000, during his visit to the US, then President Kim Dae-Jung asked GM's chairman, 
John Smith, to acquire Daewoo and MOCIE announced that Daewoo Motor would look 
for another way to survive if GM did not confirm its willingness to buy the company by 
April. In May 2001, the board of GM made a decision to acquire Daewoo Motor and in 
September, the creditors of Daewoo and GM signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) and a contract for the sale of Daewoo. The amount invested by GM to acquire a 
controlling share of the company was just USD400 million, against assets estimated at 
more than USD 1 0 billion (Shin and Chang 2003: 105). 
Bargaining Power of the Korean Government 
As we have seen, the bargaining power of the Korean government had continuously 
decreased throughout the negotiation process with GM. Finally, the negotiations ended 
\05 In 2000, Ford had to recall substantial numbers of its pickup trucks and SUVs because of defects in 
the tyres, which were made by Firestone. Ford was also about to recall other vehicles which had defective 
i&,nitions (Lee Young-Myeon 2002: 49). 
I Court receivership is a legal process to normalize a company by coordinating the interests of creditors 
and shareholders under court supervision after freezing debt repayments. It is most effective when it is 
difficult to coordinate interests among parties. The disadvantage is that it damages the credibility of the 
company in question and prevents it from doing business normally for a considerable period of time. 
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under disadvantageous conditions from the government's perspective, with the outcome 
falling far short of original expectations. In terms of assets and technology, Daewoo 
Motor was sufficiently competitive for five domestic and foreign auto makers for the 
takeover when the Korean government opened up the international bidding. 
Nevertheless, Daewoo Motor was sold to GM for a disappointing amount; the reason 
for the decline in the Korean government's bargaining power was its high level of stakes 
and constraints. We will now examine the Korean government's bargaining power by 
applying N eo Bargaining Model to the case. 
Firstly, in terms of resources, Korean government had a relatively high level of 
resources in the negotiations with GM. In 1972, the time of GM's first entry into the 
Korean market, Korean GDP was USD 1 0 billion and the Korean economy was ranked 
33rd in the world. As the annual production and sales of vehicles was only 15,000 units, 
which were mostly assembled and manufactured on a KD basis, Korea was not 
attractive to carmakers as a production location or as a market (Kim Cheon-Wuk 2002: 
86). By 2000, however, Korea's economy had grown to be the 12th largest in the world 
with GOP of USD511 billion. Korea was the fifth-largest automaker with annual 
production of 3 million units, the second-biggest car consumer in Asia and the 8th-
largest consumer in the world (Lee Young-Myeon 2002: 65). Moreover, Korea now had 
appropriate infrastructure and related industries for automakers. The value chain was 
strong throughout the production processes, including design, manufacturing, sales, and 
distribution. Furthermore, all related industries had developed to an advanced leveL 
including machinery, chemistry, textile, electricity, and electronics. Obviously, Korea 
had advantages as a production base for multinational companies in terms of industrial 
infrastructure (Lee and lung 2001: 37). In the 2000s, Korea was not only an attractive 
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production base but also a big market for MNCs. 
GM had been interested in the Korean market even after the end of its 
relationship with Daewoo in 1992, as evidenced by GM's unsuccessful attempt to 
acquire Ssangyong in 1997.107 Firstly, GM's interest in the Korean market can be 
attributed to the size of the Korean market and, secondly, Korea could serve as a 
production platform for GM's advance into Asian markets which were growing rapidly. 
GM's target was to gain a 10 percent share of the Asian market, although it held only 
3.8 percent share at the end of 1990s. Even though GM had six regional offices in six 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region - including China, Taiwan, and Thailand - there 
were only two nations with production capacity of more than 100,000 units and, in 2000, 
Daewoo's production capacity was more than one million units. Therefore, investment 
in the Korean market satisfied GM's motivations of both production and consumption. 
Korea was rich with resources in the automobile industry (Lee Young-Myeon 2002: 64) 
and, therefore, the level of relative resources of the Korean government can be said to 
have been high during the second round of bargaining ,with GM. 
Secondly, in terms of stake, the commitment level of the Korean government 
was high due to the lack of alternatives. The government's insistence on selling Daewoo 
Motor to a foreign multinational company increased its level of commitment to those 
companies. Since he took office, President Kim Dae-Jung had tried to attract foreign 
investment; wanting to settle the situation with Daewoo Motor by attracting MNC 
investment, on two occasions he asked GM's chairman to acquire Daewoo Motor. in 
June 1998 and March 2000. His efforts at sales diplomacy aimed to salvage the Korean 
economy after the financial crisis; hence, it was no exaggeration to say that the success 
107 Ssangyong Motor was merged with Daewoo in 1998. 
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of President Kim's diplomacy depended on the sale of Daewoo Motor to GM. It was 
almost impossible for those within the government to propose another option for 
Daewoo Motor because of the President's determination to sell Daewoo Motor to a 
foreign company (Cho 2001b: 151). Although there were some groups - including 
MOCIE and the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) - that 
advocated an interventionist industrial policy and criticized the sale of Daewoo to a 
foreign company, the government did not accept their suggestions. 108 Rather, the 
Minister of MOCIE, Kim Young-Ho, and the head ofKIET, Lee Sun - both of whom 
had advocated nationalizing Daewoo - had to step down from their positions. 
In the meantime, the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (MOFE), and the Korea Development Bank (KDB), all of whom 
opposed the industrial policy approach, took the initiative in dealing with Daewoo 
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Motor. Their argument was based on the prediction that only the five major auto makers 
would survive in the world car market, creating an oligopoly system, and so it was only 
a matter before Daewoo was sold to a foreign automaker, as Daewoo could not survive 
on its own. Therefore, they argued that trying to save Daewoo through nationalization 
was meaningless and that selling Daewoo to one of the MNCs was the best solution for 
the Korean automobile industry (Cho 2001b: 131-132). Industrial policy groups were 
alienated as the sale of Daewoo Motor to a foreign MNC. This development was the 
opposite to the situation seen with the above-mentioned cases of KPCC and Shinjin 
Motor. During the SOM period, the high level of commitment to the capital and 
technology of MNCs was offset by the govemmenfs industrial policies. However, 
\08 Traditionally, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and Korea Development Institute (KDI) 
took a liberal stand, opposing industrial policy while MOCIE and KIET were proponents of industrial 
policy, advocating mercantilism. 
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during the MOS period, the level of commitment to MNCs was higher because of the 
abandonment of industrial policy, even though the level of dependence on MNCs' 
capital and technology was low. 
The government decreased its bargaining power by exhausting these alternatives. 
The industrial policy group within the government recommended temporarily 
nationalizing Daewoo Motor for the sake of the long-term interests of the domestic 
automobile industry. MOCIE and KIET also maintained that Daewoo could be 
normalized through the settlement of bad debts by giving KDB, the main creditor, the 
large stake in the company through a debt-for-equity swap, a practice that was not 
uncommon when the government liquidated debt-ridden companies. In 1976, when 
GMK (the predecessor of Daewoo Motor) was in financial trouble, the government sold 
it off after taking over GMK's management control for a while by transferring Shinjin 
Motors' share in GMK to KDB. This time, however, this option did not gain support 
within the government. The other option was to sell Daewoo Motor to one of the 
domestic automakers; although Hyundai Motor had a strong interest in acquiring 
Daewoo at the time, the government did not approve the sale. The government's 
rationale was that Hyundai's monopoly in the domestic automobile market would be 
reinforced because it had already acquired Kia Motors, one of the major carmakers in 
Korea. I09 Although the government itself had eliminated some of the available 
alternatives, it still had various options, such as GM, Ford, and Hyundai-
DaimlerChrysler, when it opened the international bidding for Daewoo Motor. 11 0 The 
government appointed Ford as the sole preferred bidder, but Ford withdrew from the 
109 The monopoly logic ran counter to the previous governments' monopolisation policy for the 
automobile industry, which was intended to limit competition and realize economies of scale. 
110 Hyundai Motor formed a consortium with DaimlerChrysler when the government opposed its sole bid. 
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bidding. Even after Ford withdrew, the government continued to oppose Hyundai's 
acquisition, citing a possible monopoly in the domestic market as the major reason. 
Thus, GM became the only option left because the government had already set the 
principle that Daewoo Motor should be sold to a multinational company. 111 In this way, 
neither nationalization nor domestic automakers were viable options for the government, 
and only foreign MNCs were considered possible. When Ford withdrew, the 
government's bargaining power shrank drastically, leaving GM as the sole option. 
Thirdly, in terms of constraints, the level of both internal and external constraints 
of the Korean government was high. In terms of external constraints, after the 1997 
crisis the Korean economy had faced tremendous external pressure under the IMF 
restructuring programmes. Furthermore, there had been increasing pressure from the US 
government regarding the trade imbalance in the automobile industry. The US 
government had complained that Korea imported far fewer cars than it exported 112 and 
urged the Korean government to provide favourable conditions for the import of 
American vehicles. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) invoked trade 
restrictions in October 1997, citing Korea's import barriers to American vehicles (Cho 
2001b: 146). The conflict was mitigated in October 1998 when Korea and the United 
States reached agreement in the Korea-US Automotive Talks. 113 Even after that, the 
III The government's detennination to sell Daewoo to a foreign finn is confmned by the fact that it 
designated Ford as the sole preferred bidder. Generally speaking, it is more common to designate multiple 
preferred bidders in order to secure favourable conditions and to prepare for a possible withdrawal by one 
of the parties. Nevertheless, the government designated Ford as a single preferred bidder, which was 
enough to raise the suspicion that the government would not give an opportunity to Hyundai-
DaimlerChrysler, who offered better conditions than GM (Cho 2003: 85). 
112 In the US auto market, sales of Korean automobiles continued to increase from 1.43 percent in 1995 
to 1.58 percent in 1996, and to 1.8 percent in 1997. On the other hand, US automakers held only a 0.2-0.3 
~ercent share of the Korean market (Ahn 2003: 512-513). 
13 In the Korea-US Automotive Talks in October 1998, the two nations agreed to reduce the automobile 
tax which was graded according to engine displacements in Korea, to maintain the current level of 
customs duties at 8 percent, and to cut the excise tax by 30 percent. As a result, the price gap between 
domestic and imported vehicles with an engine displacement of 2000cc narrowed from 12.5 percent to 
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USTR and American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) continued to put pressure on 
Korea, with AMCHAM insisting that the tariff on imported cars should be lowered from 
the current 8 percent to 2.5 percent and asking the Korean government to help alleviate 
the public's antipathy toward imported cars. The US pressure on automobile trade acted 
as an indirect pressure on the settlement of Daewoo Motor, which the Korean 
government saw as a way of escaping from US pressure (Cho 2001 b: 148). 
Internally, there were too many negotiating parties, changing too many times, 
regardless of each of their capabilities. Although KDB was the main party in the 
negotiations, representing the entire group of creditors, other parties such as the 
Presidential Office, MOFE, FSS, and the negotiation task force of Daewoo Motor also 
participated, because of the possible effects on the national economy and because public 
funds that had been channelled into Daewoo. To make matters worse, there was no 
single coordinator on Korea's side who was responsible for the negotiations; the Korean 
coordinator in the negotiations changed six times: Lee Hyun-Jae, head of the FSS; Lee 
Keun-Young, president of KDB; Oh Ho-Keun, president of the Daewoo Restructuring 
Association; Eom Nak-Yong, president of KDB; Jeong Keun-Yong, president of KDB; 
and Lee Jong-Dae, chairman of Daewoo Motor. A consistent policy could not be 
expected to emerge under these circumstances. In contrast, Allen Periton, head of GM 
Asia-Pacific, had represented GM throughout the whole negotiation process; Periton, 
who had been sent to Korea as a missionary in 1965 and was an expatriate executive in 
Saehan Motor (the predecessor of Daewoo Motor), knew Korea and the Koreans very 
well (Ahn 2003). 
11.7 percent. The Korean government applied higher taxes on large size vehicles, which was an obstacle 
to US carmakers which had a competitive edge in large size models (Cho 2001 b: 146). 
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Another factor contributing to the deterioration of the Korean government's 
bargaining power was internal resistance, the strongest of which was Daewoo's labour 
union. From the beginning, Daewoo's union opposed the sale of their company to a 
foreign company and, even after the deal was struck, the union continued to strike, 
opposing restructuring schemes that included layoffs. The union's resistance to the sale 
and restructuring weakened the bargaining power of the government and GM's desire 
for acquisition. Moreover, local sentiment in the Incheon area, where Daewoo's main 
factory was located, was against the sale of Daewoo to GM because of the fear of mass 
layoffs and negative effects on the regional economy after the acquisition. Protesters set 
up various organizations and local lawmakers joined forces with them, intervening in 
the negotiation process in various ways. There was little consensus even within the 
government on the settlement of Daewoo. MOFE and the FSS considered that the best 
solution was to sell Daewoo Motor to a foreign company as quickly as possible. On the 
contrary, MOCIE was negative about the sale of Daewoo overseas, insisting on the 
possibility of reviving Daewoo without selling it (Ahn 2003: 612-613). The main 
bargaining body had to cope with two separate negotiations, bargaining with GM while 
seeking to persuade the opposing camps at home. Thus, it was natural that the Korean 
government's bargaining power decreased during the course of negotiation. 
Applying the Neo Bargaining Model to the GM-Daewoo Motor case, the Korean 
government's bargaining power can be illustrated by the table and figure below. Despite 
plentiful resources, the Korean government failed to secure favourable conditions for 
the negotiations and completed the bargaining process with outcomes that were far from 
satisfactory. This can be attributed to the high level of stakes and constraints on the 
Korean government. Putting these three dimensions together, we now place the position 
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of the bargaining power of the Korean government in the cube of the N eo Bargaining 
Model. As the figure indicates, the bargaining power of the government in this case is 
located closer to point W (weakest point) than point S (strongest point). Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the Korean government's bargaining power was relatively weak 
in the case ofGM-Daewoo. 
Table 4.6 Korean Government's Bargaining Power: GM-Daewoo case 
Dimensions Level of Each Dimensions Level of Bargaining Power 
Relative Resources High 
Relative Stake Commitment High High 
Alternatives Low High 
Relative External High High 
Constraints Internal High 
Figure 4.3 The Position of Korean government's Bargaining Power: GM-Daewoo case 
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3. Conclusion 
This chapter comprised a statistical analysis of foreign-invested fInns in Korea and 
three case studies on the bargaining power of the government, both of which strengthen 
the arguments made in Chapter Three. The statistical analysis demonstrated the decline 
of the government's bargaining power and the case studies showed the how the three 
elements of the Neo Bargaining Model - resources, stakes, and constraints -
influenced the changes in the bargaining power of the Korean government. The 
arguments made in the previous chapter were generalised by the statistical analysis and 
specified by the case studies. 
In particular, this chapter clearly showed how the differences in the approach 
adopted by the government had in dealing with multinationals in the SOM 
(developmental state) period and the MOS (neo-liberal dominated state) period. This 
different attitude toward foreign investment had contrasting consequences in tenns of 
the stakes and constraints dimensions of the NBM. In the SOM period, the state had 
firm industrial policies, to which FDI policy was subordinated. KPCC's joint venture 
with Dow Chemical was a project arising from the 1966 'Petrochemicals Industry 
Development Plan', and Shinjin's partnership with GM was made under the 1969 
'Blueprint for Fostering the Automobile Industry'. When foreign companies entered 
Korea, they were required to follow the government's industrial policy, which was 
applied to foreign capital as well as domestic capital. The government's commitment to 
FDI was lower in this period because the government gave a higher priority to industrial 
policy considerations than FDI policy. These industrial policies also created alternatives 
to reliance on foreign companies by building competitive domestic companies, which 
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eventually could check the domination of foreign companies, as the case of Hyundai 
Motors showed. Therefore, the government's stake could be reduced by the industrial 
policies of the developmental state. 
In contrast, in the MOS period, the government was only concerned about 
coping with the crisis situation, disregarding the previous long-term strategies for 
domestic industry. This abandonment of industrial policy prompted the government to 
increase its level of stakes. In the MOS period, the industrial policy argument lost 
favour while neo-liberal beliefs were dominant in the government; in fact, the term 
'industrial policy' was almost forgotten and FDI policy received a new emphasis in the 
government. The attempt to transfer the management of Daewoo Motor to domestic 
capital was discouraged because foreign companies were perceived as the cure for an 
ailing industry while the chaebol had fallen from grace. The pursuit of foreign capital 
heightened the commitment of the government and diminished domestic alternative 
options, resulting in high stakes in FDI during the MOS period. 
In terms of the constraints aspect, government capacity in the SOM period -
both in terms of controlling social pressure groups and managing a competent 
bargaining agency - enhanced its bargaining power, which, in tum, reduced internal 
constraints. Many cases in the automobile industry showed the impact of strong 
government initiatives in promoting the industry'S development; the government set 
targets (such as the development of a local vehicle model) and, in order to motivate 
companies to achieve these targets, the government penalised poor performers (as in the 
case of Asia Motors) and rewarded good ones (as in the case of Hyundai Motors) 
(Amsden 1989: 15). The government's powerful grip on the domestic industry enabled 
the state have strong bargaining power. In the petrochemicals industry, the government 
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led not only the planning process but also negotiations with foreign firms, during which 
the government generated artificial competitiveness through the removal of 
disadvantages and the creation of advantages, as the Dow Chemical-KPCC case showed. 
However, in the MOS period, the government faced not only strong external 
pressures but also a high level of internal restraints. The government could not 
effectively control groups that opposed or resisted its policies: the labour union at 
Daewoo Motors persisted in its strike action even during the process of bargaining. 
Within the government and National Assembly, officials were split into different 
factions, making it difficult to form consistent and firm government bargaining policy. 
Moreover, the bargaining agencies also drifted toward weaker powers in the cases of 
GM-Daewoo. 
The difference In the bargaining power between the two periods produced 
contrasting consequences. In the SOM period cases - Dow Chemical-KPCC and GM-
Shinjin - both companies left the country and the assets they left behind were 
transferred to the emerging chaebol. The shares that had belonged to Dow Chemical and 
GM were taken over by the Korea Explosive Group in 1982 and Daewoo Motors in 
1992, respectively. In contrast, Daewoo Motors - which had grown under the 
protection of the state and which were sustained by substantial amounts of public 
funding after their collapse - transferred their ownership to foreign concerns. Strong 
bargaining power led to increased domestic capital, but weak bargaining power allowed 
domestic capital to flow out of the country. 
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Chapter Five: Bargaining Outcomes 
Chapter Three examined how the Korean government's bargaining power has changed 
and what factors have affected that power shift and in Chapter Four, the arguments in 
Chapter Three were illustrated by case studies and statistical analysis. This chapter will 
analyse the consequences of this change in bargaining relations. The strengths and 
weaknesses of bargaining power, of course, affect bargaining outcomes; when the 
bargaining power of the host government is strong, bargaining outcomes are likely to be 
favourable to the host country. However, when its bargaining power is weak, bargaining 
outcomes tend to be more beneficial to foreign firms. This chapter will identify the legal 
consequences of the changes in host country bargaining power in Korea. 
Bargaining power relations impact on the host country FDI legal structures, 
which regulate the activities of foreign companies. The legal system, in turn, affects the 
inflow ofFDI, which eventually produces an economic effect in the host country. In this 
chapter, we first examine how bargaining power has affected Korean FDI legal 
structures. 
1. FDI Laws and the Bargaining Outcomes 
Bargaining outcomes are the result of bargaining between the host government and 
MNCs· in this thesis FDI laws are considered to be the one of the bargaining outcomes. , , 
The host government, in attracting foreign firms, wants to obtain MNC assets such as 
capital and technology, while MNCs aim to realize their profits by expanding their 
markets and exploiting factor endowments in host countries. Such conflicting goals 
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between two parties are coordinated through the bargaining process, from which the 
bargaining outcomes will emerge. 
FDI laws, which regulate the entry and operations of foreign companies, are 
regarded as bargaining outcomes because such laws result from the bargaining between 
a host government, and MNCs and the forces behind them such as home countries and 
supranational institutions. This study has assumed that the government negotiated with 
MNCs when they entered or operated in the host country, an assumption that is abstract 
rather than practical. In practice, the government rarely negotiates with potential 
investors at the table except in certain special cases. The reality is that the government 
sets rules regulating foreign companies' inward investments and applies them 
unilaterally. However, the relative power of the state and MNCs is reflected in the 
process of establishing FDI rules. The power of MNCs or home countries and the 
strength of the host economy affect the fonnulation and implementation of a host 
country's FDI laws directly or indirectly, as does the relative strength in bargaining 
power of the host country and MNC. In this respect, FDI laws are regarded as part of 
the creation of the host country's 'circumstances', which is a passive interpretation of 
FDI laws. 
On the other hand, the laws also have proactive aspects. That is, the laws 
embody the government's intentions and desire to attempt to introduce changes into an 
existing situation. Therefore, FDI laws include both proactive and passive aspects. The 
proactive aspects represent what the government wants from MNCs and how it tries to 
achieve its goals, while the passive aspects reveal the circumstances of the state in 
relation to MNCs. Accordingly, FDI laws can be seen as the reflection of both internal 
goals and capacities and external conditions and environments. In other words, the FDI 
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laws are the outcome of the interaction between a host government and external forces. 
In this section, we will first briefly review how Korean FDI laws changed from 1960 to 
2005 and demonstrate how the FDI laws are formed by the interactions between the 
host government and external forces. The second section will compare FDI law in both 
the SOM and MOS periods to calculate the consequences of bargaining power strengths 
and weakness in those periods. By this analysis, we will demonstrate how bargaining 
outcomes are affected by the bargaining power of the state: strong bargaining power 
tends to produce favourable outcomes to the host country whereas weak bargaining 
power is likely to result in detrimental effects on the economy. 
2. Overview ofFDI Laws in Korea 
Korea's principal FDI laws have developed from the Foreign Capital Inducement 
Promotion Act (FCIPA) in 1960; to the Foreign Capital Inducement Law (FCIL) in 
1966; to the Foreign Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FIFCIA) in 1997; 
and to the Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) in 1998. This section will review 
how these laws have shifted and what factors have caused these changes. 
The first FDI legislation was the Foreign Capital Inducement Promotion Act 
(FCIPA), which was enacted on January 1, 1960. This law was later replaced by the 
Foreign Capital Inducement Law (FCIL) on August 3, 1966, which remained in force 
for 31 years from 1966 to 1997, with two major revisions in 1973 and 1983. The FCIL 
was replaced by the Foreign Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FIFCA) 
in 1997 and the FIFCA was in tum abolished in September, 1998, less than two years 
after its implementation. The Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) was passed on 
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September 16, 1998; although the FIPA had undergone three partial revisions by 2005, 
none of these revisions had any real effect on the main framework of the 1998 law. 
Table 5.1 Changes in the Laws on FDI 
Foreign Capital Inducement Promotion Act (FCIPA) 
• Enactment: 1 January 1960 
• Partial revisions (3): 7 August 1961, 1 December 1961,16 December 1963 
• Abolition: 3 August 1966 
Foreign Capital Inducement Law (FCIL) 
• Enactment: 3 August 1966 
• Complete revisions (2): 12 March 1973, 31 December 1983 
• Partial revisions (4): 14 January 1991, 8 December 1992, 10 December 1993, 
22 December 1994 
• Abolition: 13 December 1997 
Foreign Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FIFCIA) 
• Enactment: 13 December 1997 
• Partial revisions (2): 24 February 1998, 25 May 1998 
• Abolition: 16 September 1998 
Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) 
• Enactment: 16 September 1998 
• Partial revisions (3): 29 December 2000, 31 December 2003, 31 December 
2004 
Source: Yoon et al. 2005 
Laws regulating FDI have changed incrementally through many revisions since 
the legislation of the FCIPA in 1960. Significant changes in Korean FDI laws are as 
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follows: the enactment of the FCIPA in 1960; the enactment of the FCIL in 1966; 
complete revisions of the FCIL in 1973 and 1983; partial revisions of the FCIL in 1991 
and 1992; the enactment of the FIFCIA in 1997; and the enactment of the FIPA in 1998. 
These changes were coupled with important changes in government FDI policy and 
bargaining power. 
The dire need for foreign capital in the early stages of economic development 
and industrialisation necessitated the establishment of the FCIPA in 1960 and the FCIL 
in 1966. The complete revision of the FCIL in 1973 was triggered by changes in 
international relations in north-east Asia and their impact on domestic. While the 
revision in 1983 was the result of liberal reform within the government after the 
economic crisis at the end of the 1970s, the revisions in 1991 and 1992 were prompted 
by trade pressure from the US government. The enactment of the FIFCIA in 1997 was a 
product of Korea's joining the OECD and the enactment of the FIPA in 1998 was the 
result of pressure from the IMF after the 1997 financial crisis, coupled with the neo-
liberal stance of the Kim Dae-Jung administration. According to the periodisation of this 
thesis, these changes can be grouped as follows: 
State over Market phase 
• The enactment of the FCIPA in 1960 
• The enactment of the FCIL in 1966 
• The complete revision of the FCIL in 1973 
Transition phase 
• The complete revision of the FCIL in 1983 
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• The partial revisions of the FCIL in 1991 and 1992 
• The enactment of the FIFCIA in 1997 
Market over State phase 
• The enactment of the FIPA in 1998 
State over Market Phase (1962-1979) 
As we have discussed above, in the SaM period, the Korean government was able to 
maintain relatively strong bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs. The strong bargaining 
power in this period was manifested in the restrictive FDI laws of the 1960s and 1970s. 
The SaM phase can be divided into two periods: from 1962 to 1971 and from 1972 to 
1979; in the first period, government FDI policy was relatively open and friendly 
towards foreign companies. The two laws, the 1960 FCIPA and the 1966 FCIL, show 
the investment-friendly atmosphere of the 1960s. However, from the early 1970s, the 
government began to show a more restrictive attitude, which was reflected in the total 
revision of the FCIL in 1973. Despite this difference between the laws of the 1960s and 
of the 1970s, throughout the period, the government screened every foreign company 
entry through a complicated approval process and subjected them to demanding criteria. 
Following the review of changes to FDI legislation presented in the first part of this 
chapter, we will examine more thoroughly the FDI laws in the SaM and MaS periods, 
comparing the rights and duties of foreign companies in the those periods. 
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Enactment of the Foreign Capital Inducement Promotion Act in 1960 
The first legislation relating to inward FDI was the FCIPA, enacted on January 1, 1960. 
From Korea's liberation from Japanese occupation in 1945 to the late 1950s, foreign aid 
was virtually the sole source of foreign capital. However, as foreign aid began to decline 
in the late 1950s, the government had to secure other sources of foreign capital to 
sustain the economy. This urgent need prompted the government to enact the FCIPA 
(Gang 1995: 41); the main purpose of the new legislation was to attract foreign capital, 
regardless of its form. Therefore, the law did not only target FDI but all sources of 
foreign capital, including foreign borrowing, as suggested by the name of the law - the 
Foreign Capital Inducement Promotion Act. FDI was treated as just one among several 
sources of foreign capital. 
As the aim of the law was to attract foreign capital, the law~s articles were 
favourable to foreign companies and included the national treatment of foreign investors, 
the guaranteed repatriation of profits, and the granting of tax relief. 114 However, despite 
its apparent purpose of attracting foreign capital, the law also stipulated a number of 
unfavourable regulations for foreign investors, such as the imposition of certain 
restrictions on profit repatriation, the forced requisition and confiscation of foreign 
companies, and the mandatory hiring of nationals. Moreover, the law specified its 
application only to 'citizens of nations that (had) signed a treaty of commerce and 
navigation with Korea as of 1960'. Since the US was the only nation that had signed 
such a treaty with Korea at that time, the law, in fact, was aimed at investment from the 
US (Yoon ef al. 2005: 33). 
114 Article 1 (the aims of the law) of the 1960 law specified the attraction, promotion and protection of 
new foreign capital for the development of manufacturing, mining, agriculture, forestry and fishing 
industries in order to stabilize the economy and improve the living standards of the nation. 
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Enactment of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law in 1966 
The FCIPA, which was abolished on August 3, 1966, was succeeded by the FCIL. 
Although the 1966 law removed the word 'promotion' from the title of the law, it 
basically aimed to promote the attraction of foreign capital (principally foreign loans), 
which was the major source of funding for the export-oriented industrialization of the 
1960s. The 1966 law also had another purpose: to attract investment from Japan 
following the normalisation of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965 (Bishop 1997: 
75). Moreover, the law made the foreign capital inducement system more effective by 
incorporating two special laws of the previous FCIPA: the 'Law for Payment Guarantee 
of Foreign Borrowing' and the 'Special Law for Facilitating Capital Equipment Imports 
on a Long-term Deferred Payment Basis' .115 However, the law was also formulated in 
such a way as to prevent the domination of foreign capital; in Article 1, which stipulated 
the purpose of the law, 'economic independence' was accentuated as the first word of 
the first sentence, demonstrating both the Korean government's determination to attract 
foreign capital and its resolve to accept foreign money only to the extent that economic 
independence was not compromised. 116 This provision provided the basis for 
restricting the activities of foreign companies in order to preserve Korea's economic 
independence. 
Compared with the FCIPA, the FCIL of 1966 was more lenient towards FDI; it 
not only provided for the protection of foreign investment by specifying investment 
115 The 'Law for Payment Guarantee of Foreign Borrowing' was established to provide government 
guarantees for firms' loans from international financial institutions in 1962. The 'Special Law for 
Facilitating Capital Equipment Imports on a Long-term Deferred Payment Basis' was enacted to assist 
Korean manufacturers by allowing them to import capital equipment under favourable conditions in 1963 
(Sakong 1993: 102-103). 
116 Article 1 (the aims of the law) of the 1966 law made it clear that the law aimed to attract, protect, 
utilize and manage foreign capital in order to achieve economic independence, economic development 
and a favourable international balance of payments situation. 
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guarantees, tax relief, equal treatment with nationals and repatriation of gains, but also 
lessened the risks associated with foreign investment in Korea by removing stipulations 
in the 1960 law such as the mandatory employment of nationals, war-time conscription, 
forced confiscation of assets and limited repatriation of profits. Yet the 1966 FCIL still 
demanded a strict screening process by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) for entry to 
Korea. The EPB, in consultation with private enterprises, screened every project and 
granted approval only on the basis of whether the projects were essential for national 
industrialization and the boosting of exports (Bishop 1997: 33). 
Complete Revision of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law in 1973 
Controls on foreign capital were tightened by the overhaul of the FCIL in 1973; on 
March 2, the Korean government established the 'General Guidelines on Foreign 
Investment (GGFI)' and, later that month, undertook a complete revision of the FCIL in 
order to reinforce the regulations relating to foreign investment. The state's strong 
determination to control foreign capital in the SOM period was expressed in the revision 
of the FCIL and GGFI in 1973. Two major reasons underpinned this change in the 
government's attitude to FDI: the rapid changes in the Northeast Asian international 
situation and the sudden increase in Japanese investment in the early 1970s. 117 
The 1973 and the 1966 laws are quite similar except for the creation of punitive 
provisions relating to foreign investment companies in the 1973 law. While the 1966 
law did not stipulate any strong penalties for foreign companies, the 1973 law added 
punitive provisions that allowed the government to revoke licenses when foreign 
investment companies failed to meet the requirements attached to their license. 
117 For a more detailed discussion of the background of the shift in government FDI policy in the early 
1970s, see Chapter Three. 
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Although the changes made in the 1973 law were not seemingly major, significant 
changes were made with the creation of a subordinate regulation of the law - the GGFI. 
Although the GGFI was originally intended as merely an internal guideline for the EPB. 
since the EPB was not only in charge of the screening of foreign entries in the SOM 
period but also responsible for the entire economy as a pilot agency, in practice the 
GGFI served as an essential guideline for FDI (Lee 1995: 188). 
From 1973, the GGFI tightened the criteria governing approvals for foreign 
investment and in fact, after 1973, the GGFI had more impact on foreign investment 
policy than the FCIL. The GGFI provided detailed guidelines on the EPB's approval of 
FDI, specifying the businesses open to FDI, the acceptable size of investment, and the 
foreign ownership ratio. Under the guidelines, the Korean government did not allow any 
investment in Korea that might cause competition with local companies, either in the 
Korean or in international markets. Even in areas that were open to foreign investment, 
various strict performance requirements were applied, along with limitations on foreign 
ownership. Following the revision of the legislation in 1973, the Korean government 
accelerated its control and management of FDI, and this control peaked between 1973 
and 1979 (Stoever 2002: 56). The characteristics of the 1973 law and the GGFI will be 
discussed in detail in the latter part of this section. 
In summary, the basic laws on FDI in the SOM period - the FCIPL in 1960, the 
FCIL in 1966 and the FCIL in 1973 - all focused on the control and management of 
foreign investment. These laws treated FDI in the same way as foreign loans, regarding 
FDI as one source of foreign capital. That is, the government took an interest only in the 
capital transfer effect of FDI. In the 1960s and 1970s, when domestic savings were in 
seriously short supply, overseas savings or foreign capital were indispensable as a 
229 
source of funding to boost domestic investment. This desperate need for foreign capital 
provoked the government to focus its attention on the capital transfer effect of FDI. As 
the government was concerned about the erosion of its economic autonomy and the 
possible domination of the domestic economy by foreign companies, it was interested 
only in capital transfer and it was reasonable that it would prefer foreign loans to FDI. 
The Korean government was in desperate need of foreign capital, but felt less of a need 
to attract FD I. 
Transition Phase (1980-1997) 
The 18 years from 1980 to 1997 were a transitional period from the SOM period, when 
the state dominated the market in the 1960s and 1970s, to the MOS period when the 
market dominated the state after 1998. Therefore, FDI laws in this period also took on a 
transitional pattern. During this time, the government did not control FDI as strongly as 
in the SOM period, yet FDI was not fully liberalized, either. FDI laws in this time were 
characterised as being somewhere between strong regulation and complete openness. In 
the transition period, the principal motivations for change in the Korean FDI system 
came from external pressures. The important changes in FDI laws in this period - the 
revisions in 1983, the revisions in 1991 and 1992, and the enactment of the FIFCIA in 
1997 - show how the Korean FDI regimes had shifted to accommodate changes in 
external circumstances. 
Complete Revision of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law in 1983 
The 1973 FCIL was radically changed in 1983 and three major factors were responsible 
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for the overhaul of this legislation. First, as a direct cause, the World Bank exerted 
pressure on the Korean government to change its foreign investment regulations. Since 
the end of the 1970s, Korea had suffered from a huge balance of payments deficit and 
had received structural adjustment loans from the World Bank twice in December 1981 
and again in November 1983. The bank, in return for its loan, demanded that the Korean 
government restructure its economy, and one result was a revision of foreign investment 
policy (Gang 1995: 53-54). The second factor was Korea's high levels of debt; in the 
1980s, Korea was burdened with heavy debt, ranking as the fourth largest debtor in the 
world in the first half of 1980s (MOF 1991 b: 15). This problem, a consequence of a high 
reliance on foreign loans for the promotion of heavy and chemical industries in the 
1970s, was regarded as more serious in light of the debt crisis in Latin America at that 
time. The Korean government became more cautious about raising foreign loans and 
began to consider FDI as an alternative source of foreign capital. Thirdly, bureaucrats 
who supported neo-liberal prescriptions for the Korean economy began to emerge in the 
early 1980s. Valuing stabilisation over growth and preferring market principles to 
intervention measures (Amsden 1994), they wanted to apply their belief to the FDI laws. 
The revision of the law in 1983 was the consequence of these external and internal 
pressures. 
The complete revision of the FCIL on December 31, 1983, was a turning point 
for foreign investment policy in Korea. First, the 1983 law removed the reference to the 
goal of 'economic independence' from Article 1 (the aims of the law), which had been 
prescribed since the 1966 FCIL and which had served as a basic provision for regulating 
the entry and operations of foreign businesses. The previous laws (enacted in 1966 and 
1973) specified the aim of seeking the promotion of foreign investment only to the 
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extent it did not hurt economic independence. This goal, which had served as a restraint 
on inward FDI since 1966, was removed under the 1983 law. 
Table 5.2 FDI Liberalization Ratio 1981-1987 (Unit: %) 
Jul 1981 Oct 1982 Jul1984 Sep 1985 Apr 1987 
Total 49.9 60.9 66.1 76.3 78.9 
Manufacturing 80.0 80.0 86.0 92.5 97.5 
Service 21.6 47.2 60.8 60.8 
Primary 12.5 12.5 20.0 20.0 
Note: FDI liberalization ratio denotes the number of the businesses open to FDI divided 
by the number of total businesses. 
Source: MOF 1991a: 13 
Secondly, the 1983 law dramatically expanded the number of businesses open 
to FDI. The previous laws had adopted a 'positive system' under which businesses open 
to foreign investment were listed and all other businesses were prohibited. However, the 
1983 FCIL adopted a 'negative system' whereby prohibited businesses were listed and 
the rest were open for foreign investment, significantly broadening the gateway to 
foreign investment. The 1983 law expanded the extent of business open to foreign 
investment by pennitting all FDI activity except for in some businesses prohibited 
under the FCIL and its subordinate laws. lIS As a result, the ratio of openness to FDI 
rose from 49.9 percent in 1981 to 66.1 percent in 1984 and again to 79.4 percent in 
1991 (see Table 5.2). Moreover, the government simplified the approval processes for 
118 Areas in which foreign investment was prohibited under Article 9 of the 1983 law were: (1) public 
businesses run by public corporations (water supply and sewage, postal, telegram and telephone services, 
railroads and transportation, tobacco and red ginseng production; (2) businesses harming national health 
or the environment (such as industries that cause pollution); (3) businesses harmful to public morals 
(including casinos); and (4) other businesses designated by presidential ordinances (newspaper 
publication, radio and broadcasting, crops and grains production and so forth). 
232 
b · 119 d h some uSlnesses an t e remmrung restrictions on repatriation of profits were 
1·· d 120 e Immate . 
Revisions of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law in 1991 and 1992 
The Korean economy was booming in the late 1980s; between 1986 and 1988, the 
annual economic growth rate stood at 11 percent, and the country recorded a substantial 
current account surplus (see Tables A and B). Of particular note was the huge surplus 
that Korean enjoyed in its trade with the US in 1987. During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
US government had maintained a supportive attitude toward Korea out of political 
considerations, granting generous assistance and tolerating the protectionist policy of 
the Korean government. Yet, from the late 1980s, with the end of the Cold War and the 
rapid economic growth of Korea, and as the US suffered large trade deficits, the US 
government began to put pressure on Korea to open its capital markets and service 
sector as a means of rectifying the trade imbalance (Gang 2002: 141). Korea and the US 
started talks to solve these trade conflicts in early 1989 and came to an agreement in 
May 20 1989. 121 
Although the Korea-US trade talks in 1989 dealt with a wide range of issues 
119 As in the previous law, the 1983 law required Ministry of Finance (MOF) approval for all foreign 
investments (The MOF was responsible for inward FDI from 1981 to 1997). Yet, for small businesses that 
had low levels of foreign ownership and that were not eligible for incentives, the approval process was 
minimized to give automatic approval. 
120 The 1966 law and 1973 laws stipulated that foreign investors were allowed to remit funds invested at 
least two years after the initial investment and the authorities could restrict the remission depending on 
the foreign currency circumstances of the country. The 1983 law ensured free remission of funds by 
foreign investors by eliminating these restrictive provisions. 
121 The US, suffering from the accumulated trade deficit in the 1980s, passed the Omnibus Trade and 
Comprehensive Act of 1988 in August of that year. The act of 1988 instituted the Super 301 provision by 
which the US government could designate a priority foreign county which was suspected of causing a 
trade imbalance by unfair trade practices. It also granted the right to impose trade retaliation such as 
retaliatory customs when negotiations to ease the imbalance failed. It was a temporary clause used from 
1989 to 1991 and abolished in the Bush Administration. In 1988, Korea along with Japan, Taiwan, India 
and Brazil were among the candidates, but avoided the designation as a result of successful trade talks in 
May of 1988 (Kim 1989: 6) 
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concerning the Korean government's trade policy, the greatest focus was on the Korean 
government's FDl policy, and this led to significant changes in FDl policy (Kim 1989: 
6-7). The major agreements on this issue were as follows: firstly, from 1991, the Korean 
government would gradually adopt a notification system for the entry of FDl, and after 
1993, the notification system would be generally applied. 122 Secondly, the government 
would not impose performance requirements when it approved the entry of foreign 
companies and it would also eliminate the existing performance requirements for 
foreign-invested companies. Thirdly, the government would open sectors including 
wholesale cosmetics, wholesale pharmaceuticals and manufacturing, advertisement 
agencies and travel agencies to foreign investment. Finally, foreign-invested companies 
would be given the same treatment as nationals in terms of the acquisition or 
development of land (MOF 1991a: 14). 
The agreements of the Korea-US trade talks were implemented one by one. First, 
the FClL was revised to adopt the notification system in 1991 and 1992. The revisions 
of the law in 1991 and 1992 enabled foreign companies to invest in Korea by merely 
notifying the Korean government of their investment. Thus MNCs no longer needed to 
request the approval of the authorities to invest in Korea. Conversely, with the adoption 
of the notification system, the government lost its power to screen FDI. Second, the 
Korean government removed all performance requirements on foreign-invested 
companies such as export quotas, technology transfers, local sourcing and access to 
export markets from January 1, 1990 (Kim et al. 2002: 102). Third. the Korean 
government gradually liberalised the service sector investment in the domestic market 
opening up wholesale medication (July, 1989), wholesale cosmetics (July, 1990), travel 
122 The notification system for the entry of FDI means a system whereby foreign companies can invest in 
Korea by merely notifying the authorities instead of requesting government approval. 
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agencies (January, 1991) and advertisement agencies (January, 1991) (MOF 1991a: 19). 
Lastly, foreigners were allowed to acquire land in Korea for business purposes when the 
'Law on Foreigners' Acquisition and Management of Land' was enacted in January 7, 
1994. In short, the critical changes in the FDI system in the early 1990s came mainly as 
a result of external pressures and engendered a weakening of the power of the Korean 
government. 
Enactment of the Foreign Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act in 1997 
On December 12, 1996, Korea became the 29th member of the OECD. The Korean 
government officially delivered its intention to join the OECD in April 1994, and the 
OECD then began to examine Korea's eligibility and level of liberalization. 
Consequently, the OECD demanded that, as a condition of membership, the Korean 
government implement several measures to liberalise the nation's FDI laws (MOFE 
1997: 547-548). In the eyes of the OECD, the major problem relating to Korean FDI 
regulations was the Korean government's definition of 'direct investment'. The OECD 
and the Korean government had different understandings of direct investment; while the 
OECD regarded long-term commercial foreign loans (LCFL) from a parent company to 
its subsidiary and Merger and Acquisition (M&A) transactions as direct investment, 
their view was not shared by Korea's FCIL (Wang 1997: 83). The Korean government 
had to modify the related regulations on FDI in accordance with the OECD's 
liberalization rules and this demand was reflected in the Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FIFCIA) in 1997. 
The 1997 law had a few important modifications compared with its predecessor. 
Firstly, the most notable change was to its name; the law was changed from the Foreign 
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Capital Inducement Law (FCIL) to the Foreign Investment and Foreign Capital 
Inducement Act (FIFCIA). While the FCIL did not deal exclusively with inward FDI, 
regarding it merely as one of many sources of foreign capital, the FIFCIA started to 
emphasize the distinction between foreign investment and foreign capital. This change 
symbolised the shift in domestic and global economic circumstances; the economic role 
of FDI was gaining importance while that of foreign loans began to diminish from the 
late 1980s. Secondly the revision acknowledged long-term foreign loans with maturities 
of more than five years offered by a parent company to its overseas subsidiary as FDI, 
in order to meet the OECD standards of direct investment. The acknowledgement of 
such loans as foreign investment was one of the liberalization measures relating to 
capital flows which had been controlled in the past. 123 Thirdly, the 1997 law permitted 
direct investment through M&A by treating the acquisition of existing stocks as direct 
investment, whereas the previous laws had regarded only the start-up investment in a 
business as direct investment. Most members of the OECD allowed free cross-border 
M&A and acknowledged the acquisition of controlling stocks as direct investment. 
When considering Korea's eligibility for membership in 1996, the issue of the 
liberalization of M&A activity was of the greatest concern to the OECD (Wang 1997: 
85). The Korean government took this issue into account and permitted M&A 
transactions as one form ofFDI under the revised 1997 law. 
From 1980 onwards, the FCIL and FIFCIA were revised in favour of MNCs. 
The shift of the bargaining power of the Korean government was reflected in the series 
123 According to the Article 19 of the 1997 law, the Korean government controlled the inflows of 
commercial foreign loans by requiring the approval of the Minister of Finance and Economy. Thus, as 
long as long-term loans with a maturity of more than five years provided by a parent company to its 
subsidiary were not acknowledged as FDI, the firms had to seek the approval of the Minister of Finance 
and Economy. Under the revision, such loans are regarded as FDI, so that they do not need to obtain 
approval from the Minister, and they also became eligible for a series of incentives including tax breaks. 
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of revisions to the country's FDI laws. After the 1980s, the capital of MNCs continued 
to grow and their influence also increased and in the 1980s and 1990s, the Korean 
government faced pressures from MNCs' home countries (especially the US) and 
international institutions (for example, the World Bank, OECD and WTO). Yet, the level 
of pressure was not so strong that it overwhelmed Korea's policy; it changed the extent 
to which the Korean government could manage and control the market. In fact, the 
Korean government opened the market gradually, so the changes would not have too 
sudden an impact on the economy. However, after the 1997 financial crisis, the Korean 
government was no longer able to control external pressures and was forced to submit 
to them. 
Market over State Phase (1998-2005) 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Korean government's bargaining power had 
gradually diminished, but after the 1997 financial crisis, that bargaining power was 
dramatically weakened. This event prompted the enactment of the Foreign Investment 
Promotion Act in 1998. The background to the legislation and the major changes 
contained in the FIPA are briefly reviewed in this section, after which the complete 
contents of the FIF A will be discussed. 
Enactment of the Foreign Investment Promotion Act in 1998 
Faced with the financial crisis in 1997, the Korean government requested bailout 
funding from the IMF and received a relief loan, in return for which the government 
pledged to implement the economic reform programs proposed by the IMF. As 
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mentioned in Chapter Three, the IMF program was very comprehensive, including the 
macro-economy, the structural reform of the chaebol, banks and labour and the opening 
up of the domestic market. Under the IMF program, the items related to the 1998 FIPA 
were as follows: firstly, the simplification of investment procedures; secondly, the 
opening of other financial sectors to foreigners, and permission for foreigners to own 
local banks; thirdly, the abolition of limitations on foreigners' ownership of stocks and 
real estate (IMF 1997, Shin and Chang 2003: 55). Those requirements related to areas 
that had previously remained closed despite continuous pressure from the US 
government in the early 1990s. Along with the pressure from the IMF, another factor 
playing a role in the establishment of the FIPA in 1998 was the support for neo-liberal 
ideals within the Kim Dae-Jung administration. As we have seen in Chapter Three, the 
Kim administration believed that the financial crisis resulted from moral hazard and the 
inefficiency of local banks and chaebol, thus financial and corporate sectors became the 
target of reforms. The government was looking for forces in the foreign companies to 
reform these sectors. Therefore, FDI was regarded as an instrument for accelerating 
reforms and investors were offered generous benefits. Therefore, the 1998 FIPA was the 
outcome of both external pressures and internal drive. 
The differences between the FIPA and previous laws are as follows. Firstly, the 
1998 FIPA dealt solely with FDI, while previous laws treated FDI as one element of 
foreign capital. The 1998 law demonstrated the growing importance of FDI in the 
Korean economy as perceived by the government. Secondly, the 1998 law stated 
explicitly in Article I that its purpose was to 'attract and promote foreign investment 
through support and facilitation'. While the purpose of previous laws had been to 
control foreign capital, the aim of the 1998 law was to attract and promote it as FDI 
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policies focused on promotion rather than regulation. Thirdly, the IMF program was 
reflected in the law; as the IMF had requested, the registration process for FDI was 
streamlined so that investment procedures were simplified. The restrictions on 
foreigners' ownership of stocks and real estate were abolished and the limitations on 
foreign ownership of Korean banks and financial firms were also eliminated (Crotty and 
Lee 2001: 37). In addition, under the pressure from the IMF, the liberalisation of M&A 
was expanded to include hostile takeovers in all sectors except for the defence industries 
(Weiss, 1999: 33). The hindrances to foreign investment that remained despite the 
gradualliberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s were eliminated all at once, reflecting the 
shrunken bargaining power of the government after the financial crisis. Throughout the 
MOS phase, the FIFA law changed several times, but all changes were minor 
adjustments to the 1998 FIPA. 124 
This section has examined the changes in basic laws on FDI from 1960 to 2005 
and has shown that FDI laws were the result of the interaction of external factors and 
internal motivations. The next section will look into the differences in the rights and 
duties of foreign companies in the SOM and MOS periods by comparing the FCIL in 
the SOM period and the FIPA in the MOS period. 
3. Comparison of FDI Laws in the SOM and MOS Phase 
This section will compare the bargaining outcomes in the SOM and MOS phases by 
124 In the revision of December, 2000, real estate and stocks were included in the means to invest for the 
foreign investment. In the next revision of December 2003, cash grants and rewards were included as 
incentives for foreigners and for people who contributed to attracting foreign investment, respectively. In 
the December 2004 revision, cash grant was expanded to include local governments as well as the central 
government. 
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comparing the laws of the two periods. The third and fourth chapters showed that the 
state's bargaining power in the SOM period was greater than that of MNCs, whereas 
MNCs' bargaining power in the MOS period surpassed that of the state. Now, the 
outcomes of these differences in bargaining power will be examined. This section will 
examine the regulations and incentives for foreign firms, which are prescribed under the 
laws of both the SOM and MOS periods. When the bargaining power of the MNCs is 
weaker than that of the host government, the MNCs will face more regulations and 
enjoy fewer incentives. Conversely, when the bargaining power of the MNCs is stronger 
than that of the host government, the situation will be reversed. Therefore, it is assumed 
that the regulations relating to foreign companies in the SOM period were stricter than 
those in the MOS period, while the incentives to foreign firms in the SOM period were 
fewer than those in the MOS period. This assumption is tested and proved through an 
analysis of the FDI regimes in both periods. 
The laws on FDI in the SOM period had changed as the 1960 FCIL was replaced 
by the 1966 FCIL and, finally, the 1973 FCIL. The first two laws, instituted in the early 
stages of the SOM period, demonstrated an ambiguous position towards FDI and the 
fact that the system was not well-established. However, the 1973 FCIL showed a firm 
government orientation with a coherent and systematic approach to FDI. Therefore, it is 
the 1973 law that perhaps best represents the characteristics of the Korean 
developmental state in the SOM period; thus the examination of FDI legislation in the 
SOM period will focus on the 1973 law. Other than the 1973 FCIL, the 'General 
Guidelines on Foreign Investment (GGFI)' played a decisive role in FDI inflow in the 
SOM period, providing the criteria for FDI approval from the EPB; for this reason the 
GGFI is also analysed in this section. As regards laws in the MOS period, the discussion 
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centres on the 1998 Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) which has established the 
basic systems for managing FDI since 1998. Even though the FIPA had undergone 
several revisions, its basic structures and foundations have not changed since its 
promulgation in 1998. The discussion of the MOS period principally focuses on the 
1998 FIPA, but the major revisions of the FIPA are also included. This section first 
discusses the regulations imposed on foreign companies and then examines the 
incentives that the government offered to foreign firms. 
Regulations relating to Foreign-Invested Companies 
State over Market phase 
If we categorise the type of government regulation according to the various stages of 
investment, FDI regulations imposed by the host government can be divided into three 
types: (1) restrictions on entry, (2) regulations on operation, and (3) limits on 
repatriation. In the SOM period, the Korean government had a rigid regulatory policy 
regarding FDI, controlling foreign companies at every stage of the investment process: 
when a company entered the market, during its operations, and when it withdrew from 
the market. 
Firstly, considering restrictions on entry, foreign compames were tightly 
controlled at the entry stage during the SOM period. There were two types of entry 
restrictions: the closure of certain types of business to foreign investment and 
complicated entry procedures. In terms of the extent of market opening, according to the 
EPB (1981: 70), the Korean government allowed investment in only 427 businesses 
(49.9 percent) out of a total of 855 in the SOM period, with the remaining 428 
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· b . I d C •• 125 Th f:' busmesses elng c ose to lorelgn Investment. e manu actunng sector showed a 
higher rate of openness (80 percent) while the service sector was less accessible to 
foreigners (with only 21.6 percent of businesses being open to FDI). In terms of entry 
procedures, a foreign investor was required to receive approval from the Minister of the 
EPB even if the target business belonged to a sector open to FDI. The criteria for the 
approval of foreign investment were specified in the 'General Guidelines on Foreign 
Investment (GGFI)'. The GGFI classified foreign investment projects into 'appropriate' 
and 'inappropriate', and allowed foreign investment only in those businesses in the 
'appropriate' category. 
The general rules regarding the appropriateness or inappropriateness of 
businesses included the following guidelines (MOF 1991a: 245-246). 'Appropriate 
businesses' included businesses requiring a massive scale of capital in which domestic 
companies could not yet compete due to their lack of capital and technology; export 
businesses in which domestic companies were facing difficulties in securing overseas 
markets; and business activities involving the exploitation and utilization of domestic 
resources. 'Inappropriate businesses' included businesses that might cause a blockage to 
the domestic supply and demand of raw materials and intermediate goods; businesses 
that might compete with local exporters in overseas markets; businesses aiming to 
supply funds to domestic firms; businesses making profits from land exploitation; and 
businesses forbidden or restricted under other laws. These approval criteria allowed the 
entry of those industries regarded as beneficial to the host economy but precluded 
projects that were perceived as harmful to domestic businesses. Furthermore, the GGFI 
regulated the size of investment, allowing only investments on a large scale but 
125 The categorization of business was made in accordance with the Korean system of industry 
categorization, which is called the Standard Classification of Korean Industries. 
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forbidding small investments; this decision was based on the belief that big companies 
with more ownership advantages would transfer more resources to a host country than 
small companies, thereby enhancing the quality of the investments. According to the 
general guidelines, the minimum amount of a foreign investment was USD 200,000, 
with lower minimum requirements of USD 100,000 for electronics and machinery 
industries and of USD 50,000 for businesses engaged exclusively in export activity 
using local resources. Lastly, M&A was not permitted in this period. All foreign 
investments were greenfield investment, introducing new capital to the Korean 
economy to build factories and new businesses. 
Secondly, two restrictions regulated the operation of foreign companIes: 
ownership requirements and performance requirements. After 1973, the Korean 
government permitted FDI on the condition that it took the form of a 50:50 joint venture 
with a domestic company. The government believed that a joint venture was more 
likely to result in the transfer the foreign company's firm-specific advantages to its 
Korean partners, thus enhancing the capabilities of Korean industry. However, MNCs 
with more firm-specific advantages tended to seek full ownership, enabling them to 
maintain management control of the company in order to exploit their firm-specific 
advantages and to in order to prevent local firms gaining access to their advantages 
(Gomes-Cas seres 1990). Therefore, in dealing with these types of MNCs, the Korean 
government needed to be more flexible or offer some attractive inducements to potential 
investors. In fact, the Korean government did not always adhere to the 50:50 principle 
but, in applying the policy, the government varied the ownership level of foreign firms 
according to their bargaining power. When it came to industries where the investors' 
bargaining power was weak, such as labour-intensive industries or industries targeting 
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the local market, foreign ownership was restricted to less than 50 percent. Foreign 
ownership levels of between 50 and 100 percent were permitted for export industries or 
import-substitution projects where the investors' bargaining power was stronger. Only 
MNCs with high technology and whose bargaining power was dominant were allowed 
100 percent ownership (MOF 1991a: 247-248). 
In addition to the restrictions on the level of foreign ownership, the government 
pursued the maximization of FDI benefits through various performance requirements 
for investment projects. According to Article 6 of the 1973 law, the Minister of the EPB 
had the authority to attach additional conditions when approving foreign investment in 
Korea. Thus, the Korean government imposed various performance requirements on 
foreign companies when they entered the Korean market, with the magnitude of the 
requirements being determined by the company's bargaining power. These requirements 
included mandatory export requirements, local sourcing requirements, technology 
transfer requirements, a requirement to assist Korean companies to access export 
markets, and requirements regarding conditions of divestiture such that the foreign 
investor's stake would be transferred to its Korean partner at a specified point in the 
future (EPB 1981: 28-31; Mardon 1990: 127). 
Lastly, there were restrictions on withdrawal and repatriation. The 1973 law did 
not specifically regulate the repatriation of dividends, but it did contain certain 
restrictions on the withdrawal of investments. According to Article 12 of the 1973 law, 
when foreign investors wanted to sell their stake in a business or their stocks, both the 
buyer and seller were required to notify the Minister of the EPB, and the money from 
the transaction could not be repatriated overseas until two years after the new domestic 
business had begun operations. This aimed was to prevent short-term speculative 
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foreign investment and instead attract long-term strategic investment. Regarding the 
repatriation, the Minister of the EPB had the authority to order foreign investors remit 
funds in stages (rather than all at once) in order to minimize the impact of sudden 
outflows of foreign currency from the national economy. Thus, in the SOM period, the 
Korean state controlled every stage of a foreign business's life including entry~ 
operation, and withdrawal in order to maximise the benefits accruing from the 
introduction of foreign capital. 
Market over State phase 
In contrast to the situation in the SOM phase, controls on foreign investment were 
eliminated in all areas of business activities in the MOS period, Firstly, in terms of 
regulations on foreign entry, the previous restrictions on the entry of certain types of 
businesses almost disappeared. Article 4 in the 1998 FIPA clearly stated that in principle 
foreigners could undertake any business, with only a few exceptions. These exceptions 
included cases that threatened national security and public order; cases that were might 
have a negative impact on public sanitation and environmental conservation; and cases 
that violated national laws and ordinances. Thus, except for these few restrictions, all 
investors could enter and conduct business freely in Korea. While the laws in the SOM 
period did not allow foreign company entry into Korea except for when they were 
investing in specific businesses selected by the government, the law in the MOS period 
opened the entire Korean market to foreign investors (in principle). As of August 2004, 
the ratio of market openness in Korea stood at 99.8 percent, with almost all industries 
open to foreign . investors except for a few businesses such as television and radio 
broadcasting. Thus, to all intents and purposes, restrictions on the entry of foreign 
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businesses can be said to have been removed (Yoon et al. 2005: 76). 
Secondly, regarding the entry process, the 1998 law simplified procedures for 
investing in Korea by requesting that foreign companies and institutions simply notify 
the authorities of their investments. In contrast, the 1973 law had required government 
approval for foreign investors to invest in Korea, with the authorities screening and 
negotiating all investment projects. The notification system was originally introduced in 
response to a demand from the US government in the 1989 trade talks; following the 
agreements reached at these talks, the Korean government replaced the approval system 
with the notification system when the FelL was revised in 1991 and 1992. Nevertheless, 
before the establishment of the 1998 FIPA, there was still some room for government 
intervention, as officials were given the authority to either approve on or demand further 
conditions of the foreign investors (Yoon et al. 2005: 176). After the financial crisis in 
1997, the IMF demanded more streamlined investment processes, and the Korean 
government reflected those demands in the 1998 law. In the earlier notification system, 
the government reviewed the underlying substance of the applications for investments; 
however, after 1998, the government examined applications only to determine whether 
or not they satisfied formal requirements. Under the 1998 law, officials had to accept all 
applications for foreign investment regardless of their substance as long as there were 
no formal problems in the applications. 
The law in the SOM period also imposed restrictions on the entry of foreign 
businesses according to the scale of investment, with a general minimum level of USD 
200,000; in contrast, the law in the MOS period lowered this minimum to KRW 50 
million (approximately USD 50,000 in 2005 exchange rate). Moreover, the law in the 
MOS period allowed M&A transactions except in the case of defence industries, while 
2.J:6 
the 1973 law permitted only greenfield investments and forbade mergers with or 
takeovers of existing companies by foreign investors. M&A investment was liberalised 
for the first time under the 1997 FIFCIA. The 1997 law still required foreign acquirers 
to obtain agreement from the board of directors of the company being merged with or 
acquired, in effect legalizing only friendly M&A transactions. However, after the 
financial crisis in 1997, the Kim administration allowed even hostile takeovers by 
foreign investors by removing the conditional provisions. The 1998 law opened FDI to 
almost all businesses, streamlined the FDI entry process, and allowed foreign 
investment through M&A transactions. Thus it is fair to say that the 1998 law 
eliminated most entry barriers to FDI. 
Thirdly, in terms of regulations on operation, the 1998 law did not stipulate any 
performance requirements or restrictions on ownership level. In fact, those two 
regulations had been removed during the transition period; the 1983 revision of the 
FCIL removed regulations relating to foreign ownership levels and eliminated the 
obligatory joint venture provisions of the FDI system that had operated in the SOM 
period, allowing ownership levels to be decided by agreement among the parties 
involved (Gang 1995: 55). As mentioned above, the performance requirements were 
abolished in response to US demands in the 1989 trade talks; following the agreements 
reached at those negotiations, the Korean government revoked all the performance 
requirements attached to investment approvals in January 1990, and deleted the 
provisions of conditional approval for foreign investment in the 1991 revision of the 
FCIL (Kim et a12002: 102). 
Lastly, the provisions on withdrawal and remittance in the 1973 law were 
eliminated in the 1983 revision and thus are not found in the 1998 law. Instead, Article 3 
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of the 1998 law established a provision on the protection of foreign investment to 
guarantee foreign investors' overseas remittances. The provision reduced risks for 
foreign-invested companies by allowing remittances even in the event of natural 
disasters or war and proscribed any discrimination against foreigners in terms of 
business operation and taxation. MNCs in the MOS period were virtually free of 
governmental regulation after the removal of restrictions on entry, operation, and 
withdrawal. In summary, the strong bargaining power of the state in the SOM period 
and of MNCs in the MOS period resulted in strong governmental regulations in the 
SOM period and higher levels of freedom in the MOS period respectively. We have seen 
the comparison of duties of the foreign companies between the two periods and now we 
turn our attention to the rights of the foreign companies. 
Incentives for Foreign-Invested Companies 
State over Market phase 
Currently, many host governments offer various types of incentives to attract foreign 
companies, such as tax breaks, subsidies, location grants, and various types of 
assistance in the establishment and operation of their businesses. However, in the SOM 
period, the Korean government officially only offered tax breaks to investors. Foreign-
invested companies in the SOM period were exempt from income tax, corporate tax, 
and property tax in proportion to their investment ratio for five years after embarking on 
their business, and they were eligible for a 50 percent tax credit for the following three 
years. All companies approved for foreign investment were eligible for such tax credits; 
in addition, foreign investors were exempt from tariffs on the import of capital goods. 
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For investors in export-oriented industries, the government provided the same benefits 
as those given to local export companies including export financing, capital assistance 
for equipment investment, and tax exemption for importing raw materials and 
machinery (EPB 1981: 28). Although tax exemptions were granted to all foreign-
invested companies in the SOM period, this did not mean that tax incentives were 
generally applied regardless of business type; the companies had already been screened 
and selected, so only the eligible ones would receive tax benefits through the approval 
process. 
Apart from the tax benefits, the government in the SOM period sometimes 
offered unconventional incentives to foreign companies when it considered them 
indispensable to the economy. These were not stipulated in law but instead decided by 
negotiation on a case-by-case basis. In the SOM period, Korea was a poor and unstable 
country, making it an unattractive location to foreign investors. Despite this 
unfavourable situation, the Korean government succeeded in attracting some MNCs that 
it regarded as indispensable for its industrialisation, keeping their ownership levels low 
and attaching various performance requirements (see the case of Dow Chemicals in 
Chapter Four). This was possible because the government had enough capacity to make 
attractive offers; it guaranteed a minimum profitability and reduced the risks involved in 
projects by providing access to the domestic market, protection of their local markets 
and price controls on their raw materials and products (Mardon 1990: 128). Although 
the FCIL in the SOM period only prescribed tax benefits as incentives for foreign-
invested companies, the government had the flexibility and extensive capacity to grant 
powerful inducements to foreign bargaining partners during negotiations. This 
flexibility and capacity was the source of the state's strong bargaining power in the 
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SOM period. 
Market over State phase 
In the MOS period, the regulations on foreign companies were lifted and the incentives 
for foreign firms became more diversified. Besides the existing tax benefits, cash grant 
systems and location support for foreign businesses were added in the MOS period. 
Moreover, the 1998 law expanded tax breaks for foreign firms to seven years on 
corporate tax, income tax, property tax, and tariffs, compared with five years under the 
1973 law. 126 The cash grant system was added in 2003, providing assistance in cash for 
certain uses for foreign investors who satisfied specific requirements. The location 
support system was designed to provide land to foreign companies at an affordable price, 
allowing foreign companies to receive a 50-100 percent reduction in their rent according 
to their size and type of business. Furthermore, the FIPA specified the establishment of 
both Invest Korea and the Ombudsman's Office to assist foreign businesses in Korea. 
Moreover, many special zones including economic free zones (EFZ), foreign-invested 
zones (FIZ), and free trade zones (FTZ) were created and managed to attract foreign 
investment, providing favourable business circumstances to foreign companies. In the 
MOS period, the types and scale of support systems for foreign-invested companies 
became larger and more diversified than in the SOM period. However, most of the 
support systems mentioned above were established only for foreign investors, and were 
not made available to domestic companies. 
126 Tax exemptions were not given to all foreign companies but were offered on a selective basis to 
businesses in possession of high technology. Since the 1973 law had granted tax credits to all companies 
approved for foreign investment, the selective tax exemptions under the 1998 law could be regarded as a 
diminution of investment incentives. However, in view of the fact that the 1973 law required the 
government to approve entry into the Korean market on a selective basis while the 1998 law opened the 
market to all types of FDI without a screening process, it is fair to say that both systems offered 
incentives on a selective basis. 
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In fact, in the MOS period, many thought that the provision of benefits to 
foreign companies was excessive, arousing concerns of reverse discrimination against 
domestic companies. Indeed, examples of reverse discrimination can be found in the 
FIPA and many other laws during the MOS period (SERI 2005). Firstly, the' Banking 
Act' forbade any individual to own more than a 10 percent stake in a bank in order to 
prevent it from being used as a private vault. Any person wishing to possess a stake of 
more than 10 percent was required to obtain the approval of the Financial Supervisory 
Committee (Article 15, Banking Act). This provision prevented the concentration of 
management control of financial institutions within a small group. In addition, 
businesses not operating in the financial sector were prohibited from acquiring a stake 
of more than four percent in a bank, virtually preventing domestic industrial capital 
from owning any bank in Korea (Section 2, Article 16, Banking Act). After the financial 
crisis, however, the principle was bent to be lenient to foreign capital; as a result, private 
equity funds, which were not qualified to be major stakeholders under the Banking Act, 
were allowed to become majority shareholders of domestic banks (Chun et aI, 2005: 20-
22). 127 Secondly, according to the 'Act on the Promotion of Cooperation among 
Conglomerates and Small-and-Medium-sized Enterprise (APCCSME),' domestic 
conglomerates were banned from entering business areas that were specifically 
designated for SMEs in order to protect small- and medium-sized businesses (Article 30, 
APCCSME). However, the provisions of the act allowed exceptions when it came to 
foreign-invested companies in foreign investment zones and free economic zones. That 
:27 ~nder Article 50f the enforcement ordinance of the Banking Act, a foreigner mu',t be (j tinanci;ll 
InstItution in ba~ki~g, ~ec~ities, or insurance in order to be a majority shareholder with over J () percent 
of a local fina~cIaI mstltutlO? Carlyl: and Lone Star, which ac~u~red Koram Bank and Kc)re(J Exchant~(; 
Bank, respectIvely, were prIvate eqUIty funds that were not ehglble to be mf.1j(Jr ',han;h()I(kr~, ()f 11)1,i:l1 
banks. T~erefore, there was a suspicion that the Korean government hf.1d dj')Tt;!~(Jr(krJ HIt; law lrJ (lfIJt;r tl) 
alIow theIr acquisitions (Chun et. al. 2005: 20). 
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IS, foreign conglomerates were allowed to invest In SME-specific areas to which 
domestic conglomerates were denied entry. 
Thirdly, the 'Act on the Designation and Management of Free Economic Zones 
(ADMFEZ)' stipulated that foreign-invested companies in economic free zones were 
exempt from many rules and laws such as the 'Labour Standard Act' and the 'Planning 
Law on Metropolitan Area Improvement.' F or example, unlike local companies, 
foreign-invested companies in FEZs were exempt from the obligation to hire disabled 
workers or citizens of merit. 128 The preferential treatment to foreign companies in the 
MOS period was overly generous, resulting in reverse discrimination against domestic 
companies. In summary, the strong bargaining power of the state in the SOM period 
resulted in the low level of incentives offered to foreign investors, while the strong 
bargaining power of MNCs in the MOS period produced a higher level of incentives to 
foreign companies, and even resulted in reverse discrimination against domestic 
companIes. 
4. Conclusion 
This section examined the results of bargaining relations between a host government 
and MNCs by analysing FDI laws in Korea. The first part showed that FDI laws were 
the outcome of interactions among the Korean government, its bargaining partners 
(MNCs), MNCs' home countries, and other international institutions by examining the 
changes in FDI laws and causes of the changes. The second part looked into how the 
128 Under Korean law, businesses are obliged to hire a certain number of the disabled or citizens of merit. 
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bargaining power of the host government in the SOM and MOS periods was reflected in 
FDI laws in Korea. Regulations were maximized and incentives were minimized in the 
SOM period when the bargaining power of the state was strong, while regulations were 
minimized and incentives were maximized in the MOS period when the state's 
bargaining power was weak. 
In this chapter, an analysis of FDI laws showed how differences in bargaining 
power produced different outcomes. The chapter examined the changes in the FDI 
regulation system since the 1960s and compared the rights and duties of foreign 
companies in the SOM and MOS periods. It was found that the strong bargaining power 
in the SOM period allowed the government to impose its will on foreign companies, 
while weak bargaining power in the MOS period made the government bow to foreign 
forces. 
In the SOM period, when its bargaining power was strong, the state selectively 
allowed FDI to serve national goals but in the MOS period, when its bargaining power 
was weak, the government had to open industrial sectors under pressure from MN Cs, 
thereby losing its capacity to select FDI. During the latter period, therefore, the 
quantitative increase in FDI did not guarantee the qualitative growth of FDI. 
We have argued that investment by an MNC can create either benefits or costs to 
the host economy. An MNC locates in another country not for the sake of the country 
but for its own business purposes, which means that the entry of a foreign company can 
not always guarantee beneficial results to a host economy. It is obvious that the benefits 
to a host country do not arise just from the entry of foreign companies, but include the 
effects resulting from that entry. Therefore, a host country's main promotional efforts 
should concentrate not just on attracting foreign companies but on achieving beneficial 
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effects from their investment and it is the government's bargaining power that can 
influence the effects of the foreign companies. In this chapter we have seen that a host 
country's bargaining power can have a profound effect on whether the host country 
gains or loses from foreign investment. This is the reason that bargaining power has to 
be emphasised. 
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Conclusion: Toward the State and Market Era 
At the beginning of this thesis, we posed two general questions: (1) as globalisation 
deepens, will states necessarily be dominated by expanding foreign capital? (2) Are 
there any ways to enhance the bargaining power of states vis-a-vis MNCs? In order to 
seek the answers to these questions, we selected Korea as our subject and examined the 
state-MNC relationship in Korea between 1962 and 2005. We explored the Korean case 
with three sub-questions in mind, which were: (1) how has the Korean state bargaining 
power vis-a-vis MNCs changed? (2) What factors have weakened or strengthened its 
bargaining power? (3) What are the consequences of the fluctuations in the state's 
bargaining power? The answers for these sub-questions will determine the ultimate 
answer to the general questions posed above. 
The study started with the realistic assumptions that MNCs have variable effects 
on host economies and that MNCs are fundamentally national firms doing business 
internationally. This assessment of MNCs reflects the need for government efforts to 
increase their bargaining power in order to maximise the positive effects of FDI while 
minimising its negative effects. Based on this view, we developed our theoretical 
framework, the Neo Bargaining Model (NBM) and applied it to the Korean 
developmental state in the State over Market (SOM) period and the Korean neo-liberal 
state in the Market over State (MOS) period, using the contrast to draw implications 
about the relationship between the nature of the state and its bargaining power. Through 
the application of the NBM to the case of Korea, we reach the answers to the three sub-
questions: (1) the bargaining power of the Korean state diminished constantly over time 
(Chapters Three and Four). (2) The Korean state's bargaining power has been affected 
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by internal factors (the decline of the developmental state) and external factors (the 
progress of globalisation) (Chapters Three and Four). (3) The bargaining power of the 
state affects its bargaining outcomes (Chapter Five). 
Now, based on these findings, we further progress the discussion to suggest 
future implications. According to finding (3), the strong bargaining power in the SOM 
period produced advantageous results while the weak bargaining power in the MOS 
period brought about the more detrimental effects of the MNCs on the economy. In the 
SOM period, the strong bargaining power of the state made the foreign companies serve 
the goal of the state, whereas in the MOS period the weak bargaining power of the state 
forced it to serve foreign firms' interests. This finding generates the proposition (1) that 
'the state must have strong bargaining power in order to enhance the national economy 
and minimise the negative effects imparted by MNCs '. 
Next, the subsequent problem is how to ensure the state has strong bargaining 
power. The solution to this problem is drawn from finding (2). In the SOM period, the 
strong bargaining power of the state stemmed from its developmentalism and the 
absence of globalisation pressures; in the MOS period, the weak bargaining power of 
the state was conversely caused by the loss of developmentalism and the increasing 
intrusion of globalisation pressures, as we have seen in Chapters Three and Four. 
Therefore, two common factors of the causes of the fluctuation in bargaining power of 
the state are drawn from finding (2): developmental state and globalisation. This finding 
generates the second proposition, that 'stronger developmentalism and weaker global 
pressures tend to create stronger bargaining power of states vis-a-vis MNCs '. However, 
as globalisation has deepened and impacted negatively on states, so the restoration of 
the developmental state remains a possible means for the state to enhance its bargaining 
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power vis-a.-vis MNCs. 
However, the old developmental state of the SOM period is not a future option 
for the current Korean state because it is no longer viable. The circumstance under 
which the old developmental state was created had changed according to the shifts of 
international and domestic political economy: the growth of domestic and foreign 
capital, the disappearance of the Cold War competition, and the establishment of 
international institutions, much of which can be represented as globalisation. In this era 
of globalisation, a new fonn of developmental state is required that is fit for 
globalisation. 
The idea of a new fonn of developmental state in the globalisation era might 
provoke serious criticism from the proponents of globalisation, many of whom 
anticipate the extinction of the nation-state (hyperglobalists) or the erosion of the power 
of the state (transfonnationalists).129 They argue that global integration has seriously 
undermined the state's power to manage the economy and rendered every effort by 
governments to create national wealth unviable (Ohmae 1995, Strange 1996). However, 
we agree with the idea that globalisation not only constrains the power of states but also 
enables the active role of states (Weiss 2003). As factors of production such as human 
and material capital become more mobile, the immobile factor of land - namely, 
location - becomes more crucial for production. In other words, as the openness of the 
global economy increases, the capacity of governments to manage their economies 
becomes even more important than before (Shin and Chang 2003: 125). The growth of 
so-called 'footloose' business not only risks the hollowing out of domestic industries, 
but it also offers opportunities that enable economies to become prosperous by 
129 For a general explanation of the globalisation debate, see Held et al (1999: introduction), Weiss (2003: 
chapter one) and Hobson and Ramesh (2002: 5-8). 
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capturing mobile resources. This critical situation prompts governments to take action to 
reduce the risks, uncertainties and vulnerabilities, which Weiss (2005) called the state-
augmenting effects of globalisation. Therefore, we argue that as globalisation progresses, 
the role of states becomes more important, and a new form of developmental state needs 
to emerge in order successfully to cope with the challenges of globalisation. 
The new developmental state will have many differences from its older 
counterpart. The old developmental state had six main components: (1) determined 
developmental elites, (2) relative state autonomy, (3) powerful, competent, and insulated 
state bureaucracy, (4) weak and subordinated civil society, (5) dominating economic 
interests, and (6) suppression of civil rights (Leftwich, 1995). Among these essential 
factors of the old developmental state, components (1), (2) and (3) can be retained in the 
new developmental state; the other elements (4), (5) and (6) have to be discarded 
because those elements are no longer applicable in the new global era. Above all, the 
most important difference is the point that the new developmental state is the creature of 
the globalisation era while the old developmental state was motivated by 
industrialisation. Therefore, globalisation defines the form of the new developmental 
state and the new developmental state is in tum characterised by the nature of 
globalisation. It is generally agreed that the most distinctive attribute of globalisation is 
the growth of MNCs and the intemationalisation of production and finance. MNCs are 
major carriers of economic globalisation and central to the globalisation process 
(Strange 1991, Gilpin 2001: 22, Held et a11999: 236). Accordingly, in the globalisation 
era, dealing with global capital becomes the essential task for the new deyelopmental 
state whereas controlling domestic capital was the key issue of the old developmental 
state. 
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In the industrialisation era, the SOM period in Korea, the old developmental 
state could dominate domestic capital because domestic capital was relatively weak: it 
was dependent on the resource distribution of the state (such as subsidiaries), and was 
locked in domestic locations. The state, for its part, had been active in promoting, 
persuading, pushing and bullying in the direction of industrialisation (Leftwich 1995: 
417). The state operated in a position of superiority, enabling it to deploy the tactic of 
'carrot and stick '. In addition, the state could maintain a strong position in relation to 
foreign capital because its goal of industrialisation could be achieved by using domestic 
capital, thus lowering its level of stakes in the age with few globalisation pressures. 
However, in the globalisation era, the state faced strong pressures of 
globalisation and the powerful force of foreign capital. In the MOS period, the nature of 
foreign capital is completely different from that of domestic capital in the SOM period. 
Foreign capital is generally big (sometimes bigger than a nation state), it is less 
interested in states' resource distribution activities, and it has high mobility. These 
factors offer greater power to MNCs, which consequently brought about the Market 
over State (MOS) era in Korea. In the MOS period, we saw the increasing power of 
MNCs and the shrinking power of the state. Not only was the state unable to control 
MNCs, but MNCs forced the state to 'race to the bottom', maximising incentives to 
MNCs and minimising the regulation on them, as we have seen in Chapter Five. The 
state lost its 'stick' and only had a rather unappealing' carrot', 
The era that we believe might unfold in the future might be characterised as one 
of 'State and Market' (SAM): both actors, state and foreign capital, are strong and 
cooperate with one other while maintaining their autonomy, essentially a 'flexible state~ 
stage (Weiss and Hobson 1995; cf. Evans 1995). In this era, the nature of the 
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relationship between states and MNCs changes to become more collaborative because 
of the balance of power between the two actors. In this stage, the power of both actors 
are sufficiently equal not to allow one party's unilateral dominance of the other party 
and both parties have enough resources to generate mutual demand leading to 
interdependence. This interdependence will direct them to a collective sum game rather 
than the zero-sum game of previous ages. The wealth of states can be enhanced through 
the linkages with MNCs, and also the interest of MNCs can be satisfied by the benefits 
of certain locations. In the SAM era, although the state does not have a 'stick', it does 
have a very tempting 'carrot', which every MNC wants to have. 
This does not mean that the state plunges into the 'race to the bottom' by 
increasing incentives (such as cutting corporate taxes or offering grants). In fact, 
incentives are not regarded as significant determinants of MNCs' location decisions at 
the national level (Stopford 1994: 66-67, Loewendhal 2001: 57-58). Instead, 
fundamental location- specific advantages - such as the creation of knowledge based 
assets, good physical infrastructures and agglomeration economies - are more 
important to making the country attractive in the globalisation era (UNCTAD 1998, 
Dunning 2000, 2002, Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2002). Therefore, in this context the 
'carrot' represents the fundamental attractiveness of a country. These efforts to enhance 
attractiveness have two effects; on the one hand, they contribute to increasing the host 
countries' bargaining power; the more MNCs want to enter, the more bargaining power 
the state has. On the other hand, they enrich the business environment, which MNCs 
can benefit from. Therefore, the bargaining power of the state in SAM has a cooperative 
perspective and ailTIS for a collective-sum game. This is, paradoxically, one aspect of the 
way to increase the bargaining power of the state by enhancing the level of resources. In 
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addition, the state is able to increase its bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs by using the 
leverage of the stakes and constraints dimensions. The following suggests how the 
Korean state's power can be enhanced - specifically by managing the three dimensions 
of the N eo Bargaining Model. In order to reach the SAM period, the bargaining power 
of the state, which had diminished in the MOS era, has to be increased. The NBM had 
been used as a tool for analysing past state-MNC relations. Here we shall use it to 
provide insights regarding what efforts the state should make to increase its bargaining 
power in the future. 
Figure 7.1 Korean Government's Policy for State and Market Era 
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Applying the NBM to the Korean case, the policy aim of the Korean government in 
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terms of its bargaining power can be illustrated (see Figure 7.1). As we argued in 
Chapter Three, the bargaining power of the Korean government has continuously 
declined since the SOM period (point SOM, located close to point S, the strongest 
point) and it is now represented at point MOS (located close to point W, the weakest 
point). The low level of bargaining power in the MOS phase derives from the medium 
level of resources, the high level of stakes and constraints that the government faced in 
the MOS period. In order to increase its bargaining power, the Korean government has 
to make efforts not only to increase its resource level but also to reduce the level of 
stakes and constraints. If such efforts were successful, the government's bargaining 
position would change from point MOS to point SAM, which is close to point S, the 
strongest point, in Figure 7.1. 
In order to identify the necessary measures for the enhancement of resources and 
the reduction of both stakes and constraints, some preliminary processes are required. 
First, the three factors are deconstructed into their constituent elements because each 
element requires different measures: bargaining resources are broken down into 
location-specific advantages; bargaining stakes into commitments and alternatives; and 
constraints into both internal constraints (from internal interest groups and the capacities 
of bargaining institutions) and external constraints (from other states and supranational 
institutions). Next, these elements are re-grouped into three categories, ranked by the 
degree to which they can be attained by the government: (1) elements where the 
government can anticipate results in the short term; (2) elements for which the 
government has to take a long-term approach; and (3) elements that are not under the 
Korean government's control. 
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Short-Term Elements 
There are two elements for which the government can take measures immediately and 
can anticipate results in the short term: bargaining institutions and alternatives. In the 
case of the capability of bargaining agencies, the government's bargaining power would 
increase if the government made efforts to enhance the capacity of its bargaining 
agencies. Compared with other issues, the measures relating to bargaining institutions 
are relatively straightforward and can be implemented immediately. As we have seen, a 
government agency's bargaining power increases if the agency holds a dominant 
position in the task (Encarnation and Wells 1985a: 52). However, the power of Korean 
bargaining institutions has continuously declined from the strength wielded by the EPB 
to the weaker powers of the MOF and, most recently, KOTRA (see Chapter Three). As 
the commitment of the Korean government to FDI increases, the capacity of the 
bargaining body must be enhanced in line with the increased commitment; in Korea, 
however, the opposite has occurred. Improving the capacity of the bargaining agency is 
essential if the Korean government is to strengthen its bargaining power. 
Secondly, the government could increase its bargaining power by augmenting its 
alternatives, which can be divided into two groups: those that can be regulated within a 
relatively short period of time and those that require more long-term action. Clearly. 
only the former is applicable as an immediate or short-term measure. Alternatives can 
be enhanced in the short term by expanding the number of potential investors; if a host 
country can ensure that potential investors are competing for entry, the bargaining 
power of that government improves. In the long-term view, a host country must develop 
its fundamental investment environment to make it more attractive for businesses, 
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thereby increasing the number of potential investors. In the short term, potential 
investors can be attracted by strengthening marketing activities. The investment 
promotion agency (IPA) plays a crucial role in this respect. Positive and effective IPA 
activity with regard to image building and the marketing of a country enables a 
government to nurture a growing number of potential investors, which in turn augments 
the alternatives available to a country. However, as we have seen in Chapter Three, 
KOTRA, the official investment promotion agency in Korea, faces many limitations in 
terms of playing a strong and effective promotion role in the current situation in Korea. 
Moreover, promotion functions are not centralised, even though KOTRA is designated 
as the official agency, and are dispersed both within and outside the government, which 
decreases the effectiveness of these activities even further. Clearly, the government's 
bargaining power would increase if these marketing activities were centralised and 
coordinated, thereby succeeding in the creation of a positive and constructive image of 
Korea as an investment location. 
Long-Term Elements 
The second category consists of elements which require a long-term approach but 
whose improvement is within the capacity of the government. This category includes 
location-specific advantages (LSA), long-term alternatives, and internal constraints. 
Firstly, the government's bargaining power will be stronger if it has more LSAs. 
Generally. the overall performance of the economy strongly affects market seekers and, 
given this, economic growth is the most important factor in an investor~s decision. 
Therefore, for market seekers, deliberate, strategic and systematic efforts on the part of 
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the government to enhance the nation's LSA's are relatively unimportant when the 
economy is performing well. In contrast, production-location seekers are more sensitive 
to these efforts because they are directly affected by the quality of the factors of 
production and infrastructure. 
Currently, Korea attracts mainly market seekers and is relatively unattractive for 
production location seekers (see Chapters Three and Five). As we argued above, Korea 
no longer has a late developer's advantages, nor does it provide the creative productivity 
advantages of developed countries. It therefore has little attractiveness both to cost-
cautious investors and efficiency-cautious investors. This situation is prompting 
domestic manufacturers to relocate their production bases to Southeast Asia or China in 
search of low-cost labour, or to the United States or the European Union to establish 
efficient manufacturing bases and access the knowledge assets of these countries 
(Cherry 2001). Given the circumstances underlying the exodus of Korean manufacturers 
from Korea, it is unreasonable to expect foreign companies to establish their production 
bases in Korea. In order to keep Korean companies at home while attracting more 
foreign companies to Korea, it is necessary to offer the quality factors of production that 
companies demand. Due to the loss of the advantages of a late developer, Korea's 
production resources have to be transformed into more knowledge- and efficiency-based 
resources by cultivating human capital, fostering knowledge assets, and designing 
production clusters. Such reforms could cause resistance from interest groups or local 
governments because the changes may conflict with existing interests; therefore. a 
strong state is necessary to carry out such goals in the face of resistance from individual 
and short-tern interests. 
Secondly, governments can enhance their bargaining power by developing long-
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tenn alternatives, specifically, domestic capabilities that may lessen the need for FDI, 
such as domestic capital and technologies. As we argued in Chapter Three, one of the 
reasons for the high stakes in the MOS period was the low level of technology. After the 
crisis was over, the government's demand for foreign capital was relatively low while 
the demand for technology was still high. The Korean economy currently still has a 
relatively high-cost production structure and technological progress is increasingly 
important. The development of domestic technological capabilities is not only an 
alternative to FDI that increases government bargaining power; it is also a crucial factor 
for sustaining long-term growth (Chang 2003: 256). Therefore, the government should 
focus its efforts to strengthening the educational system and R&D activities. If 
technological and scientific progress can produce innovative ideas and products, 
domestic businesses will be further encouraged to invest in these initiatives. This will 
lead not only to increased alternatives for the government but also to higher levels of 
FDI activity in the economy. 
Thirdly, if the government can reduce the pressures from internal interest groups, 
it can increase its bargaining power vis-iI-vis MNCs. One of the most serious problems 
that foreign investors faced in Korea was that of labour disputes (Park 2003). Increasing 
pressure from organised labour is one of the major factors that can weaken the 
government's bargaining power; conversely, its capacity to coordinate conflicts and 
maintain industrial peace is essential to increasing its bargaining power. Furthermore. 
the government must maintain a close relationship not only with labour but also with 
business in order to create cooperative networks. Strong links with labour and business 
endow the government with strong bargaining power by reducing internal constraints. 
The authoritarian regime during the SOM period advanced the position of capital but 
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oppressed labour; in the transition period, business freed itself from state control while 
labour aggressively challenged the government, thus weakening state bargaining power. 
In the MOS period, the government launched the Tripartite Agreement among labour, 
capital and government, as an institution to coordinate their conflicting interests. It 
remains in question whether the institution will continue, but undoubtedly, the 
successful management of social forces will surely increase the host country's 
bargaining power. 
Uncontrollable Elements 
The final category includes those elements that operate outside the government's control. 
For the Korean government, international economic variables are beyond its control; 
thus, the external pressures from the home countries of potential investors or 
supranational organizations are regarded as independent variables that affect the 
government but are beyond its control. The capacity of the government in managing 
external pressures can vary, but the external pressures themselves are not manageable 
by the Korean state. 
Most of the above measures to augment the government's bargaining power demand a 
strong state - a new form of developmental state in the SAM era. A weak state without 
autonomy and capacity could hardly be expected to achieve such aims as creating 
stronger bargaining agencies, improving marketing capacity. reforming economic 
structures, developing domestic industrial capacities, and coordinating internal conflicts. 
Most tasks demand an active role of a competent government that can set long-term 
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policy goals, orchestrate its resources, and overcome challenges. Some of the tasks may 
be achieved by neo-liberal means, as the cases of successful Anglo-American 
economies show. However, Korea's circumstances are different from these forerunners 
and, as we pointed out in Chapter One, the same strategies cannot be applied to 
latecomers. Korea is still in the process of catching up and needs the critical role of the 
state to overcome its disadvantages. 
However, it is hard to expect the current Korean government, which seems to 
lack the capacities to cope with the above matters, to play an active role in the market. 
Many neo-liberal proponents argue that the Korean state is no longer a developmental 
state (Pirie 2005; Jayasuriya 2005; Maswood 2002), and even the advocates of the 
developmental state concede that the Korean system has been transformed into an 
Anglo-American economic system (Shin and Chang 2003). Clearly, the role of the 
government has been seriously reduced since the crisis. The present government appears 
to be unwilling to call itself a developmental state and the remains of the developmental 
state are ostensibly fading away. However, as long as the key features of the 
developmental state are regarded as part of what defines the state's vision of economic 
development, so the Korean state can regain its developmental characteristics (Weiss 
2003a, Thurbon and Weiss 2006, Woo-Cumings 2001). 
MOCIE (2003, 2006) has still made regular formal announcements on industrial 
policy, and industrial policy is still popular among government officials. In contrast with 
Anglo-American regulatory systems, in which the legislature is more influential than 
the executive in economic decisions, the Korean administration still exerts actual power 
in economic affairs. Many official government documents use phrases such as 'the 
promotion of growth engine industries for the next generation'. which clearly illustrates 
268 
the state's perceptions of its role in the market. The Korean government still regards 
itself as an entrepreneur who dares to attempt risky investments for the future. The 
mentality of the developmental state is still alive almost everywhere in the government. 
Therefore, it is a latent developmental state rather than a dismantling developmental 
state. Although this study can not anticipate whether this latent nature will be 
reactivated or not and can not provide the way to arouse the latent nature of current 
Korean state to action, the findings of the study suggest future directions for the state, 
urging it to revive its past developmentalism of the industrialisation era in a new form in 
the era of globalisation, that is, SAM. 
In this thesis, we have initially sought to answer the two questions by examining the 
relationship between state and market in Korea. Now we can finally reach the answers 
by synthesising all the discussions in this thesis. 
(l) As globalisation deepens, will states necessarily be dominated by expanding 
foreign capital? No, states will not necessarily be dominated by global capital. 
Following proposition (2), that 'stronger developmentalism and weaker globalisation 
pressure tend to create stronger bargaining power of states vis-it-vis MNCs', 
developmental ism and globalisation are the causes of the change in bargaining power of 
the state. Therefore, if a state can build new form of developmental state while facing 
globalisation pressures, the state can maintain its bargaining power and can avoid being 
dominated by global capital. Whether states are dominated by MNCs and whether 
globalisation becomes an opportunity or a threat to states is contingent on the capacity 
of states and this critical task in the global era provokes the need for the emergence of a 
new form of developmental state. In addition, if a state can build a new form of 
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developmental state, which has strong bargaining power vis-a.-vis MNCs~ the state can 
take advantage of globalisation according to proposition (l) that • the state must have 
strong bargaining power in order to attain more beneficial effects and less harmful 
consequences from the MNCs '. 
(2) Are there any ways to enhance the bargaining power of states vis-a.-vis MNCs? 
Yes, there are and the Neo-Bargaining Model can illustrate them. The above policy 
prescription for the State and Market era in Korea shows one example of a direction 
wherein the state makes positive efforts to increase its bargaining power. This study's 
Neo Bargaining Model produces a fresh framework for analysing state-MNC relations. 
Using the NBM, policy makers can identify their bargaining setting and evaluate their 
strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis MNCs. Furthermore, this model provides useful 
insights regarding what efforts the state should make to increase its bargaining power. 
Whether states facing the challenges of globalisation become victors or victims is 
dependent on the states' capacity, and this thesis shows one way for the state to become 
a victor in the global era. 
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Appendices 
(Table A) National Accounts 1962-2005 
GOP Per capita GNI GDPGrowth Gross Domestic Gross Saving Saving GDP Deflator Growth Rate of 
Rate Inveslment Ratio Ratio Investment Ratio Increase Rate Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 
.wo ,."n-.... lJsn OL OL ot. ot. ot. ot. 
1!162 2.3 87 2.1 11.8 11.0 25.5 18.4 28.7 
1963 2.7 100 9.1 17.0 14.4 48.0 29.3 27.3 
1964 2.9 103 9.7 13.2 14.0 62.2 30.0 -9.3 
1965 3.0 105 5.7 14.1 13.2 49.1 6.2 27.1 
1966 3.6 125 12.2 20;4 16.6 54.8 14.5 59.5 
1967 4.2 142 5.9 20.9 15.4 51.9 15.6 22.6 
1968 5.2 169 11.3 24.9 18.2 58.3 16.1 37.4 
1969 6.5 210 13.8 27.9 21.4 65.3 14.8 24.8 
1970 7.8 254 8.8 24.8 17.8 64.7 15.6 1.0 
1971 9.5 290 8.2 25.2 15.7 71.7 14.5 4.6 
1972 10.7 320 4.5 21.4 17.0 62.3 17.9 1.7 
1973 13.7 401 12.0 25.4 22.8 79.1 15.4 26.2 
. 1974 19.2 554 7.2 31.8 21.9 89.6 33.2 14.1 
1975 21.5 602 5.9 28.8 19.5 69.0 26.0 8.9 
1976 29.6 818 10.6 26.6 25.3 . 67.6 24.5 20.7 
IBn 37.9 1.034 10.0 28.6 28.7 95.2 16.7 30.2 
1978 53.1 1.431 9.3 32.7 31.0 100.5 23.4 34.4 
1979 63.3 1.676 6.8 36.0 30.2 94.8 20.1 10.0 
1980 63.8 1.645 -1.5 31.9 24.7 84.0 24.0 -10.7 
1981 71.4 1.800 6.2 29.9 24.6 77.3 18.2 -3.1 
1982 76.2 1.893 7.3 28.9 25.7 82.3 6.7 11.1 
1983 84.5 2.076 10.8 29.2 29.0 88.8 6.2 17.4 
1984 93.2 2.257 8.1 30.6 31.0 99.5 6.0 10.9 
1985 96.6 2.309 6.8 30.4 31.2 101.4 4.8 5.3 
1986 111.3 2.643 10.6 29.4 34.9 102.7 5.5 11.5 
1987 140.0 3.321 11.1 30.3 38.4 118.8 5.6 18.1 
1988 187.7 4.435 10.6 31.2 40.4 126.7 7.6 13.6 
1989 230.5 5.418 6.7 33.8 37.6 129.3 5.7 16.0 
1990 263.7 6.147 9.2 37.4 37.5 111.0 10.5 25.4 
1991 308.1 7.105 9.4 39.7 37.6 100.4 10.7 14.4 
1992 329.8 7.527 5.9 37.2 36.8 94.8 7.6 0.6 
1993 362.1 8.177 6.1 35.7 36.7 98.8 6.4 7.7 
1994 423.3 9.459 8.5 36.9 36.3 102.9 7.8 12.5 
1995 517.3 11.432 9.2 37.8 36.3 98.3 7.4 13.1 
1996 557.4 12.197 7.0 39.0 35.5 96.0 5.1 8.4 
1997 516.4 11.176 4.7 36.1 35.5 90.8 4.6 -2.3 
1998 346.1 7.355 -6.9 25.2 37.5 98.4 5.8 
-22.9 
1999 
, 
445.2 9.438 9.5 29.3 35.3 148.9 -0.1 
8.3 
2000 511.8 10.841 8.5 31.1 33.7 120.3 0.7 12.2 
2001 482.0 10.160 3.8 29.4 31.7 108.4 3.5 
-0.2 
2002 546.9 11.499 7.0 29.1 31.3 107.9 2.8 
6.6 
2003 608.0 12.720 3.1 30.1 32.8 107.3 2.7 
4.0 
2004 680.9 14.193 30.4 34.9 109.0 
2.7 2.1 
4.7 
.1IIM 7117 .. :\:\0 114 7 -II.' 2.l 16:101 4n 30.2 
(Note) The definition of 'saving-investment ratio (SIR), is the ratio of gross savmgs (GS) to gross capl~ fonnatlon 
(~F). However, prior to 1970 the SIR was the ratio of gross national saving (GNS) to GeF. ~e GNS ~Ifferes from 
OS an that ONS does not include "net current transfers from the rest of the world" whereas GS mclude thiS figure. 
Sourte: BOK 2006 
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(Table B) Balance of Payments 1962-2005 
Export Export Increase I~ Import Increase Balance of Goods Current Account Capital Account 
Rate Rate 
llnil l~n~iIIi"" OL II~nmillinn OL IIC1.nmillin.. II~n millinn II~nmillinn 
ilIA? 55 341 4?? 334 -367 -56 19 
1963 87 58.4 560 32.8 -473 -143 107 
1964 119 37.2 404 -27.8 -285 -26 27 
1965 175 47.1 463 14.6 -288 9 7 
1966 250 43.0 716 54.6 -466 -103 197 
1967 320 27.9 996 39.1 -676 -192 280 
1968 455 42.2 1.463 46.8 -1.007 -440 501 
1969 623 36.7 1.824 24.7 -1.201 -549 718 
1970 835 34.2 1.984 8.8 -1.149 -623 662 
1971 1.068 27.8 2.394 20.7 -1.327 -848 815 
1972 1.624 52.1 2.522 5.3 -898 -371 500 
1973 3.225 98.6 4.240 68.1 -1.015 -309 630 
1974 4.460 38.3 6.852 61.6 -2.391 -2.023 2.010 
1975 5.081 13.9 7.274 6.2 -2.193 -1.887 2.501 
1976 7.715 51.8 8.774 20.6 -1.058 -314 1.973 
1977 10.046 30.2 10.811 23.2 -764 12 1.365 
1978 12.711 26.5 14.972 38.5 -2.261 -1.085 767 
1979 15.055 18.4 20.339 35.8 -5.283 -4.151 5.251 
1980 17.505 16.3 22.292 9.6 -4.787 -5.312 6.522 
1981 21.254 21.4 26.131 17.2 -4.878 -4.607 5.313 
1982 21.853 2.8 24.251 -7.2 -2.397 -2.551 3.935 
1983 24.445 11.9 26.192 8.0 -1.747 -1.524 2.391 
1984 29.245 19.6 30.631 16.9 -1.387 -1.293 3.059 
1985 30.283 3.6 31.136 1.6 -853 -795 1.633 
1986 34.714 14.6 31.584 1.4 3.131 4.709 -4.217 
1987 47.281 36.2 41.020 29.9 6.261 10.058 -10.369 
1988 60.696 28.4 51.811 26.3 8.886 14.505 -5.068 
1989 62.377 2.8 61.465 18.6 912 5.344 -2.886 
1990 65.016 4.2 69.844 13.6 -4.828 -2.014 2.564 
1991 71.870 10.5 81.525 16.7 -9.655 -8.417 6.412 
1992 76.632 6.6 81.775 0.3 -5.144 -4.095 6.587 
1993 82.236 7.3 83.800 2.5 -1.564 821 2.741 
1994 96.013 16.8 102.348 22.1 -6.335 -4.024 10.295 
1995 125.058 30.3 135.119 32.0 -10.061 -8.665 16.786 
1996 129.715 3.7 150.339 11.3 -20.624 -23.120 23.327 
1997 136.164 5.0 144.616 -3.8 -8.452 -8.287 1.314 
1998 132.313 
-2.8 93.282 -35.5 39.031 40.371 -3.197 
1999 143.685 8.6 119.752 28.4 23.933 24.522 2.040 
2000 172.268 19.9 160.481 34.0 11.786 12.251 12.110 
2001 150.439 
-12.7 141.098 -12.1 9.341 8.033 -3.391 
2002 162.471 8.0 152.126 7.8 10.344 5.394 6.252 
2003 193.817 19.3 178.827 17.6 14.991 11.950 13.909 
2004 253.845 31.0 224.463 25.5 29.382 28.174 8.319 
2M!; ?AAA1Q 120 ?S1 ?AA 11'; .4 ?"l1An 
11'; ,,"J;Q 4889 
Source: KITA 2006, BOK 2006 
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(Table C) Inflows and Outflows of Capital 1962-2005 
Public lalli Conmen:iaILaIII Bank Loan InwardFDI Inward FDI OutwardFDI OuIwardFDI 
(Arrival Basis) (NoIification Basis) (Actual Basis) (NoIificaIion Basis) 
I" 11Iln ....... 111m miIIiftn II~n m1linn II~n miIIinn II~n millinn 111m .nIIinn IL<:Orr6In 
1AR' a 0 0 ?::l 4 - -
1983 43 24 0 0 6 - -
1964 12 12 0 0 1 - -
1966 5 35 0 0 22 - -
1966 73 110 0 0 16 - -
1967 106 124 0 98 28 - -
1968 70 268 40 5 26 3 3 
1969 139 410 30 3 49 2 4 
1970 115 367 25 9 76 5 8 
1971 303 345 90 1 40 4 1 
1972 324 326 20 518 122 2 2 
1973 403 461 49 5 318 5 14 
1974 385 603 218 2 153 12 36 
1975 477 801 200 6 207 14 12 
1978 713 839 131 5 79 7 18 
1977 636 1.241 300 143 84 21 18 
1978 817 1.913 328 181 149 34 38 
1979 1.089 1.578 1.522 195 191 21 98 
1980 1.518 1.402 440 131 143 17 21 
1981 1.705 1.247 2.196 152 153 28 294 
1982 1.877 914 1.619 129 189 101 818 
1983 1.494 973 2.121 123 269 109 83 
1984 1.424 858 3.121 193 422 50 195 
1985 1.024 964 3.880 236 532 113 219 
1986 880 1.620 1.180 477 355 183 364 
1987 1.124 1.558 777 626 1.063 410 367 
1988 891 988 9 894 1.284 216 1.636 
1989 475 860 208 812 1.090 571 974 
1990 418 30 1.344 895 803 963 2.274 
1991 430 0 4.077 1.178 1.396 1.111 1.800 
1992 486 150 2.114 807 895 1.217 2.027 
1993 417 0 2.662 731 1.044 1.264 1.997 
1994 734 0 3.565 997 1.317 2.304 3.631 
1995 462 38 6.906 1.361 1.948 3.102 5.223 
1996 535 108 8.940 2.321 3.203 4.458 7.019 
1997 5.396 1.302 19.419 3.091 6.971 3.677 8.105 
1998 5.170 1.914 15.779 5.308 8.853 4.794 5.837 
1999 3.814 12.161 5.133 10.851 15.531 3.329 5.111 
2000 769 
-
7.196 10.237 15.221 5.073 6.091 
2001 225 
-
2.168 5.046 11.286 5.171 6.390 
2002 153 
-
7.218 3.804 9.093 3.708 6.348 
2003 80 
-
8.234 5.125 6.469 4.059 5.925 
2004 0 
-
10.806 9.260 12.786 6.003 8.063 
20M 
- - -
Q 1\10; ii 1;A'l Ar.tVI Q1M 
Source: Lee 2005, Invest Korea 2006, KEIB 2006 
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(Table D) Foreign Debts and Foreign Exchange 1962-2005 
TCIIII Fonign Debt External Assets Net Foreign Debt Total Foreign Debt Net Foreign Debt 10 Foreign Exchange Exchange Rae 
10 GOP GOP Reserves 
'w 111m rnHIinn IIl:n mi"inn IIl:n mi"inn IlL IlL Ilcm mimnn KRWnl~n 
111B' R9 - - 39 - 169 130 
1963 157 - - 5.8 - 131 130 
1964 177 - - 6.1 - 136 256 
1965 206 - - 6.9 - 146 272 
1966 392 - - 10.9 - 245 271 
1967 645 - - 15.4 - 357 275 
1966 1.199 - - 23.1 - 391 282 
1969 1.800 - - 27.7 - 553 304 
1970 2.245 675 1.570 27.7 19.4 610 317 
1971 2.922 - - 30.8 - 568 373 
1972 3.587 
- -
33.5 - 740 399 
1973 4.257 1.497 2.760 31.1 20.1 1.094 398 
1974 5.933 
- -
30.9 - 1.056 484 
1975 8.443 1.693 6.750 39.3 31.4 1.550 484 
1978 10.520 
- - 35.5 - 2.961 484 
1977 12.649 5.049 7.600 33.4 20.1 4.306 484 
1978 14.823 5.286 9.537 37.9 18.0 4.937 484 
1979 20.287 6.294 13.993 32.0 22.1 5.708 484 
1980 27.170 7.539 19.631 42.6 30.8 6.571 660 
1981 32.433 7.963 24.470 45.4 34.3 6.891 701 
1982 37.083 8.778 28.305 48.7 37.1 6.984 749 
1983 40.378 9.504 30.874 47.8 36.5 6.910 796 
1984 43.053 10.108 32.945 46.2 35.3 7.650 827 
1985 46.762 11.222 35.540 48.4 36.8 7.749 890 
1986 44.510 12.008 32.502 40.0 29.2 7.955 861 
1987 35.568 13.156 22.412 25.4 16.0 9.193 792 
1988 31.150 23.874 7.276 16.6 3.9 12.378 684 
1989 29.368 26.356 3.012 12.7 1.3 15.245 680 
1990 31.700 26.847 4.853 12.0 1.8 14.822 716 
1991 39.135 27.186 11.949 12.7 3.9 13.733 761 
1992 42.819 31.724 11.095 13.0 3.4 17.154 768 
1993 43.870 35.996 7.874 12.1 2.2 20.262 808 
1994 89.831 71.560 18.271 21.2 4.3 25.673 789 
1995 119.800 94.380 25.420 23.2 4.9 32.712 775 
1996 157.363 111.120 46.243 28.2 8.3 33.237 844 
1997 174.230 106.148 68.082 33.7 13.2 20.405 1.415 
1998 163.807 129.275 34.532 17.3 10.0 52.041 1.208 
1999 152.937 146.095 6.842 34.4 1.5 74.055 1.145 
2000 148.119 166.954 -18.835 28.9 3.7 96.198 1.260 
2001 128.687 163.415 -34.728 26.7 -7.2 102.821 1.326 
2002 141.470 183.468 -42.018 25.9 -7.7 121.413 1.200 
2003 157.552 229.250 -71.698 25.9 -11.6 155.352 1.198 
2004 172.260 284.196 -111.936 25.3 -16.5 199066 1.044 
2tJM 
-
-
-
'10~1 1013 
- -
Source: Lee 2005, BOK 2006 
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(fable E) Human Resources 1962-2005 
fPqdaIan EcononicaIy Active Unell1Jloyment Rae Real Wage Increase Labour Dispute Seconday Tdry Enrolment 
PopIAlion Rille Enrolment 
... n-..- TlInllurvi OL IlL nllmhAr OL IlL 
1M' ?A 513 - - -1 , - - -
1983 27.262 8.230 8.1 -7.9 - - -
1964 27.984 8.341 7.7 ~.5 - - -
1965 28.705 8.754 7.3 0.8 - 69.1 32.3 
1966 29.436 8.957 7.1 10.9 117 67.8 28.3 
1967 30.131 9.180 6.1 10.9 130 70.2 30.8 
1968 30.838 9.541 5.0 14.1 135 68.6 29.5 
1969 31.544 9.747 4.7 19.3 94 70.2 26.2 
1970 32.241 10.062 4.4 9.3 90 70.1 26.9 
1971 32.883 10.407 4.4 2.4 109 69.4 28.3 
1972 33.505 10.865 4.5 2.1 
-
67.2 29.0 
1973 34.103 11.389 3.9 14.3 
-
77.6 28.1 
1974 34.692 11.900 4.0 8.8 
-
67.6 26.5 
1975 35.281 12.193 4.1 1.5 133 74.7 25.8 
1976 35.849 12.911 3.9 16.8 110 75.5 23.8 
1977 36.412 13.316 3.8 19.9 96 76.8 21.4 
1978 36.969 13.849 3.2 18.0 102 79.3 22.0 
1979 37.534 14.142 3.8 8.5 105 81.0 25.9 
1980 38.124 14.431 5.2 4.1 407 84.5 27.2 
1981 38.723 14.983 4.5 0.5 186 86.5 35.3 
1962 39.326 15.032 4.4 7.9 88 86.9 37.7 
1983 39.910 15.118 4.1 7.4 98 89.4 38.3 
1984 40.406 14.997 3.8 6.3 113 89.7 37.8 
1985 40.806 15.592 4.0 6.6 265 90.7 36.4 
1986 41.214 16.116 3.8 5.8 276 91.2 36.4 
1987 41.622 16.873 3.1 6.9 3.749 91.9 36.7 
1988 42.031 17.305 2.5 7.8 1.878 93.5 35.0 
1989 42.449 18.023 2.6 14.6 1.616 94.6 35.2 
1990 42.869 18.539 2.4 9.4 322 95.7 33.2 
1991 43.296 19.109 2.4 7.5 234 97.5 33.2 
1992 43.748 19.499 2.5 8.5 235 98.8 34.3 
1993 44.195 19.806 2.9 7.0 144 98.2 38.4 
1994 44.642 20.353 2.5 6.1 121 98.8 45.3 
1995 45.093 20.845 2.1 6.4 88 98.5 51.4 
1996 45.525 21.288 2.0 6.7 B5 98.9 54.9 
1997 45.954 21.782 2.6 2.5 78 99.4 60.1 
1998 45.287 21.428 7.0 -9.3 129 99.4 83.5 
1999 46.617 21.666 6.3 11.2 198 99.4 666 
2000 47.008 22.134 4.4 5.6 250 99.6 680 
2001 47.354 22.471 4.0 1.5 235 99.6 70.5 
2002 47.615 22.921 3.3 8.6 322 996 74.2 
2003 47.849 22.957 3.6 5.7 320 •. 7 797 
2004 48.082 23.417 3.7 - ~ •. 7 
807 
')!WI: .a~ 241"'" "',,; - - - -
Source: Kim and Sung 2005, BOK 2005, BOK 2006 
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